Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Four cases raised the ultimate question of whether driving under the influence (“DUI”) was a lesser included offense of either vehicular assault-DUI or vehicular homicide-DUI, and presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to address: (1) whether a double jeopardy claim could be raised for the first time on direct appeal; and (2) what test courts should apply in evaluating whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another. The Supreme Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims could be raised for the first time on appeal, and appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. With respect to the applicable test for determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another, the Supreme Court reiterated that the “strict elements test” was the proper test, but the Court acknowledged that prior iterations of that test had arguably been inconsistent. An offense is a lesser included offense of another offense if the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the greater offense, such that the lesser offense contains only elements that are also included in the elements of the greater offense. Applying this test to the cases here, the Court concluded that DUI was a lesser included offense of both vehicular assault-DUI and vehicular homicide-DUI, and thus, defendants’ DUI convictions had to merge into the greater offenses. The Court further concluded that in not merging such offenses, the trial courts here plainly erred and that reversal of the multiplicitous convictions was therefore required. View "Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case presented two issues for the Supreme Court’s review: (1) whether a double jeopardy claim can be raised for the first time on appeal; and (2) whether defendant William Costello Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced with a deadly weapon (“aggravated robbery-menaced victim”) and menacing amounted to plain error. In light of the Court’s opinion in “Reyna-Abarca v. Colorado,” (2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___),the Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that in the circumstances presented here, any error that might have occurred when the trial court entered judgment on Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced victim and menacing was not obvious and thus, did not amount to plain error. Accordingly, although the Court concluded that the division erred in declining to review Scott’s unpreserved double jeopardy claim, the Court nonetheless affirmed the judgment. View "Scott v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jessica Ferrer and her companion, Kathryn Winslow, were injured when a taxicab driven by Tesfamariam Okbamicael struck them as they crossed a street in Denver. Okbamicael worked for Colorado Cab Company (“Yellow Cab”), which owned the taxicab. Ferrer brought this suit against Okbamicael and Yellow Cab (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Okbamicael was negligent and that Yellow Cab was vicariously liable for his negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Ferrer also alleged that Yellow Cab was liable for her injuries suffered in the collision under theories of direct negligence (negligence as a common carrier) and negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, and training. In an amended answer to the complaint, Yellow Cab admitted that Okbamicael was an employee acting within the course and scope of his employment with Yellow Cab at the time of the accident. Defendants then moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, seeking to dismiss Ferrer’s direct negligence claims against Yellow Cab. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion, applying the rule from “McHaffie v. Bunch,” (891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995)), that an employer’s admission of vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence bars a plaintiff’s direct negligence claims against the employer. Agreeing with the trial court’s application of the “McHaffie” rule, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Ferrer" on Justia Law

This case centered on the design and construction of a single-family residence in Pitkin County, Colorado. Heritage Builders, Inc. (“Heritage”) was retained as the general contractor by the original owners of the property, Karen and Courtney Lord. Pitkin County issued a certificate of occupancy for the home in September 2006. In November 2011, Richard Goodman purchased the property from the Lords. Then, sometime between March and June 2012, Goodman discovered the alleged construction defects in the home. Goodman gave Heritage informal notice of his construction defect claims in July 2013. In this original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the statute of repose in section 13-80-104(1)(a), C.R.S. (2016), barred a general contractor’s third-party claims brought in response to a homeowner’s claim for construction defects discovered in the fifth or sixth year following substantial completion of an improvement to real property. The Court held that such claims were timely, irrespective of both the two-year statute of limitations in section 13-80-102, C.R.S. (2016), and the six-year statute of repose in section 13-80-104(1)(a), so long as they are brought at any time before the ninety-day timeframe outlined in section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II). View "In re Goodman v. Heritage Builders" on Justia Law

Petitioner-defendant Farouk Nagi appealed the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction and sentence for sexual assault on a child by one of a position of trust. He also argued the district court lacked sufficient grounds to justify ordering a competency evaluation, and that the period during which petitioner was under observation or examination was not properly excluded from the calculation of time within which trial was statutorily required. The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s assertion he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. In the absence of any specific assertion or indication in the record that the district court’s order was entered in bad faith, for the purpose of circumventing the statutory speedy trial mandate or otherwise depriving the defendant of a protected interest, rather than from any concern for the defendant’s rights or the integrity of the judicial process, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Nagi v. California" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Colorado had jurisdiction to award benefits for out-of-state work-related injuries and to impose a statutorily penalty on an employer under 8-41-204, C.R.S. (2016), when the employer was not a citizen of Colorado, and had no offices or operations in Colorado, only that the employer hired a Colorado citizen within the state. The Supreme Court held that on the facts presented here, Colorado lacked personal jurisdiction over the employer. View "Youngquist v. Miner" on Justia Law

In 2006, respondent Ruben Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend. His girlfriend’s three children were seated in the backseat along with R.L., his girlfriend’s friend. The girlfriend and Ramos began to argue when Ramos turned his attention to R.L., where he punched R.L. in the face several times. Blood from Ramos’ hand ended up on R.L.’s jacket and baseball cap. Ramos’ theory of defense was that he had not struck R.L. and the blood stains were from waiving his hand around. This case, as in “Venalonzo v. Colorado,” presented for the Supreme Court’s review an issue of lay and expert testimony. Specifically, this case required the Court to resolve one issue: whether an ordinary person would be able to differentiate reliably between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Applying the test announced in “Venalonzo,” the Court held that an ordinary person would not be able to testify reliably about the difference between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Therefore, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by not qualifying a police detective’s blood testimony as expert testimony. View "Colorado v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The defendant in this case, Daniela Molina, used the last name and social security number (SSN) of another person, D.K., to obtain an apartment lease and employment. A jury later convicted Molina of two counts of identity theft and three counts of forgery. Molina appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove all the elements of identity theft and forgery. The court of appeals held: (1) the State was required to prove that Molina knew she had stolen the information of a real person; (2) there was insufficient evidence that Molina knew the last name and SSN she used belonged to a real person; (3) vacated her identity theft convictions; and (4) affirmed her forgery convictions. The court of appeals declined to reach Molina’s argument that the term “thing of value” in the identity theft statute only pertained to items with pecuniary value and therefore neither employment nor an apartment lease were “thing[s]of value.” The Supreme Court concluded: (1) the State needed to show that Molina knew she stole another person’s information; (2) there was sufficient evidence to show Molina knew she stole a real person’s information; and (3) an apartment lease and employment qualified as “things of value.” View "Colorado v. Molina" on Justia Law

Trooper Joseph Ynostroza stopped John Cox for driving in the left lane. During the stop, the Trooper observed several factors that led him to suspect that there might be evidence of illegal activity in the trunk of the vehicle, including the fact that his canine alerted to the odor of drugs in the trunk. The Trooper opened the trunk where he found, among other things, two white trash bags with multiple sealed packages of marijuana. The trial court granted Cox’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that it is “unreasonable for an officer to rely on the alert from a canine trained to detect any amount of marijuana, including legal amounts.” The trial court concluded that, based on the remaining factors to be considered, the Trooper did not have probable cause to search the trunk. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Trooper had probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. View "Colorado v. Cox" on Justia Law

In 2006, respondent Ruben Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend. His girlfriend’s three children were seated in the backseat along with R.L., his girlfriend’s friend. The girlfriend and Ramos began to argue when Ramos turned his attention to R.L., where he punched R.L. in the face several times. Blood from Ramos’ hand ended up on R.L.’s jacket and baseball cap. Ramos’ theory of defense was that he had not struck R.L. and the blood stains were from waiving his hand around. This case, as in “Venalonzo v. Colorado,” presented for the Supreme Court’s review an issue of lay and expert testimony. Specifically, this case required the Court to resolve one issue: whether an ordinary person would be able to differentiate reliably between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Applying the test announced in “Venalonzo,” the Court held that an ordinary person would not be able to testify reliably about the difference between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Therefore, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by not qualifying a police detective’s blood testimony as expert testimony. View "Venalonzo v. Colorado" on Justia Law