Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a case brought by a group of Colorado electors, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado considered whether former President Donald J. Trump could appear on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. The electors claimed that Trump was disqualified under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits anyone who has engaged in insurrection against the U.S. Constitution from holding office. The district court found that Trump had engaged in insurrection on January 6, 2021, but concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the presidency.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Election Code allows the electors to challenge Trump's status as a qualified candidate based on Section Three. The court found that Congress does not need to pass legislation for Section Three's disqualification provision to apply, and that the provision encompasses the office of the Presidency. The court further held that the district court did not err in finding that Trump had engaged in insurrection, and that his speech inciting the crowd was not protected by the First Amendment. As a result, the court concluded that Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President under Section Three, and it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Secretary of State to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot. The court stayed its ruling until January 4, 2024, to maintain the status quo pending any review by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Anderson v. Griswold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the district court's order to suppress inculpatory statements made by the defendant, John J. Sanders Jr., in a case involving alleged sexual assault on a child. The district court concluded that Sanders's statements were elicited during a custodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings and were not voluntary. The People appealed, challenging the district court's ruling on custody but failing to sufficiently challenge the court's separate ruling on voluntariness. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, stating that even if they agreed with the People on the issue of custody, they must affirm the district court's suppression order due to the unchallenged finding of involuntariness. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Joseph James Tippet was initially charged with first-degree murder for allegedly shooting and killing his father. However, due to a series of discovery violations by the Eleventh Judicial District Attorney's Office, Tippet's charge was reduced to second-degree murder by the district court as a deterrent sanction. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review this decision.The People (prosecution) had a history of neglecting their discovery obligations, leading to multiple discovery violations in Tippet's case and others. Despite several warnings from various judges, the District Attorney's Office continued to neglect its discovery obligations. As a result, Tippet's defense counsel was unable to effectively prepare for his preliminary hearing.The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Tippet's charge as a sanction for the District Attorney's Office's consistent neglect of its discovery obligations. The court emphasized the importance of the discovery process in advancing the search for truth and protecting the integrity of the truth-finding process. The court affirmed the sanction as a necessary deterrent to encourage the District Attorney's Office to modify its discovery practices. The court also rejected the People's argument that the district court lacked the authority to reduce the charge as a discovery sanction, explaining that the decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations was within the court's discretion.In conclusion, the court discharged the rule to show cause, upholding the district court's decision to reduce Tippet's charge from first-degree murder to second-degree murder as a deterrent sanction for the District Attorney's Office's discovery violations. View "People v. Tippet" on Justia Law

This case concerns the interpretation of two oil and gas leases negotiated in Boulder County, Colorado in the 1980s. In 2014, during the secondary terms of the leases, necessary repairs to a third party’s sales pipeline forced the lessee to shut in otherwise commercially viable wells on the leased properties for approximately four months. The question before the Colorado Supreme Court in this case was whether this four-month shut-in caused the leases to terminate under their respective cessation-of-production clauses. Examining the specific leases at issue here, the Supreme Court concluded the four-month shut-in did not trigger termination under their cessation-of-production clauses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, but vacated the division’s opinion to the extent it adopted the commercial discovery rule to universally define the term “production” in Colorado oil and gas leases as “capable of production.” View "Board of County Commissioners v. Crestone Peak Resources" on Justia Law

The Washington County Department of Human Services (“WCDHS”) and the Board of County Commissioners of Washington County (“the Board”)—collectively, Washington County, contended a Colorado district court erred when it failed to adhere to Colorado v. Madera, 112 P.3d 688 (Colo. 2005) in granting Father’s request for an in camera review of documents that were allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court and Father countered that Madera was inapposite and that the challenged ruling was free of error because it is consistent with the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735 (Colo. 2005). The issue this case presented was whether Madera or Alcon, issued six days apart in the spring of 2005, controlled in this case. Here, in response to a subpoena duces tecum served by Father, Washington County provided a privilege log listing documents allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. After reviewing the log, Father insisted the privilege did not apply, and the parties were unable to resolve their dispute informally. Consequently, Father asked the district court to conduct an in camera inspection of the documents identified in the log. Because the log provided vague descriptions of the withheld documents, the district court could not assess Washington County’s claim of privilege. It thus granted Father’s request for an in camera review. In doing so, the district court neither made Madera’s required findings nor employed Madera’s analytical framework. Washington County argued the district court’s failure to conform to Madera rendered the in camera order faulty. But the district court and Father responded that Madera didn't apply. Instead, they maintained, Alcon applied. The Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly followed Alcon, not Madera, in this case. And the Court further concluded that, consistent with Alcon, the court correctly granted Father’s request for an in camera review because Washington County’s log did not permit an assessment of the claim of privilege. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in interest of children and concerning J.L.M. and J.P." on Justia Law

Jose Garcia sued Colorado Cab Company, LLC (“Colorado Cab”) to recover for severe injuries he suffered while attempting to aid one of Colorado Cab’s drivers, Ali Yusuf. Garcia discovered Yusuf being assaulted by Yusuf’s passenger, Curt Glinton. Enraged by Garcia’s interference, Glinton attacked Garcia, first with his fists and then with the cab itself. The jury determined that Colorado Cab was liable for failing to install certain protective devices and awarded Garcia damages. In a split decision, a division of the court of appeals concluded as a matter of law that Garcia’s injuries resulting from Glinton’s theft and use of the cab as a weapon were “outside the risks reasonably to be anticipated” from both Colorado Cab’s negligence and Garcia’s rescue attempt. The broader question presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was how to analyze proximate cause in the rescuer context. To this, the Court held that, to prove proximate cause, the rescuer must show that his injuries were reasonably foreseeable based on the defendant’s alleged tortious conduct and the nature of the rescue attempt. While the Court agreed with much of the appellate court majority’s analytical framework, the Supreme Court concluded that it erred by deciding the issue of proximate cause as a matter of law. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the jury’s verdict. View "Garcia v. Colorado Cab Company" on Justia Law

On November 18, 2022, Ashleigh Walthour drove her car off a snowy road into some trees. She ran the four or five blocks to her home and called the Aurora Police Department. When the police arrived at Walthour’s home to speak with her, she smelled like alcohol and had slurred speech, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes. She admitted to having consumed a shooter of Jack Daniels and was unable to perform voluntary roadside maneuvers. Walthour was arrested and taken to the Aurora City Jail, where she consented to a blood test. The police submitted Walthour’s blood sample to the CBI for processing on November 23. Walthour appeared in court for the first time on January 6, 2023. At that hearing, she notified the court that she would seek the assistance of the Public Defender’s Office. The court set a second hearing for February 6. However, at the second hearing, Walthour explained that she had not qualified for a public defender and would be representing herself. At the same hearing, the State said it had not yet received the blood test results from the CBI but that they “should” have the results “hopefully within the next week or two.” The court set a third pretrial conference for March 7 and directed the prosecution to disclose the test results by February 28 at 5 p.m. The prosecutor did not have any test results to disclose on that date. The trial court announced that it would suppress blood alcohol test results when no trial had been set and the prosecution had not yet received the results of the test from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”). A day later, on March 8, the prosecutor received the blood test results from the CBI. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(I)(b)(3), which required prosecutors to disclose the results of scientific exams such as blood alcohol tests to defendants “as soon as practicable but not later than [thirty-five] days before trial,” did not support the trial court's preemptive suppression. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Walthour" on Justia Law

The “rule of Martin,” applied to state agencies, political subdivisions, and officials acting in their official capacity, was a judicially created rule that precluded standing to challenge a government entity’s decision when: (1) the state agency, political subdivision, or official seeking review is subordinate to the government entity whose action is challenged; and (2) no statutory or constitutional provision expressly authorizes the subordinate party to seek judicial review of the superior government entity’s action. The Colorado State Board of Education (“the State Board”) invoked this doctrine in successfully moving to dismiss claims brought by Adams County School District 14 (“Adams 14”) challenging the State Board’s decision to remove its accreditation and order its reorganization. Adams 14 challenged the district court’s dismissal of its claims and the political subdivision doctrine itself, contending that the doctrine has become unmoored from its jurisprudential origins and results in the unfair denial of judicial relief to public entities that have been injured by state agencies and statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the political subdivision doctrine and its articulation in the rule of Martin generated unnecessary confusion and were ultimately duplicative of the two-part test for standing set forth in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). The Court therefore abandoned the doctrine and the rule of Martin and instead hold that Wimberly supplied the sole test for determining whether a party has standing in Colorado. Evaluating each of Adams 14’s claims under Wimberly, the Court further held that all were correctly dismissed for lack of standing. View "Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. 14" on Justia Law

The Weld County Colorado Board of County Commissioners (“Weld County”) sought review of rules adopted by the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission (the “Commission”) to minimize emissions of certain pollutants from oil and gas wells. A Colorado court of appeals applied a specialized political subdivision standing test and concluded that Weld County did not have standing to pursue its claims. In Colorado State Board of Education v. Adams County School District 14, 2023 CO 52, __ P.3d __, the Colorado Supreme Court abandoned the political subdivision test because it generated unnecessary confusion, and that a political subdivision, just like any other plaintiff, had to satisfy only the standing test developed in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). Applying that holding here, the Court examined whether Weld County has suffered (1) an injury in fact (2) to a legally protected interest. To this, the Court concluded that, although Weld County had a legally protected interest, it could not demonstrate an injury to that interest. Accordingly, Weld County lacked standing to pursue the claims raised here. We thus affirm the division’s judgment, albeit on different grounds. View "Weld County v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Two months after an apparent arson left five people dead, the Denver Police Department (“DPD”) had no suspects. They employed an unconventional investigative technique: a “reverse-keyword warrant.” Google disclosed to DPD a list that included five Colorado internet protocol (“IP”) addresses associated with devices that had searched for the location of the fire in a roughly two-week period before it occurred. Based in part on this information, law enforcement eventually charged Gavin Seymour and two others with multiple counts of first degree murder. Seymour moved to suppress the fruit of the warrant, arguing that it lacked probable cause and particularity. The trial court denied Seymour’s suppression motion. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, finding: (1) under the Colorado Constitution, Seymour had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his Google search history even when revealed only in connection with his IP address and not his name and that, under both the Colorado Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, he also had a constitutionally protected possessory interest in that same history; (2) Seymour’s Google search history implicated his right to freedom of expression; (3) the warrant at issue adequately particularized the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (4) the warrant required individualized probable cause and that its absence here rendered the warrant constitutionally defective; and (5) law enforcement obtained and executed the warrant in good faith, so the evidence shouldn’t be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. "At every step, law enforcement acted reasonably to carry out a novel search in a constitutional manner. Suppressing the evidence here wouldn’t deter police misconduct." View "Colorado v. Seymour" on Justia Law