Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On July 4, 2004, the Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority (the “Authority”) diverted 0.716 cubic feet per second (“cfs”) of water at the Edwards Drinking Water Facility on the Eagle River and delivered that water to the Cordillera area for beneficial use. On that date, there was a “free river” (meaning that there was no call on the Colorado or Eagle Rivers). Of the water diverted and delivered to Cordillera, the Authority allocated 0.47 cfs to its Eagle River Diversion Point No. 2 conditional water right (the “Junior Eagle River Right”) and filed an application to make this amount absolute. The State and Division Engineers opposed the application, asserting that the Authority could not make its Junior Eagle River Right absolute when it owned another, more senior conditional water right, the SCR Diversion Point No. 1 water right (the “Senior Lake Creek Right”), decreed for the same claimed beneficial uses at the same location and for diversion at the same point. The water court agreed with the Engineers, and held that the July 4, 2004, diversion had to be allocated first to the Senior Lake Creek Right. The Authority appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that where there was no evidence of waste, hoarding, or other mischief, and no injury to the rights of other water users, the owner of a portfolio of water rights was entitled to select which of its different, in-priority conditional water rights it wished to first divert and make absolute. "[T]he portfolio owner must live with its choice. Since it has chosen to make a portion of the Junior Eagle River Right absolute, the Authority may not now divert and use the Senior Lake Creek Right unless it demonstrates that it needs that water right in addition to the Junior Eagle River Right." View "Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s initial attorneys were discharged for cause and replaced by successor counsel. Initial counsel had been hired on a contingency basis. When discharged, they asserted a lien against any settlement or judgment entered in the underlying action and in favor of the plaintiff. The underlying action was subsequently settled, and successor counsel filed a motion to void the lien. Initial counsel responded by moving to strike successor counsel’s motion and to compel arbitration, based on an arbitration clause contained in initial counsel’s contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff. The district court ultimately concluded that this dispute was between the lawyers, and thus, the arbitration clause contained in initial counsel’s contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff did not apply. The court then determined that initial counsel was not entitled to fees because it had been discharged for cause, and under the express terms of the contingent fee agreement, it had forfeited the right to those fees. Initial counsel appealed, and a division of the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that successor counsel’s motion to void the lien at issue was properly filed in the underlying action and that the underlying action was a “proper civil action.” In light of this determination, the Supreme court further concluded that the lien dispute was between initial and successor counsel and that therefore, the matter: (1) was not subject to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in initial counsel’s contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff; and (2) was properly before the district court. View "Martinez v. Mintz" on Justia Law

In June 2010, the Denver City Council passed Ordinance 333, replacing the old zoning code but including an exception that allowed any person seeking to “erect or alter structures” to apply for a permit under the old zoning code until December 30, 2010. On December 30, 2010, Open Door Ministries (Open Door) applied for a use permit under the old code to change the use of 740 Clarkson Street to provide transitional housing for people in need. The Denver Zoning Authority (“the DZA”) issued the rooming and boarding permit. Open Door then purchased the property for $700,000; made improvements to the property; and began providing room and board to people at risk of becoming homeless. Several months later, Jesse Lipschuetz, who owned a home adjacent to 740 Clarkson, sought administrative review of the DZA’s decision to issue the permit. He argued that Open Door did not meet the exception under Ordinance 333 because the permit was for a change of use, not to “erect or alter” a structure. The DZA defended its decision to issue the permit, explaining that it had consistently interpreted the exception to allow parties to seek any kind of permit under the old zoning code until December30, 2010. The trial court concluded that the City should not have issued the permit, but stayed its order to revoke the permit until Open Door’s cross-claims were resolved. Several months later, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Open Door on the cross-claims. On appeal, Lipschuetz argued that Open Door’s cross-claims against the City were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because they “could lie in tort.” Because Open Door did not notify the City prior to filing its cross-claims, Lipschuetz argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the cross-claims. The court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals failed to consider whether, at the time of filing, Open Door had suffered an injury that would subject its cross-claims to the Act. The Court concluded that the Act did not apply to Open Door’s request for prospective relief to prevent future injury. View "Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz" on Justia Law

On October 27, 2015,one week before the November 3 regular biennial school board election for Mesa County Valley School District 51, three registered electors of the school district, Kent Carson, James “Gil” Tisue, and Dale Pass, filed a verified petition with the district court, challenging as wrongful the certification of one of the candidates. Carson and two other electors of Mesa County Valley School District 51 sought certiorari review of the district court’s order denying their requested relief concerning a school board election. After review, the Supreme Court found that C.R.S. section 1-1-113(1) did not permit a challenge to an election official’s certification of a candidate to the ballot, solely on the basis of the certified candidate’s qualification, once the period permitted by section 1-4-501(3), C.R.S. (2015), for challenging the qualification of the candidate directly has expired. Therefore the district court's ruling was affirmed. View "Carson v. Reiner" on Justia Law

After a jury found that the environment of M.L.’s four children was injurious to their welfare, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve two points: (1)whether determination of a child’s status as dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision of Article 3 of the Colorado Children’s Code must take into account each parent’s actions or failures to act; and (2)whether findings as to parental fault are required to adjudicate a child dependent or neglected under the same provision. Mother (“M.L.”) appealed a jury’s finding that the environment for four of her five children was injurious to their welfare and the trial court’s resulting adjudication. Relying on "Troxel v. Granville," (530 U.S. 57 (2000)), the court of appeals agreed with M.L. and reversed the trial court’s adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Troxel’s due process requirements did not necessitate that the State prove that both parents lack the availability, ability, and willingness to provide reasonable parental care before a child may be adjudicated dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision. Additionally, the Court held that neither the plain language of the dependency or neglect statute nor Troxel required the State to prove parental fault when adjudicating a child dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision. Hence, the trial court’s jury instructions were consistent with the plain language of the statute and the trial court did not err when it allowed the jury to find that the children’s environment was injurious to their welfare without first requiring the jury to make findings of parental fault. View "Colorado in the Interest of J.G." on Justia Law

In this case, E.S.V. (“mother”) challenged the termination of her parental rights with respect to C.E.M. and M.F.M. (“children”). Mother’s treatment plan included as one of its objectives that mother would “demonstrate appropriate protective capacities to ensure her children’s safety.” To achieve this objective, mother was required to report to her caseworker and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) any contact that she had with the children’s abusive father. The district court found that mother had failed to report numerous contacts with father and was unable or unwilling to internalize the safety concerns at which the treatment plan was directed, despite the efforts of many professionals and treatment providers. The court therefore terminated mother’s parental rights as to the children. Mother appealed this ruling, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence amply supported the district court’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "E.S.V. v. Colorado in the Interest of C.E.M." on Justia Law

Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers) petitioned for review of a court of appeals judgment affirming the district court’s denial of its motion for directed verdict in a lawsuit brought by its insured, Stresscon Corporation. Stresscon, a subcontracting concrete company, filed suit against Travelers, alleging, among other things, that Travelers acted in bad faith, unreasonably delaying or denying its claim for covered insurance benefits; and Stresscon sought awards of two times the covered benefits along with fees and costs, as prescribed by statute. Stresscon’s claims for relief arose from a serious construction accident in July 2007, which was caused by a crane operator employed by a company that was itself a subcontractor of Stresscon. Stresscon’s general contractor, Mortenson, sought damages from Stresscon, asserting Stresson’s contractual liability for the resulting construction delays, and Stresscon in turn sought indemnification from Travelers. Although there was much dispute over the factual and legal import of Travelers’ reservation of rights and other of its communications with both Stresscon and Mortenson concerning Mortenson’s claim, there was no dispute that by December 31, 2008, Travelers had not paid the damages asserted by Mortenson. The appellate court rejected Travelers’ contention that the no-voluntary-payments clause of their insurance contract relieved it of any obligation to indemnify Stresscon for payments Stresscon had made without its consent. Instead, the court of appeals found that the Colorato Supreme Court's opinion in "Friedland v. Travelers Indemnity Co.," (105 P.3d 639 (2005)) had effectively overruled prior “no voluntary payments” jurisprudence to the contrary and given Stresscon a similar opportunity. The Supreme Court found that its adoption of a notice-prejudice rule in "Friedland" did not overrule any existing “no voluntary payments” jurisprudence in Colorado, and because the Court declined to extend notice-prejudice reasoning in Friedland to Stresscon’s voluntary payments, made in the face of the no-voluntary-payments clause of its insurance contract with Travelers, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed. View "Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Stresscon Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Branch Banking and Trust Company (BB&T) petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review of whether a deed of trust securing a promissory note was a negotiable instrument under Colorado's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court of appeals held that deeds of trust were not negotiable instruments within the meaning of Article 3 of the UCC, therefore BB&T was not a holder in due course with respect to the deed at issue here. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds: in this case, the deed and other documents were forged. "[E]ven assuming a deed of trust qualifies as a negotiable instrument, holder-in-due-course status does not preclude a purported maker from asserting a forgery defense." Here, the purported maker possessed a valid forgery defense, his negligence didn't contribute to the forgery, and he did not ratify the forged documents. As such, the Court did not reach the issue of negotiability under Article 3 of the UCC. View "Liberty Mortg. Corp. v. Fiscus" on Justia Law

Brian Penn was convicted by jury of unlawful sexual contact. On appeal, he argued that the county court erred in allowing an investigating officer to testify that he "had reason to arrest the defendant for a crime that had been committed." The district court agreed and reversed the conviction. The State moved for reconsideration which was denied, then appealed to the Supreme Court. Penn moved to dismiss the State's appeal, arguing it was outside the time limit set by Colorado Appellate Rule 52(a). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and concluded that the State's petition was timely, and that the county court's admission of the officer's testimony was not reversible plain error. The Court reversed the district court and remanded for reinstatement of Penn's conviction. View "Colorado v. Penn" on Justia Law

In 2001 when he was twenty-eight years old, respondent David Corson had a sexual relationship with "K.B.," a seventeen-year-old client of the residential treatment facility where Corson worked. Two years later, he pled guilty to sexual assault on a child, position of trust. The prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of probation and dismiss a separate charge. Approximately three years before this plea, the prosecutor in this case obtained a juvenile adjudication against K.B. for falsely reporting a sexual assault. That case had no connection except that it could have been used to impeach K.B.'s credibility at Corson's trial. This adjudication was not disclosed to Corson, and as a result, he sought to overturn his conviction. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the court of appeals reversed. The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Corson argued that the State's non-disclosure rendered his plea involuntary and his plea counsel ineffective. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding no due process violation, that Corson knew of K.B.'s adjudication prior to his plea, and that the adjudication was not part of K.B.'s criminal history and therefore not subject to automatic disclosure. View "Colorado v. Corson" on Justia Law