Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Penn was convicted by jury of unlawful sexual contact. On appeal, he argued that the county court erred in allowing an investigating officer to testify that he "had reason to arrest the defendant for a crime that had been committed." The district court agreed and reversed the conviction. The State moved for reconsideration which was denied, then appealed to the Supreme Court. Penn moved to dismiss the State's appeal, arguing it was outside the time limit set by Colorado Appellate Rule 52(a). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and concluded that the State's petition was timely, and that the county court's admission of the officer's testimony was not reversible plain error. The Court reversed the district court and remanded for reinstatement of Penn's conviction. View "Colorado v. Penn" on Justia Law

In 2001 when he was twenty-eight years old, respondent David Corson had a sexual relationship with "K.B.," a seventeen-year-old client of the residential treatment facility where Corson worked. Two years later, he pled guilty to sexual assault on a child, position of trust. The prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of probation and dismiss a separate charge. Approximately three years before this plea, the prosecutor in this case obtained a juvenile adjudication against K.B. for falsely reporting a sexual assault. That case had no connection except that it could have been used to impeach K.B.'s credibility at Corson's trial. This adjudication was not disclosed to Corson, and as a result, he sought to overturn his conviction. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the court of appeals reversed. The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Corson argued that the State's non-disclosure rendered his plea involuntary and his plea counsel ineffective. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding no due process violation, that Corson knew of K.B.'s adjudication prior to his plea, and that the adjudication was not part of K.B.'s criminal history and therefore not subject to automatic disclosure. View "Colorado v. Corson" on Justia Law

Initiative #63 would establish a right to a healthy environment in Colorado by amending the state Constitution. Petitioners argued the text of the Initiative filed a motion to the Title Board, arguing the Initiative as written was misleading and contained multiple subjects. The Supreme Court reviewed the Title Board's action setting the title, ballot title and submission clause for the Initiative, and concluded that the Initiative contained a single subject, and that the title clearly expressed the subject and was not misleading. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015" on Justia Law

As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered Carl Ruch to complete a sex offender polygraph and participate in sex offense specific treatment intervention. Ruch refused such treatment, contending that participating would have violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Due to this refusal, the trial court revoked Ruch's probation and sentenced him to a prison term. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Ruch's Fifth Amendment rights would have been violated had he complied with the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether Ruch's probation officer would have sought to revoke probation based solely on the other probation violations, and if so, whether the trial court would have revoked on other grounds. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found no Fifth Amendment violation, finding Ruch's purported invocation of the Fifth was premature and amounted to a "prohibited blanket assertion of the privilege." View "Colorado v. Ruch" on Justia Law

The State challenged a district court order denying the probation department's complaint to revoke Bryan Roberson's sex offender intensive supervision probation (SOISP). The State sought to revoke probation because Roberson (among other thins) allegedly failed to participate in a sex offender evaluation and treatment program, allegedly refusing to answer during a polygraph test. Roberson refused to answer on advice of counsel, fearing that the answers would be used against him in future criminal proceedings (he had a direct appeal of his conviction pending at the time of the polygraph test). The district court denied the State's revocation complaint, concluding that answering the questions would have violated Roberson's Fifth Amendment rights to self-incrimination. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court and affirmed. View "Colorado v. Roberson" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court accepted this case from the court of appeals because it had granted certiorari in two other cases involving similar issues ("City of Littleton v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office," 2016 CO 25, ___ P.3d ___, and "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Town of Castle Rock," 2016 CO 26, ___ P.3d ___). In these cases, the Court interpreted section 8-41-209, C.R.S. (2015), of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, which provided workers’ compensation overage, under certain conditions, for occupational diseases affecting firefighters. An employer can show, by a preponderance of the medical evidence, either: (1) that a firefighter’s known or typical occupational exposures are not capable of causing the type of cancer at issue, or (2) that the firefighter’s employment did not cause the firefighter’s particular cancer where, for example, the claimant firefighter was not exposed to the cancer-causing agent, or where the medical evidence renders it more probable that the cause of the claimant’s cancer was not job-related. Englewood firefighter Delvin Harrell was diagnosed with melanoma, underwent surgery to remove it, and sought workers' compensation benefits. Englewood sought to overcome the statutory presumption. Because the ALJ and the Panel in this case did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's analysis in City of Littleton and Town of Castle Rock, it set aside the Panel’s order affirming the ALJ and remanded this case to the Panel with directions to return the matter to the ALJ for reconsideration in light of the "Littleton" and "Castle Rock" decisions. View "City of Englewood v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Littleton firefighter Jeffrey Christ was diagnosed with glioblastoma multiforme (“GBM,” a type of brain cancer). After undergoing surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, he returned to work, but ultimately died as a result of the disease. He (and later his widow and child) sought workers’ compensation benefits to cover his cancer treatment, asserting that his brain cancer qualified as a compensable occupational disease under the “firefighter statute” of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado. .At issue here was whether Christ’s employer, the City of Littleton, and Littleton’s insurer, Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. (collectively “Littleton”), successfully overcame a statutory presumption that Christ’s condition resulted from his employment as a firefighter. After review, the Supreme Court held that the employer, through a preponderance of the evidence, could meet its burden to show the firefighter's cancer "did not occur on the job" by establishing the absence of specific causation. Here, the ALJ applied the statutory presumption and found that Littleton established by a preponderance that Christ's GBM condition was not caused by his occupational exposures. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (“Panel”) reversed, concluding that Littleton’s medical evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption. In a split decision, a division of the court of appeals affirmed the Panel. Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals’ interpretation of the breadth of the statutory presumption and of the employer’s burden to overcome the presumption, the Court concluded that the court of appeals erroneously evaluated the medical evidence presented by Littleton and erroneously failed to defer to the ALJ’s findings of fact, which are supported by substantial evidence. The court of appeals' judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded back to the Panel for reinstatement of the ALJ’s original findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. View "City of Littleton v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office" on Justia Law

Castle Rock firefighter Mike Zukowski was diagnosed with melanoma. He had three surgeries to remove the melanoma and was then released to return to work on full duty. He sought both medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits under the "firefighter statute" of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, asserting that his melanoma qualified as a compensable occupational disease. At issue here was whether Zukowski’s employer, the Town of Castle Rock, and Castle Rock’s insurer, the Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency (collectively, “Castle Rock”), could overcome a statutory presumption that Zukowski’s condition resulted from his employment as a firefighter by presenting evidence indicating that Zukowski’s risk of melanoma from other sources was greater than his risk of melanoma from firefighting. After review, the Supreme Court held that the employer, through a preponderance of the evidence, could meet its burden to show the firefighter's cancer "did not occur on the job" by establishing the absence of specific causation. Here, Castle Rock sought to establish the absence of specific causation by presenting evidence indicated that Zukowski's particular risk of developing melanoma from other, non-job-related sources outweighed his risk of developing it from on-the-job, and that an employer could rely on such evidence to overcome the statutory presumption. The Court affirmed the court of appeals and remanded this case back to the ALJ for reconsideration. View "Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Town of Castle Rock" on Justia Law

The citizens of home-rule City of Longmont voted in favor of a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and the storage of its waste products within city limits. Thereafter, the Colorado Oil and Gas Association (the Association), an industry organization, sued Longmont seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating, and a permanent injunction enjoining Longmont from enforcing, Article XVI. "In a lengthy and thorough written order," the district court granted these motions, ruling that the Oil and Gas Conservation Act preempted Longmont’s bans on fracking and the storage and disposal of fracking waste. Longmont and the citizen intervenors argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that: (1) the district court erred in its preemption analysis; and (2) the inalienable rights provision of the Colorado Constitution trumped any preemption analysis and required the Supreme Court to conclude that ArticleXVI superseded state law. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n" on Justia Law

The citizens of home-rule city Fort Collins voted in favor of a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and the storage of its waste products within city limits. The Colorado Oil and Gas Association (the Association), an industry organization, sued Fort Collins and requested: (1) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, and the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, preempted Fort Collins’s fracking moratorium; and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement of the moratorium. The Association subsequently moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim, and Fort Collins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to find that the moratorium was not preempted by state law. The Supreme Court concluded that "fracking is a matter of mixed state and local concern," Fort Collins’s fracking moratorium was subject to preemption by state law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Fort Collins’s five-year moratorium on fracking and the storage of fracking waste operationally conflicted with the effectuation of state law. Accordingly, the Court held that the moratorium was preempted by state law and was, therefore, invalid and unenforceable. The district court’s order was affirmed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n" on Justia Law