Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Douglas Wilson was charged with first degree murder. He was appointed a public defender, but citing a conflict of interest, Wilson insisted upon new representation. The trial court determined that Wilson either had to keep the same lawyer or represent himself. Wilson opted to represent himself with assistance from advisory counsel. At a subsequent hearing, a question over Wilson's competency to stand trial became an issue. After being deemed competent as long as he was on his medications, Wilson went through two more attorneys until six days prior to trial when Wilson alleged he was no longer competent to stand trial. The trial court disagreed with Wilson's allegations, and he continued to represent himself with limited help. A jury ultimately found him guilty. Wilson appealed his conviction through counsel, and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner William Beaty was charged with assault, criminal mischief, tampering with a victim or witness, and intimidating a victim or witness. A public defender was appointed to represent Beaty, but that counsel was dismissed and Beaty elected to represent himself. After his Arguello advisement, Beaty chose not to represent himself, and accepted the help of a public defender. Beaty stated that his original decision to proceed pro se was due in part to his failing to take his medications to control bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. On the first day of trial, Beaty expressed a renewed desire to represent himself due to a conflict with his public defender. Beaty represented himself throughout the trial, and a jury found him guilty of all charges. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in Williams' and Beaty's cases to determine whether to adopt a new competency standard for mentally ill defendants in light of "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). The Court declined to create a new standard, and affirmed the court of appeals' decisions to retain the existing analytical framework. View "Wilson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant Rashaim Davis with possession and distribution of a schedule II controlled substance after Davis allegedly sold 0.372 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover detective. The State appointed a series of attorneys to represent Davis, but he refused to cooperate with any of his lawyers. He also threatened to harm at least one lawyer and wanted an investigator from the public defender's office that he might harm her if she made him uncomfortable. Several of Davis' lawyers questioned whether he was competent to proceed because at times he "exhibited a flat affect, bordering on catatonic." Prior to trial, Davis told the trial court he wanted to represent himself. Davis was taking several medications for his "bipolarism," and that he had a mistrust of lawyers resulting from paranoia that the medications did not completely control. The trial court was not convinced that Davis could proceed pro se; the case was tried with court-appointed counsel. A jury found Davis guilty of all counts. Davis appealed the trial court's denial of his requests to represent himself and his subsequent convictions to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order denying Davis' request to represent himself, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, declining to adopt a new competency standard for mentally ill defendants pursuant to "Edwards." Furthermore, the Court reversed the appellate court's failing to order the trial court to merge Davis' possession and distribution convictions during sentencing. View "Colorado v. Davis" on Justia Law

Morgan Drexen was described as a "legal software and legal software development company" owned and operated by nonlawyers but provided paraprofessional and administrative support to attorneys. The company provided debt-management services nationwide in conjunction with contracting attorneys, known as "engagement counsel." Morgan Drexen referred to engagement counsel as its "clients" and paid them a minimal fee that passed through the engagement counsel's (or engagement law firm's) trust accounts. Parties Donald Moore and Lawrence Williamson, Jr. served as engagement counsel. Moore was a Colorado-licensed attorney, and Williamson was a Kansas attorney who represented Colorado clients by association with Moore. In 2011, Morgan Drexen applied in Colorado to be registered as a debt-management service provider under the Debt Management Services Act (DMSA). The DMSA Administrator denied the application and issued a cease-and-desist order instructing Morgan Drexen to stop providing its services to Colorado residents and collecting fees. Morgan Drexen, Moore and Williamson filed a complaint seeking a declaration that :(1) they did not provide debt-management services under the original DMSA; and (2) the amended DMSA was unconstitutional. In its review of Morgan Drexen's appeal, the Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in concluding that Morgan Drexen's services fell within the scope of the legal services exemption in the original DMSA. Further, the amended DMSA was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coffman v. Williamson" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve a split of authority between divisions of the court of appeals on whether double jeopardy barred a new habitual criminal sentencing hearing when the trial court erroneously dismissed the habitual counts before the State presented any evidence as to those counts. In 2002, Reginald Porter robbed and attempted to sexually assault a casino worker. He tried to evade capture after a police chase. Based on these events, the State charged Porter with two counts of first degree burglary and one count each of aggravated auto theft, attempted sexual assault, aggravated robbery, vehicular eluding and third degree assault. The prosecution added habitual counts later. A jury found Porter guilty of all charges. The trial court adjudicated Porter as a habitual offender. Porter appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Porter waived his right to trial by jury, and the court found him guilty of most of the substantive charges. Before the habitual phase, Porter moved to dismiss the habitual counts. The trial court was persuaded by his arguments, and the counts were dismissed. The court of appeals concluded, in pertinent part, that double jeopardy precluded a new habitual criminal sentencing hearing. The court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in "Colorado v. Quintana," (634 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1981)) to conclude that jeopardy attached during the substantive phase of trial, and carried through to the habitual phase. Since Quintana, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal constitutional double jeopardy protections do not apply to habitual criminal proceedings. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Colorado double jeopardy law did not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings. Accordingly, double jeopardy did not bar trial of defendant's habitual counts in this case. View "Colorado v. Porter" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk sought a declaration that it was prohibited from disclosing the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, the General Assembly enacted 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014) that made voted ballots subject to CORA. The Clerk thereafter produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect. The only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. After its review, the Supreme Court held that when an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure, a prevailing requestor was entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court found that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. The district court in this case found the denial was proper, therefore Marks was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law

Allstate Insurance Company petitioned for review of a court of appeals' judgment that reversed the dismissal of a breach of assignment claim brought by Medical Lien Management (MLM). The district court effectively construed MLM's Lien and Security Agreement with a motor vehicle accident victim (upon which the underlying complaint was premised), as failing to assign the victim's right to the proceeds of his personal injury lawsuit against Allstate's insured. The court of appeals found a valid assignment to MLM all rights to the future proceeds from the personal injury claim in an amount equal to the costs of medical services paid for by MLM, as well as a sufficient allegation in the complaint of an enforceable obligation by Allstate to pay the assigned sums to MLM. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals erred in finding the purported assignment in this case. View "Allstate Insurance Co. v. Medical Lien Management, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, a man made sexual advances toward two teenaged girls in a bathroom of a horse-facing facility in which petitioner Miguel Pena-Rodriguez worked. The girls identified petitioner as the assailant at a one-on-one show-up. The State charged petitioner with one count of sexual assault on a child, one count of unlawful sexual contact, and two counts of harassment. At the start of a three-day trial, the venire received a written questionnaire. None of the jurors that were impaneled answered any question pertaining to any biases, or if they were unable to be fair on their respective questionnaires. After trial, the jury ultimately found petitioner guilty on all but the attempted sexual assault charge. Two weeks later, petitioner moved the trial court for juror contact information, alleging that some members of the jury used ethnic slurs in the course of deliberations. Defense counsel obtained affidavits from some jurors suggesting that one juror exhibited racial bias against petitioner during deliberations. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the secrecy of those deliberations and petitioner's constitutional right to an impartial jury. Specifically, the issue was whether CRE 606(b) applied to such affidavits, and if so, whether the Sixth Amendment nevertheless required their admission. The Supreme Court concluded that the affidavits fell within the broad sweep of CRE 606(b), and that they did not satisfy the rule's "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. The Court held that the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) did not violate petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. View "Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a change-of-water-rights application filed by East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District and the Colorado Water Network, Inc. (collectively, East Cherry Creek). East Cherry Creek submitted its application involving shares it owned in the Greeley Irrigation Company (GIC) for use in its water system. The "Poudre Prairie Decree" used a ditch-wide analysis for calculating the amount of historical consumptive use ascribable to each GIC share. East Cherry Creek asserted its ability to use the same Poudre Prairie pro-rata allocation of consumptive use water to its shares as occurred for previously changed shares in the ditch system. The water court denied East Cherry Creek's C.R.C.P. 56(h) motion. East Cherry Creek then sought an order entering the denial as a final judgment. The State and Division Engineers opposed the motion, but was overruled. East Cherry Creek then appealed its Rule 56(h) motion denial (raising three issues), and the Engineers cross-appealed (raising two issues). The Supreme Court agreed with the Engineers: that the trial court did not enter a final judgment on any claim for relief in this litigation. The water court's certification order was reversed, the appeal dismissed, and the case remanded for further proceedings at the water court. View "East Cherry Creek Valley v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether (and to what extent) the Colorado Probate Code displaced a court's authority to award an equitable adjustment supplementing a spouse's elective share of the decedent's estate. By the date of final distribution, the estate at issue here had grown in value from $73 million to more than $250 million. The probate court concluded that it would have been unfair for the elective share to be "frozen in time" while litigation concerning its computation eroded its value in relation to the appreciating estate. The Court exercised its equitable authority by supplementing the elective share, and awarded the surviving spouse $26 million plus an equitable award of approximately $24.5 million. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Probate Code displaced the probate court's authority with regard to the elective share, as a matter of law. Reading the elective-share statutes together with the probate court's equitable authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the Code's plain language demonstrated that 15-11-202(1) C.R.S. (2014), fixed the value of the property comprising the augmented estate on the decedent's date of death. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the probate court erred in linking its equitable award to appreciation and income to the entire augmented estate. Nevertheless, 15-10-103 expressly reserved the probate court's equitable authority to the extent that it was not displaced by a specific statutory provision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded this case. The court of appeals judgment requiring the surviving spouse repay $24.4 million was set aside, and the probate court was mandated to determine on remand what equitable relief was available under the specific facts of this case. View "Beren v. Beren" on Justia Law

While incarcerated, defendant Josph Diaz punched a prison guard. Less than three months later, Diaz threw a cup that hit another guard in the mouth. The district attorney charged him in two cases with second degree assault of a detention center employee. Diaz finished finishing his original sentence before he went to trial in either assault case. Trial for the second assault took place before trial for the first. A jury found Diaz guilty, and the court sentenced him to ten years for the second (cup-throwing) assault. Shortly thereafter, another jury found Diaz guilty of the first assault, and he was sentenced to ten years consecutive to the ten he was sentenced for the second assault. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by ruling that 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S. (2014) required that the sentences be served concurrently. The Supreme Court reversed: 18-3-203(1)(f) required a consecutive sentence if, at the time of sentencing, a defendant was serving any other sentence. View "Colorado v. Diaz" on Justia Law