Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court violated respondent Michael Johnson's statutory and constitutional rights by increasing his sentence on the remaining conviction on remand following a successful appeal on his other convictions. The trial court initially accepted, then rejected at sentencing, a plea agreement in which Johnson would have pled guilty to an added count of possession of a controlled substance, then the original counts would have been dismissed. The trial court rejected the plea agreement, the case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, and possession of a controlled substance. Johnson was then sentenced to an aggregate sentence of twenty years to life. The court of appeals reversed and vacated the sexual assault and kidnapping convictions on double jeopardy grounds. The case was remanded for the trial court to reinstate the original plea agreement, and to resentence Johnson on the remaining possession conviction. Johnson received a twelve-year sentence (twice the length of the original six-year sentence). Johnson appealed a second time, arguing that the increased sentence violated his statutory and due process rights. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's statutory claim, but applied a presumption of vindictiveness to the trial court's resentencing and held that the sentence indeed violated Johnson's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the court of appeals correctly rejected Johnson's statutory argument, but erred in applying the presumption of vindictiveness to the new sentence on the possession of a controlled substance conviction. View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Respondent Louis Madden was convicted of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted third degree sexual assault by force. He was originally sentenced to an indeterminate sentence and ordered to pay costs, fees and restitution. He appealed his conviction. The attempt to patronize a prostituted child was reversed, leaving only the attempted sexual assault charge. The case was returned to the trial court with instructions to impose a determinate sentence. Madden was thereafter sentenced to three years with credit for time served. Madden moved for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The motion was granted, and the prosecution elected not to appeal or retry the case. Madden applied to be refunded that portion of the fees, costs and restitution he had already paid, and the trial court agreed to a partial refund; the trial court reasoned that money paid to a counseling service the victim used could not be returned. Madden appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's "refund" order, finding that the trial court did not have statutory authority to order a refund from public funds. "Madden did not pursue a refund through the procedures defined in the Exoneration Act" which provides trial courts the proper authority pursuant to which to issue refunds. View "Colorado v. Madden" on Justia Law

Respondent Shannon Nelson was convicted of five charges relating to sexual assaults allegedly committed against her children. She was sentenced to 20 years in prison, and ordered to pay court costs, fees and restitution. The court of appeals reversed the judgment against Nelson and remanded for a new trial based on the improper use of an unendorsed expert witness. In the second trial, a new jury acquitted Nelson of all charges. At issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether Nelson could get a refund of all the costs, fees and restitution she paid following her conviction after the first trial. The Supreme Court found that a trial court could not authorize a refund absent statutory authority. Because none of the statutes governing the fines, fees and restitution empowered the trial court in this case to issue a refund, it could not do so. Exonerated defendants could seek a refund of costs, fees and restitution through a separate civil proceeding (which Nelson did not pursue). View "Colroado v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2014, a detective from the Douglas County Sheriff's Office (DCSO) responded to a middle school's report that twelve-year-old female student J.M. had posted a picture of herself drinking what appeared to be alcohol. Officials became worried that there was more to the posting, contacted police, and spoke to the student. DCSO was contacted by J.M.'s mother, stating that J.M. wanted to talk to them. J.M. and her mother separately participated in a series of video-recorded interviews. The interviews would reveal that the mother's then-fiancee, defendant-appellee John Swietlicki allegedly had regular sexual encounters, since the child was eight. J.M. J.M. told the detective that Swietlicki sometimes showed her pornography on his computer during these encounters. The mother corroborated various details pertinent to J.M.'s allegations. Swietlicki would ultimately be extradited back to Colorado to stand charges based on J.M.'s allegations. Police seized Swietlicki's laptop without a warrant until a search warrant issued. Once issued, police found that the laptop contained child pornography. Swietlicki moved to suppress all evidence found on the laptop, and the trial court granted the motion, finding that police lacked probable cause to seize the laptop. The State appealed the suppression motion. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression order, finding that the search was justified under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement. View "Colorado v. Swietlicki" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cathy Ritzert had worked as a teacher for more than twenty years. She worked for the Air Academy High School, part of the Academy School District No. 20. A student's parents complained about Ritzert, and the District placed her on administrative leave, telling her they would recommend dismissal unless she resigned. Ritzert refused. Several months passed without the District making good on its threat to fire her. Ritzert eventually took a new job teaching special needs students in a neighboring district, claiming she did this to mitigate her damages. She still wanted the District to prove it had a legitimate basis for terminating her, so she again refused to quit. The District responded by ordering Ritzert to report to work as a floating substitute. When Ritzert did not comply, the District initiated formal dismissal proceedings, claiming in part that her refusal to return to work constituted insubordination. A hearing officer recommended that Ritzert be retained, finding in part that the District's insubordination allegation was pretextual and unreasonable under the circumstances. The Board dismissed Ritzert for insubordination anyway, making no comment about the complaint that triggered placing her on leave in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that under the Teacher Employment, Compensation and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA), the School Board's order must be fully warranted by the hearing officer's evidentiary findings of fact. Because the Board here "abdicated" that responsibility here, the Court concluded that its decision to dismiss Ritzert for insubordination on the facts of this case was arbitrary and capricious. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the Board to reinstate Ritzert. View "Ritzert v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

The State appealed an appellate court's judgment that vacated respondent Kenneth Childress' conviction of vehicular assault while operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. It was undisputed that Childress was not driving the vehicle in question, but the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty as a complicitor. The court of appeals concluded that because vehicular assault while under the influence was a strict liability offense, and required no culpable mental state on the part of the driver. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the Colorado Supreme Court had held previously that complicitor liability was inapplicable to crimes lacking a culpable mental state requirement. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, clarifying its holding that the appellate court relied on in vacating Childress' conviction. View "Colorado v. Childress" on Justia Law

This case concerned the nature of transactions that petitioners, national litigation finance companies, made with tort plaintiffs seeking funds to pay personal expenses while waiting for their lawsuits to settle or go to trial. Plaintiffs usually agreed to pay the companies a sum of money from the future litigation proceeds. By the terms of the agreements, any money the companies give tort plaintiffs were not to be used to prosecute the legal claims. The specific issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the companies’ forwarding of expense money to tort plaintiffs constituted a “loan.” Petitioners contended they were “asset purchases,” but the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code interprets these transactions as loans. The Supreme Court agreed with the UCCC: these transactions are loans. View "Oasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Coffman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Meridian Service Metropolitan District (Meridian) appealed a district court order finding that Meridian sought to appropriate designated ground water that was subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Ground Water Commission. Meridian petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether storm runoff could be classified as “designated ground water” subject to administration and adjudication by the Commission, or whether such water was in or tributary to a natural stream (vesting jurisdiction in the local water court). The Supreme Court concluded that because this case presented a question of whether the water at issue here met a statutory definition of “designated ground water,” the Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial determination. View "Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Chavez was convicted of a sex offense, and the trial court imposed an indeterminate, fifteen-year-to-life sentence. Chavez challenged that sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court did not understand the range of its sentencing options. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s calculation of petitioner’s sentence and affirmed it. View "Chavez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a non-attorney trustee of a trust could proceed pro se before the water court. Appellant-trustee J. Tucker appealed the water court’s ruling that as trustee of a trust, he was not permitted to proceed because he was representing the interests of others. He also appealed the court’s order granting appellee Town of Minturn’s application for a finding of reasonable diligence in connection with a conditional water right. Appellant’s pro se issue was one of first impression before the Supreme Court, and the Court held that the water court correctly ruled that as a non-attorney trustee, appellant could not proceed pro se on behalf of the trust. In light of that determination, the Court did not address appellant’s other arguments regarding the sufficiency of the verification. View "Tucker v. Town of Minturn" on Justia Law