Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on a series of questions arising under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act ("the LSA") which established indeterminate sentencing for felony sex offenses. Specifically, the Court addressed whether a minimum sentence in the aggravated range on a conviction for sexual assault on a child–pattern of abuse is legal when there is no explicit finding of aggravating circumstances. The Court also addressed three related procedural questions: is the prosecution authorized to appeal a legal sentence entered on resentencing?; if a defendant received an illegal sentence on one count, does Crim. P. 35(a) entitle him to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences?; If not, does Crim. P. 35(b)nonetheless authorize a resentencing court to reconsider and reduce the defendant's legal sentences? The Court held: (1) when a conviction is for a sex offense that requires sentencing in accordance with the mandatory sentencing statute, the prosecution is not required to prove aggravating circumstances to support a bottom-end sentence in the aggravated range; (2) the prosecution here is authorized to appeal the post-conviction court's ruling on the defendant's Rule35(a) motion because it challenged the legal basis for the range the post-conviction court used to impose the sentence; (3)under Crim. P. 35(a), the illegality of a sentence on one count does not entitle a defendant to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences; and(4) if a sentence is subject to correction on one count, Crim. P. 35(b) authorized a resentencing court to reconsider and reduce the legal sentences as to all counts after it has corrected the entire sentence. View "Hunsaker v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the narrow question of whether the trial court's improper admission of unfairly prejudicial 404(b) evidence offered to establish the defendant's intent in a single count warranted reversing defendant Armando Perez' two remaining convictions. The trial court allowed 404(b) evidence for the limited purpose of showing Perez's intent to commit sexual assault or unlawful sexual contact upon a child for the count of enticement of a child. In so doing, it excluded the jury's use of the 404(b) evidence for any element for the two remaining counts, sexual assault on a child and second-degree kidnapping. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the evidence and that the error was not harmless, and reversed the enticement conviction. The court of appeals, however, affirmed the defendant's sexual assault and kidnapping convictions because it presumed that the jury followed the limiting instructions not to consider the evidence for any element of those two counts. The State did not appeal the court of appeals' ruling that the trial court erred in admitting the 404(b) evidence. After review of Perez' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 404(b) evidence of Perez's prior bad acts for a single count, and that the error was not harmless as to the convictions on the two remaining counts. The Court therefore vacated Perez's convictions for sexual assault on a child and second-degree kidnapping and remanded to the court of appeals with instructions to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Coats claimed respondent Dish Network, LLC violated 24-34-402.5 C.R.s. (2014) by terminating his employment based on his state-licensed use of medical marijuana at home, during non-working hours. He argued that the Medical Marijuana Amendment (Colo. Const. art XVIII sec. 14) made such use "lawful" for purposes of the statute, notwithstanding any federal laws prohibiting medical marijuana use. The trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim after finding that medical marijuana use was not "lawful" under Colorado state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed: "the term 'lawful' as used in section 24-34-402.5, was not restricted in any way, and we decline to engraft a state law limitation onto the term. Therefore, an activity such as medical marijuana use that is unlawful under the federal law is not a 'lawful' activity under section 24-34-402.5." View "Coats v. Dish Network" on Justia Law

The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in ruling that "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)) applied retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. Defendant Frank Vigil, Jr. Filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief of his final judgment, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under "miller." The trial court applied "Miller" retroactively and granted his motion. The Supreme Court held that "Miller" did not apply retroactively, and reversed. View "Colorado v. Vigil" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a change of water rights filed by applicants East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District and Colorado Water Network, Inc. (collectively, East Cherry Creek). East Cherry Creek submitted an application for change of water right involving shares it owned in the Greeley Irrigation Company (GIC) for use in its system. The Poudre Prairie Decree employed a ditch-wide analysis for calculating the amount of historical consumptive use ascribable to each GIC share. Subsequent decrees relied on the ditch-wide historical consumptive use determination made in the Poudre Decree. In making its application, East Cherry Creek asserted its ability to use the same Poudre pro-rata allocation of consumptive use water to its shares as occurred for previously changed shares in the ditch system. East Cherry Creek sought an order from the water court entering the court's denial of its Rule 56(h) motion as a final judgment, and the State and Division Engineers opposed the motion. The order was made final, and East Cherry Creek appealed denial of its Rule 54(b) motion to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court agreed with the Engineers that the water court's order did not constitute a final judgment on any claim for relief in the underlying change case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's certification order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Cherry Creek Valley v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

This water case involving neighboring property owners in Saguache County presented an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court: may the land owner whose property is burdened by an easement across his or her property for a water ditch obtain a junior conditional water right at the headgate of that ditch for non-consumptive hydropower use of water that the neighbor is diverting from the stream under a senior water right for irrigation use through that headgate? Applying the no material injury, water availability, and maximum beneficial use principles of Colorado water law, in conjunction the decision in "Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co.," (36P.3d 1229 (2001)), the District Court for Water Division No. 3 issued a declaratory judgment and a conditional water right decree in the amount of 0.41 cubic feet per second ("cfs") with a 2010 priority for hydropower use to Charles and Barbara Tidd for diversion from Garner Creek at the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. The Plaintiffs–Appellants, David L. Frees, George A. Frees, Delmer E. Frees, and Shirley A. Frees, asserted that the water court lacked authority to decree this water right over their objection. After review, the Supreme Court deferred to the water court's findings of fact and upheld its conclusions of law. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the water court did not err in issuing a conditional decree for a non-consumptive hydropower use water right with a 2010 priority for 0.41 cfs diverted from Garner Creek through the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. View "Frees v. Tidd" on Justia Law

Health Grades, Inc., operated a website providing information to healthcare consumers about hospitals and physicians around the country, filed suit against two of its former employees, Christopher Boyer and Patrick Singson. Its complaint alleged that Boyer and Singson created competing websites during their employment at Health Grades and solicited Health Grades’ clients to advertise on their competing websites, which utilized proprietary methodologies created by Health Grades to increase the probability that consumers would discover their websites. The complaint included claims of breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, and ultimately, breach of contract and conversion. Defendants Boyer and Singson denied Health Grades’ material allegations and asserted a counterclaim for abuse of process. In support of their counterclaim, they alleged that Health Grades’ claims lacked a reasonable factual basis or cognizable basis in law and were based on allegations Health Grades largely knew to be false. A jury rejected all of Health Grades’ claims and returned a verdict for defendants on their counterclaim. The court subsequently denied Health Grades’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court found that the district court erred by allowing the jury to decide the question of whether Health Grades’ claims were devoid of reasonable factual support or lacked any cognizable basis in law such that they were not immune from liability under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment; and it remanded with instructions for the district court to make an independent judicial determination of that question. Shortly after the opinion was released, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in "General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller," (291 P.3d 1), holding that the heightened standard set forth in earlier case law did not apply where the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint concerning a purely private dispute. On rehearing, the court of appeals modified its initial opinion, concluding that nothing in "General Steel" required the modification of its remand order. Because the Supreme Court held that the underlying rationale for its judgment in General Steel concerning arbitration proceedings was equally applicable to actions filed in courts of law, and because it was uncontested by the parties that the action filed by Health Grades involved a purely private dispute, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the matter remanded with directions to affirm the jury’s verdict. View "Boyer v. Health Grades, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, then-Governor Bill Ritter, Jr. consulted with the state's medical and nursing boards and concluded that opting out of the supervision requirement for certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) would be consistent with state law and would be in the state's best interest. The Governor sent notice of his conclusions to the federal government, and exercised the opt-out as to all critical access hospitals in Colorado and certain rural general hospitals. Petitioners, the Colorado Medical Society and the Colorado Society of Anesthesiologists, filed suit against the Governor, claiming that Colorado law did not permit CRNAs to administer anesthesia without supervision by a physician. The Governor and three intervening medical associations (respondents) moved to dismiss petitioners'' complaint. The trial court found that petitioners failed to state a valid claim and granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, which also affirmed, albeit on different grounds: the Court found petitioners had standing, however, contrary to the assumption that belied this case (the Governor's attestation with regard to physician supervision of CRNAs) is not a generally binding interpretation of Colorado that is subject to de novo review. The Governor's decision, if reviewable at all, is reviewable only for a gross abuse of discretion. Because petitioners did not allege as much, the case was properly dismissed. View "Colorado Medical Society v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

Defendants Tenarro Banks and Michael Tate were convicted in 2004 of class 1 felonies for acts committed when they were juveniles. The Supreme Court granted review in defendants' respective cases to determine what remedy was appropriate in light of the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time (which governed offenses committed between 1990 and 2006), both Banks and Tate were given mandatory sentences to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). While both cases were pending on appeal to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court released its opinion in "Miller." The "Miller" decision rendered the Colorado statutory scheme for mandatory LWOP in place from 1990-2006 as unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Because the Colorado legislature has not acted to adopt a new sentencing scheme in light of "Miller," so the Colorado Supreme Court was tasked with "filling the gap." For Tate and Banks, the Supreme Court remanded the cases for the trial court to determine wither LWOP was an appropriate sentence under "Miller;" if the trial court determined LWOP was not warranted, life with the possibility of parole (LWPP) was the proper sentence. A third case before the Court on collateral review centered on whether "Miller" applied retroactively: Brendan Jensen was convicted in 1998 of first degree murder while he was seventeen. Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time, his sentence was LWOP. The Court held that the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive in nature, and therefore did not apply retroactively. For Jensen, the Court affirmed the trial court's order denying his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law

Commercial Research, LLC (“Creditor”) obtained an assignment of a default judgment that had been entered against Gary S. Roup in a Texas court. Creditor then filed the judgment in Colorado and began collection proceedings against Roup’s assets, including $3,729.24 held in a Health Savings Account (HSA). Roup asserted these funds were exempt from attachment or garnishment because his HSA is a retirement plan under section 13-54-102(1)(s), which exempted certain types of property (including funds held in any “retirement plan”) from levy and sale. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an HSA qualified as a “retirement plan” for the purposes of section 13-54-102(1)(s), C.R.S. (2014). The Court held that an HSA is not a “retirement plan” within the meaning of Colorado’s exemption statute. "An HSA is not intended to replace income lost as a result of retirement; it is intended to cover medical costs incurred at any point during a person’s lifetime. The General Assembly has not chosen to provide an exemption for HSAs in the relevant statutes." The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Roup v. Commercial Research, LLC" on Justia Law