Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Cathy Ritzert had worked as a teacher for more than twenty years. She worked for the Air Academy High School, part of the Academy School District No. 20. A student's parents complained about Ritzert, and the District placed her on administrative leave, telling her they would recommend dismissal unless she resigned. Ritzert refused. Several months passed without the District making good on its threat to fire her. Ritzert eventually took a new job teaching special needs students in a neighboring district, claiming she did this to mitigate her damages. She still wanted the District to prove it had a legitimate basis for terminating her, so she again refused to quit. The District responded by ordering Ritzert to report to work as a floating substitute. When Ritzert did not comply, the District initiated formal dismissal proceedings, claiming in part that her refusal to return to work constituted insubordination. A hearing officer recommended that Ritzert be retained, finding in part that the District's insubordination allegation was pretextual and unreasonable under the circumstances. The Board dismissed Ritzert for insubordination anyway, making no comment about the complaint that triggered placing her on leave in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that under the Teacher Employment, Compensation and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA), the School Board's order must be fully warranted by the hearing officer's evidentiary findings of fact. Because the Board here "abdicated" that responsibility here, the Court concluded that its decision to dismiss Ritzert for insubordination on the facts of this case was arbitrary and capricious. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the Board to reinstate Ritzert. View "Ritzert v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

The State appealed an appellate court's judgment that vacated respondent Kenneth Childress' conviction of vehicular assault while operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. It was undisputed that Childress was not driving the vehicle in question, but the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty as a complicitor. The court of appeals concluded that because vehicular assault while under the influence was a strict liability offense, and required no culpable mental state on the part of the driver. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the Colorado Supreme Court had held previously that complicitor liability was inapplicable to crimes lacking a culpable mental state requirement. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, clarifying its holding that the appellate court relied on in vacating Childress' conviction. View "Colorado v. Childress" on Justia Law

This case concerned the nature of transactions that petitioners, national litigation finance companies, made with tort plaintiffs seeking funds to pay personal expenses while waiting for their lawsuits to settle or go to trial. Plaintiffs usually agreed to pay the companies a sum of money from the future litigation proceeds. By the terms of the agreements, any money the companies give tort plaintiffs were not to be used to prosecute the legal claims. The specific issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the companies’ forwarding of expense money to tort plaintiffs constituted a “loan.” Petitioners contended they were “asset purchases,” but the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code interprets these transactions as loans. The Supreme Court agreed with the UCCC: these transactions are loans. View "Oasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Coffman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Meridian Service Metropolitan District (Meridian) appealed a district court order finding that Meridian sought to appropriate designated ground water that was subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Ground Water Commission. Meridian petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether storm runoff could be classified as “designated ground water” subject to administration and adjudication by the Commission, or whether such water was in or tributary to a natural stream (vesting jurisdiction in the local water court). The Supreme Court concluded that because this case presented a question of whether the water at issue here met a statutory definition of “designated ground water,” the Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial determination. View "Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Chavez was convicted of a sex offense, and the trial court imposed an indeterminate, fifteen-year-to-life sentence. Chavez challenged that sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court did not understand the range of its sentencing options. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s calculation of petitioner’s sentence and affirmed it. View "Chavez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a non-attorney trustee of a trust could proceed pro se before the water court. Appellant-trustee J. Tucker appealed the water court’s ruling that as trustee of a trust, he was not permitted to proceed because he was representing the interests of others. He also appealed the court’s order granting appellee Town of Minturn’s application for a finding of reasonable diligence in connection with a conditional water right. Appellant’s pro se issue was one of first impression before the Supreme Court, and the Court held that the water court correctly ruled that as a non-attorney trustee, appellant could not proceed pro se on behalf of the trust. In light of that determination, the Court did not address appellant’s other arguments regarding the sufficiency of the verification. View "Tucker v. Town of Minturn" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State of Colorado argued that evidence of text messages between defendant Matthew Herrera and a juvenile girl (“Faith”) was admissible under a warrant authorizing a search of his cellphone for indicia of ownership, or in the alternative, under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. Faith’s mother told police she believed defendant was involved in a sexual relationship with her daughter. A police detective started texting defendant posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. These texts eventually led to defendant’s arrest, at which time police seized the cell phone in question. After review of the evidence in the record to the point of this appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that the texts were obtained under the warrant’s authorization to search for “indicia of ownership” of the cellphone. Further, the Court concluded the texts did not fall within the plain view exception. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence. View "Colorado v. Herrera" on Justia Law

In 2011, In 2011, Regional Transportation District (“RTD”) filed a petition in condemnation against 750 West 48th Avenue, LLC (“Landowner”) to acquire approximately the approximately 1.6 acre property a light rail project. Landowner was leasing the property to a commercial waterproofing business ("Tenant"). Over the years, Landowner made several luxury improvements to the property, including adding a steam room, fitness room, atrium, ceramic and cherry-wood flooring, and marble and granite finishes. The parties stipulated to every condemnation issue except the property's reasonable market value. Landowner elected to litigate the property's value through a commission trial. RTD established the value at $1.8 million; Landowner thought the property was worth $2.57 million. Landowner's calculations focused solely on the cost of replacement; RTD based its estimation on a "superadequacy" theory, asserting that many of the luxury improvements that Landowner made to an industrial property would not fetch a price on the open market commensurate with the cost of replacement. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the respective authorities of the supervising judge and the commission to make evidentiary rulings in eminent domain valuation hearings. Specifically, the Court considered: (1) whether a commission could alter a supervising judge's ruling in limine regarding admissibility, and (2) whether the supervising judge could instruct the commission to disregard as irrelevant evidence that the commission had previously admitted. The Supreme Court held that judicial evidentiary rulings controlled in valuation hearings. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment insofar as it approved the supervising judge instructing the commission to disregard previously admitted evidence as irrelevant. The Court reversed that portion of the appellate court's opinion permitting the commission to alter the judge's evidentiary ruling in limine. View "RTD v. 750 West 48th Ave., LLC" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged an order suppressing at retrial the testimony given by defendant Ivan Quintero-Amador at his first trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in suppressing this evidence because: (1) defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights when he testified at the first trial; and (2) his trial counsel's ineffective assistance did not directly affect his prior testimony, thus precluding a finding that the admission of this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The trial court's suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Quintero-Amador" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the legality of the "negative factor," a legislative enactment that operated to reduce education funding across all Colorado school districts. Plaintiffs sued the State, the Commissioner of Education, and the Governor, arguing that the negative factor was unconstitutional because it violated Amendment 23, a state constitutional provision requiring annual increases to "statewide base per pupil funding." The trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court granted review to determine whether that denial was made in error. After review, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs' complaint misconstrued the relationship between the negative factor and the constitutional amendment: "[b]y its plain language, Amendment 23 only requires increases to statewide base per pupil funding, not to total per pupil funding." Therefore, the Court held that the negative factor did not violate Amendment 23. The trial court was reversed and instructed to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Dwyer v. Colorado" on Justia Law