Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on how both trial and appellate courts should determine whether a party has used a peremptory challenge to purposefully discriminate against a prospective juror on account of her race, in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rule in "Batson v. Kentucky," (476 U.S. 79 (1986)). The State charged respondent Romielo Rodriguez with three counts of felony menacing after his neighbors alleged that he and a co-defendant pointed guns at them during a dispute. Rodriguez pled not guilty, and his trial began in August 2009. During jury selection, the prosecutor used his first peremptory strike to excuse Ms. D., a black woman. Rodriguez raised a Batson objection, but the juror was excused nonetheless. Rodriguez raised another Batson objection when the prosecutor used his second peremptory strike to excuse Ms. A., who has a Hispanic surname. On her juror questionnaire, Ms. A. had stated that she was affiliated with a church. Ms. A. was also dismissed. The prosecution exercised three more peremptory challenges, and Rodriguez used all six available to him. The trial court denied Rodriguez' Batson-challenged jurors for lack of a pattern of strikes against members of a cognizable racial group. The court of appeals reversed Rodriguez’s convictions and ordered a new trial because it held that the trial court clearly erred by denying Rodriguez’s Batson challenges for failure to show a pattern of discrimination. The Colorado Court granted the State's petition for certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision to reverse Rodriguez’s convictions and order a new trial. After review, the Court reversed, holding that the proper remedy for an inadequate inquiry into a Batson challenge at the time of jury selection was to remand the case to the trial court with directions to conduct the three-part Batson analysis and make the required factual findings. An inadequate Batson inquiry occurs when the trial court’s findings are insufficient to determine whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has proved that the proponent used the strike to purposefully discriminate against prospective jurors at issue. The case was remanded for the trial court to conduct the three-part Batson analysis. View "Colorado v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the court of appeals erred in its conclusion that defendant waived his public trial claim by failing to object to the closure of the courtroom during jury selection. The case turned largely on whether the controlling case law, "Anderson v. Colorado," (490 P.2d 47 (Colo. 1971)) remained controlling, or whether it was abrogated by more recent United States Supreme Court decisions in "Waller v. Georgia," (467 U.S. 39 (1984)) and "Presley v. Georgia," (558 U.S. 209 (2010)). The Colorado Court concluded that "Anderson" remained good law and controlling in this case, therefore, it affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Stackhouse v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Colorado Governor, under guidance from the state's medical and nursing boards, decided that Colorado would opt-out of a federal regulation requiring certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) administer anesthesia under a physician's supervision. Under the regulation, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers and critical access hospitals received Medicare reimbursement if CRNAs worked under a physician's supervision. Petitioners the Colorado Medical Society and the Colorado Society of Anesthesiologists, filed suit against the Governor, claiming that Colorado law did not permit CRNAs to administer anesthesia without supervision. In ruling on the Governor's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that petitioners failed to state a valid claim and granted relief. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion. The Supreme Court agreed with the result, but held that the Governor's decision to opt-out of the federal regulation was revieweable by a court only for a gross abuse of discretion. Because petitioners did not allege that such a gross abuse occurred here, the court of appeals' decision to affirm dismissal of the case was affirmed. View "Colorado Medical Society v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

The Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District appealed a water court order that interpreted an earlier stipulated decree to which it and Cherokee Metropolitan District were parties, concerning Cherokee's rights to deliver wastewater returns back to the Upper Black Squirrel Basin for recharge of the aquafier. Upper Black Squirrel District sought a declaration that the stipulation bar Cherokee and Meridian (another metropolitan district with which Cherokee had entered into an intergovernmental agreement) from claiming credit for the wastewater returns as replacement water, for purposes of acquiring the right to additional pumping from Cherokee's wells in the basin. The water court ruled instead that nothing in the stipulation implied abandonment or forfeiture of any right Cherokee might otherwise have to claim future credits with the Ground Water Commission. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the water court properly interpreted the stipulation, it affirmed the order. View "Up. Black Squirrel Creek Grnd Water Mgmt Dist v. Cherokee Metro. Dist." on Justia Law

After entry of a guilty verdict, defense counsel obtained juror affidavits suggesting that one of the jurors exhibited racial bias against the defendant during deliberations. The trial court refused to consider these affidavits, finding that Colorado Rule of Evidence ("CRE") 606(b) barred their admission, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether CRE 606(b) applied to such affidavits and, if so, whether the Sixth Amendment nevertheless required their admission. After review, the Court concluded that the affidavits regarding the juror's biased statements fell within the broad sweep of CRE606(b) and that they did not satisfy the rule's "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk filed an action in district court under section 24-72-204(6)(a) seeking an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure of the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, however, the General Assembly enacted section 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014), providing that voted ballots are subject to CORA and describing the process by which records custodians must make them available. The Clerk then produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect, and the parties agreed that the only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that where an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure under section 24-72-204(6)(a), a prevailing records request or is entitled to costs and attorney fees in accordance with section 24-72-204(5). "Under section 24-72-204(5), a prevailing records requestor is entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court finds that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. Here, the district court's order reflects that the Clerk's denial of Marks' request was proper. Consequently, Marks is not entitled to attorney fees in this case." The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding to the contrary. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, and to what extent, the Colorado Probate Code displaced a probate court's authority to award an equitable adjustment supplementing a spouse's elective share of the decedent's estate. By the date of final distribution of the estate at the heart of this case, it had grown in value from $73 million to more than $250 million. Concluding that it would be unfair for the elective share to be "frozen in time" while extensive litigation concerning its computation eroded its value in relation to the appreciating estate, the probate court exercised its equitable authority by supplementing the elective share. The probate court determined that the spouse was entitled to an elective share of approximately $26 million, plus an equitable award of approximately $24.5 million, based on a17.46% rate of return on the undistributed balance of her elective share, calculated to reflect appreciation and income to the entire estate. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the Probate Code displaced a court's equitable powers in the elective-share arena as a matter of law. The court of appeals ordered the spouse to repay the entire $24.5 million equitable award, plus restitutionary interest from the date of distribution. Reading the elective-share statutes together with the probate court's equitable authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the Colorado Probate Code's plain language demonstrated that a particular statutory provision dealing with the spouse's elective share, section 15-11-202(1), C.R.S. (2014), fixed the value of the property comprising the augmented estate on the decedent's date of death. This specific provision controlled over the general equitable authority the probate court may exercise under section 15-10-103, C.R.S. (2014).Accordingly, the probate court erred by linking its equitable award to appreciation and income to the entire augmented estate. Nevertheless, section 15-10-103 expressly reserved the probate court's equitable authority to the extent that it was not displaced by a specific statutory provision. "On remand, the probate court has tools at its disposal to exercise equity consistent with the statutory elective-share framework." The Court set aside the court of appeals' judgment requiring the spouse to repay the entire $24.5 million equitable award with interest. The probate court's mandate on remand was to determine what equitable relief was available to the spouse under the specific facts of this case. View "Beren v. Beren" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on a series of questions arising under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act ("the LSA") which established indeterminate sentencing for felony sex offenses. Specifically, the Court addressed whether a minimum sentence in the aggravated range on a conviction for sexual assault on a child–pattern of abuse is legal when there is no explicit finding of aggravating circumstances. The Court also addressed three related procedural questions: is the prosecution authorized to appeal a legal sentence entered on resentencing?; if a defendant received an illegal sentence on one count, does Crim. P. 35(a) entitle him to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences?; If not, does Crim. P. 35(b)nonetheless authorize a resentencing court to reconsider and reduce the defendant's legal sentences? The Court held: (1) when a conviction is for a sex offense that requires sentencing in accordance with the mandatory sentencing statute, the prosecution is not required to prove aggravating circumstances to support a bottom-end sentence in the aggravated range; (2) the prosecution here is authorized to appeal the post-conviction court's ruling on the defendant's Rule35(a) motion because it challenged the legal basis for the range the post-conviction court used to impose the sentence; (3)under Crim. P. 35(a), the illegality of a sentence on one count does not entitle a defendant to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences; and(4) if a sentence is subject to correction on one count, Crim. P. 35(b) authorized a resentencing court to reconsider and reduce the legal sentences as to all counts after it has corrected the entire sentence. View "Hunsaker v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the narrow question of whether the trial court's improper admission of unfairly prejudicial 404(b) evidence offered to establish the defendant's intent in a single count warranted reversing defendant Armando Perez' two remaining convictions. The trial court allowed 404(b) evidence for the limited purpose of showing Perez's intent to commit sexual assault or unlawful sexual contact upon a child for the count of enticement of a child. In so doing, it excluded the jury's use of the 404(b) evidence for any element for the two remaining counts, sexual assault on a child and second-degree kidnapping. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the evidence and that the error was not harmless, and reversed the enticement conviction. The court of appeals, however, affirmed the defendant's sexual assault and kidnapping convictions because it presumed that the jury followed the limiting instructions not to consider the evidence for any element of those two counts. The State did not appeal the court of appeals' ruling that the trial court erred in admitting the 404(b) evidence. After review of Perez' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 404(b) evidence of Perez's prior bad acts for a single count, and that the error was not harmless as to the convictions on the two remaining counts. The Court therefore vacated Perez's convictions for sexual assault on a child and second-degree kidnapping and remanded to the court of appeals with instructions to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Coats claimed respondent Dish Network, LLC violated 24-34-402.5 C.R.s. (2014) by terminating his employment based on his state-licensed use of medical marijuana at home, during non-working hours. He argued that the Medical Marijuana Amendment (Colo. Const. art XVIII sec. 14) made such use "lawful" for purposes of the statute, notwithstanding any federal laws prohibiting medical marijuana use. The trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim after finding that medical marijuana use was not "lawful" under Colorado state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed: "the term 'lawful' as used in section 24-34-402.5, was not restricted in any way, and we decline to engraft a state law limitation onto the term. Therefore, an activity such as medical marijuana use that is unlawful under the federal law is not a 'lawful' activity under section 24-34-402.5." View "Coats v. Dish Network" on Justia Law