Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Douglas County School District implemented its Choice Scholarship Pilot Program (CSP), a program that awarded taxpayer-funded scholarships to qualifying elementary, middle, and high school students. Those students could use their scholarships to help pay their tuition at partnering private schools, including religious schools. Following a lawsuit from Douglas County taxpayers, the trial court found that the CSP violated the Public School Finance Act of 1994, as well as various provisions of the Colorado Constitution. The trial court permanently enjoined implementation of the CSP. The court of appeals reversed, holding that: (1) Petitioners lacked standing to sue under the Act; and (2)the CSP did not violate the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the CSP comported with both the Act and the Colorado Constitution. After review, the Court held that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the CSP under the Act. Further, the CSP violated article IX, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court with instructions to remand back to the trial court so that the trial court could reinstate its order permanently enjoining the CSP. View "Taxpayers for Public Education v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The trial court completely closed the courtroom during the testimony of two undercover officers in respondent Omer Hassen's trial. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review of this case to determine whether this closure constituted structural error. The Court concluded that the closure violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, rejecting the State's argument that the closure was so trivial that it did not implicate respondent's constitutional rights. View "Colorado v. Hassen" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two water court rulings upholding the Special Improvement District No. 1 (“Subdistrict”) of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District’s (“District”) and the State Engineer’s approval of the 2012 Annual Replacement Plan (“ARP”) developed pursuant to the Subdistrict’s decreed Plan of Water Management (“Amended Plan”). In "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association v. Special Improvement District No. 1" (“San Antonio”), (270 P.3d 927 (Colo. 2011)), the Supreme Court affirmed the water court’s May 2010 Decree that approved the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan and imposed additional decree conditions on that Plan. The 2012 ARP under review here was the first ARP prepared pursuant to the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan. Water levels in the unconfined aquifer within the Subdistrict declined significantly due to increased groundwater consumption and sustained drought. The Amended Plan required the Subdistrict to prepare, and obtain the State Engineer’s approval of, an ARP that prevented injury to senior water rights. Objectors San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association Save Our Senior Water Rights, LLC, Richard Ramstetter, and Costilla Ditch Company were senior surface water right holders on the Rio Grande River and its tributaries. They appealed two pretrial rulings as well as a judgment and decree upholding the 2012 ARP. Upon review of the objections, the Supreme Court concluded that the 2012 ARP complied with the Amended Plan and 2010 Decree, and protected against injury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's pretrial orders, judgment and decree pertaining to the 2012 ARP. View "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation" on Justia Law

In 2009, a jury found defendant Kevin Elmarr guilty of first degree murder for strangling his ex-wife. In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals reversed Elmarr’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of two alternate suspects Before the new trial, the State moved to exclude evidence of similar acts by one of those alternate suspects, as well as out-of-court statements made by that alternate suspect implicating himself in both the other similar acts and the charged crime. The trial court, relying largely on the court of appeals’ decision remanding the case, denied the State's motion. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court failed on remand to conduct the proper analysis to determine the admissibility of the alternate suspect evidence, in particular, evidence of other similar acts committed by the alternate suspect and statements made by the alternate suspect to law enforcement. The State contended that this area of the law has generated considerable confusion and asked the Supreme Court to clarify the proper framework for examining the admissibility of such evidence. Upon review, the Court agreed with the State that the trial court failed to conduct the proper analysis and thus make absolute our rule to show cause. The trial court understood the court of appeals’ decision remanding the case to require admission of the alternate suspect However, the court of appeals applied an incorrect framework for analyzing the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence. The Court used the opportunity of this opinion to set forth the proper framework, and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Elmarr" on Justia Law

This case centered on appropriate resolution of a Batson challenge. Petitioner Derrick Wilson objected to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory strike to excuse a black veniremember and argued that the strike violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmen tas interpreted in "Batson v. Kentucky," (476 U.S. 79 (1986)). The trial court allowed the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for the strike. She explained that the prospective juror appeared uncomfortable with DNA evidence and the lack of eyewitness identification. Defense counsel responded that the prospective juror’s responses indicated “the exact opposite,” but the trial court accepted the prosecutor’s explanation and denied Wilson’s Batson challenge. The jury later found Wilson guilty of sexual assault, second-degree kidnapping, and unlawful sexual contact. Wilson appealed, and the court of appeals held that the trial court clearly erred in denying his Batson challenge. The State appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that a prosecutor’s error in recollection did not compel a finding of purposeful discrimination in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause pursuant to Batson. "Rather, the Batson analysis requires the trial court to assess the credibility of the proponent of a peremptory strike and determine whether to believe her race-neutral explanation. Unless the opponent of the strike can prove purposeful discrimination, the trial court should deny the Batson challenge." View "Colorado v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on how both trial and appellate courts should determine whether a party has used a peremptory challenge to purposefully discriminate against a prospective juror on account of her race, in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rule in "Batson v. Kentucky," (476 U.S. 79 (1986)). The State charged respondent Romielo Rodriguez with three counts of felony menacing after his neighbors alleged that he and a co-defendant pointed guns at them during a dispute. Rodriguez pled not guilty, and his trial began in August 2009. During jury selection, the prosecutor used his first peremptory strike to excuse Ms. D., a black woman. Rodriguez raised a Batson objection, but the juror was excused nonetheless. Rodriguez raised another Batson objection when the prosecutor used his second peremptory strike to excuse Ms. A., who has a Hispanic surname. On her juror questionnaire, Ms. A. had stated that she was affiliated with a church. Ms. A. was also dismissed. The prosecution exercised three more peremptory challenges, and Rodriguez used all six available to him. The trial court denied Rodriguez' Batson-challenged jurors for lack of a pattern of strikes against members of a cognizable racial group. The court of appeals reversed Rodriguez’s convictions and ordered a new trial because it held that the trial court clearly erred by denying Rodriguez’s Batson challenges for failure to show a pattern of discrimination. The Colorado Court granted the State's petition for certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision to reverse Rodriguez’s convictions and order a new trial. After review, the Court reversed, holding that the proper remedy for an inadequate inquiry into a Batson challenge at the time of jury selection was to remand the case to the trial court with directions to conduct the three-part Batson analysis and make the required factual findings. An inadequate Batson inquiry occurs when the trial court’s findings are insufficient to determine whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has proved that the proponent used the strike to purposefully discriminate against prospective jurors at issue. The case was remanded for the trial court to conduct the three-part Batson analysis. View "Colorado v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the court of appeals erred in its conclusion that defendant waived his public trial claim by failing to object to the closure of the courtroom during jury selection. The case turned largely on whether the controlling case law, "Anderson v. Colorado," (490 P.2d 47 (Colo. 1971)) remained controlling, or whether it was abrogated by more recent United States Supreme Court decisions in "Waller v. Georgia," (467 U.S. 39 (1984)) and "Presley v. Georgia," (558 U.S. 209 (2010)). The Colorado Court concluded that "Anderson" remained good law and controlling in this case, therefore, it affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Stackhouse v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Colorado Governor, under guidance from the state's medical and nursing boards, decided that Colorado would opt-out of a federal regulation requiring certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) administer anesthesia under a physician's supervision. Under the regulation, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers and critical access hospitals received Medicare reimbursement if CRNAs worked under a physician's supervision. Petitioners the Colorado Medical Society and the Colorado Society of Anesthesiologists, filed suit against the Governor, claiming that Colorado law did not permit CRNAs to administer anesthesia without supervision. In ruling on the Governor's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that petitioners failed to state a valid claim and granted relief. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion. The Supreme Court agreed with the result, but held that the Governor's decision to opt-out of the federal regulation was revieweable by a court only for a gross abuse of discretion. Because petitioners did not allege that such a gross abuse occurred here, the court of appeals' decision to affirm dismissal of the case was affirmed. View "Colorado Medical Society v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

The Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District appealed a water court order that interpreted an earlier stipulated decree to which it and Cherokee Metropolitan District were parties, concerning Cherokee's rights to deliver wastewater returns back to the Upper Black Squirrel Basin for recharge of the aquafier. Upper Black Squirrel District sought a declaration that the stipulation bar Cherokee and Meridian (another metropolitan district with which Cherokee had entered into an intergovernmental agreement) from claiming credit for the wastewater returns as replacement water, for purposes of acquiring the right to additional pumping from Cherokee's wells in the basin. The water court ruled instead that nothing in the stipulation implied abandonment or forfeiture of any right Cherokee might otherwise have to claim future credits with the Ground Water Commission. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the water court properly interpreted the stipulation, it affirmed the order. View "Up. Black Squirrel Creek Grnd Water Mgmt Dist v. Cherokee Metro. Dist." on Justia Law

After entry of a guilty verdict, defense counsel obtained juror affidavits suggesting that one of the jurors exhibited racial bias against the defendant during deliberations. The trial court refused to consider these affidavits, finding that Colorado Rule of Evidence ("CRE") 606(b) barred their admission, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether CRE 606(b) applied to such affidavits and, if so, whether the Sixth Amendment nevertheless required their admission. After review, the Court concluded that the affidavits regarding the juror's biased statements fell within the broad sweep of CRE606(b) and that they did not satisfy the rule's "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado" on Justia Law