Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether (and to what extent) the Colorado Probate Code displaced a court's authority to award an equitable adjustment supplementing a spouse's elective share of the decedent's estate. By the date of final distribution, the estate at issue here had grown in value from $73 million to more than $250 million. The probate court concluded that it would have been unfair for the elective share to be "frozen in time" while litigation concerning its computation eroded its value in relation to the appreciating estate. The Court exercised its equitable authority by supplementing the elective share, and awarded the surviving spouse $26 million plus an equitable award of approximately $24.5 million. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Probate Code displaced the probate court's authority with regard to the elective share, as a matter of law. Reading the elective-share statutes together with the probate court's equitable authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the Code's plain language demonstrated that 15-11-202(1) C.R.S. (2014), fixed the value of the property comprising the augmented estate on the decedent's date of death. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the probate court erred in linking its equitable award to appreciation and income to the entire augmented estate. Nevertheless, 15-10-103 expressly reserved the probate court's equitable authority to the extent that it was not displaced by a specific statutory provision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded this case. The court of appeals judgment requiring the surviving spouse repay $24.4 million was set aside, and the probate court was mandated to determine on remand what equitable relief was available under the specific facts of this case. View "Beren v. Beren" on Justia Law

While incarcerated, defendant Josph Diaz punched a prison guard. Less than three months later, Diaz threw a cup that hit another guard in the mouth. The district attorney charged him in two cases with second degree assault of a detention center employee. Diaz finished finishing his original sentence before he went to trial in either assault case. Trial for the second assault took place before trial for the first. A jury found Diaz guilty, and the court sentenced him to ten years for the second (cup-throwing) assault. Shortly thereafter, another jury found Diaz guilty of the first assault, and he was sentenced to ten years consecutive to the ten he was sentenced for the second assault. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by ruling that 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S. (2014) required that the sentences be served concurrently. The Supreme Court reversed: 18-3-203(1)(f) required a consecutive sentence if, at the time of sentencing, a defendant was serving any other sentence. View "Colorado v. Diaz" on Justia Law

The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's order suppressing the results of a blood draw taken from defendant-appellee Travis Ackerman. At the hearing, the trial court found that a warrant was required before the police could order a blood draw and that the police lacked exigent circumstances that would justify the involuntary, warrantless blood draw under the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed on the issue of whether the facts of the case constituted exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court held that under the specific facts of this case, exigent circumstances existed: police were still investigating the scene of the crime and were not finished preparing the affidavit for a warrant they learned that the hospital personnel were taking the unconscious and injured defendant for the medical procedures that could alter his blood-alcohol content. Under the totality of the circumstances, these exigent circumstances made it impractical for the police to obtain a search warrant and justified the blood draw. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

After an exchange of Rule 26 disclosures, Anero Resources Corporation, Antero Resources Piceance Corporation, Calfrac Well Services Corporation and Frontier Drilling, LLC (collectively, Antero Resources) asked the trial court to enter a modified case management order requiring plaintffs, William and Beth Strudley, to present prima facie evidence that they suffered injuries attributable to the natural gas drilling operations of Antero Resources. The trial court granted the motion and issued a "Lone Pine" order that directed the Strudleys to provide prima facie evidence to support their claims of exposure, injury, and causation before the court would allow full discovery. The trial court determined that the Strudleys failed to present such evidence, and dismissed their case with prejudice. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that, as a matter of first impression, "Lone Pine" orders were not permitted as a matter of Colorado law. Upon review of the matter from an appeal of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that Colorado's Rules of Civil Procedure did not allow a trial court to issue a modified case management order (such as a "lone Pine" order) that required a plaintiff to present prima facie evidence in support of a claim before plaintiff could exercise its full rights of discovery under the Colorado Rules. "Although the comments to C.R.C.P. 16 promote active judicial case management, the rule does not provide a trial court with authority to fashion its own summary judgment-like filter and dismiss claims during the early stages of litigation." View "Antero Resources v. Strudley" on Justia Law

After a late night out, Jillian Groh brought a group of friends back to a room she rented at the Westin Hotel. Security guards confronted the group about the noise level in the room, and ultimately evicted them, even though Groh and her companions advised the guards they were drunk and could not drive. On the way out, one of the friends asked if the group could wait in the lobby for a taxi (because it was cold outside). The guard blocked the door. Seven people then got into Groh's car, with a drunk driver behind the wheel. Fifteen miles away they rear-ended another vehicle, resulting in a crash that killed one man and left Groh in a persistent vegetative state with traumatic brain injuries. Groh's parents sued the Westin for their daughter's injuries, because of the manner in which the security guards evicted her. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression: what duty of care, if any, does a hotel owe a guest during a lawful eviction? A divided appellate panel held that the hotel had a duty to evict a guest "in a reasonable manner," noting that this precludes ejecting a guest into a "foreseeably dangerous circumstance" that result from either the guest's condition or the environment. It also held that the Colorado Dram Shop Act did not apply because the hotel did not serve Groh alcohol. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's analysis, and affirmed. View "Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh" on Justia Law

Petitioner Barbara Jordan sued respondent Panorama Orthopedics and Spine Center, PC for negligence and premises liability. After receiving medical treatment at the Center, Jordan tripped over uneven sidewalk slabs near Panorama's main entrance. She fell and suffered a concussion and an orbital fracture. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Colorado pRemises Liability Act (PLA) applied to a commercial tenant defendant for injuries plaintiff sustained in a common area. Specifically, the case turned on whether the tenant qualified as a "landowner" under the PLA. A jury ultimately found in favor of petitioner. The clinic appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, concluding that because the clinic neither was in possession of the sidewalk where petitioner fell, it was not legally responsible for the condition of the sidewalk or for the activities conducted or circumstances existing there, so it was not a landowner as defined by the PLA. View "Jordan v. Panorama Orthopedics & Spine Ctr., PC" on Justia Law

Applicants-appellants Tom McKenna and McKenna Ranch challenged a water court decision regarding the abandonment list of three of its water rights. The Division Engineer placed applicants' three Sanchez Ditch water rights on the decennial abandonment list because the ditch had not diverted water for several decades. After a hearing in 2013, the water court determined that the Sanchez Ditch water rights had not been applied to beneficial use for the statutory abandonment period, and found applicants had failed to rebut the resultant presumption of intent to abandon the rights. Applicants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the water court's judgment was improper because the Division Engineer missed the statutory deadline to prepare the abandonment list by several days, which they claim divested the water court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed: the deadline to prepare the list under 37-92-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014), was directional and not a jurisdictional mandate. Thus the Division Engineer's failure to prepare the list by the statutory deadline did not divest the water court of jurisdiction. Furthermore, because the record supported the water court's conclusion that applicants intended to permanently discontinue using the Sanchez Ditch water rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court's judgment of abandonment. View "McKenna v. Witte" on Justia Law

Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB), after a notice and comment period and a hearing, voted to appropriate an instream flow right (ISF) on the San Miguel River, and to file a water application for water rights with the water court. Farmers Water Development Company opposed the proposed San Miguel ISF during the notice and comment period, but did not attend the hearing. Farmers also opposed the application at the water court. On cross-motions for a determination of a question of law, the water court was asked to determine whether the CWCB's decision to appropriate an ISF was a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial decision. Farmers argued that the decision was quasi-judicial, and that the procedures CWCB followed did not meet the dictates of procedural due process. The water court disagreed, concluding the CWCB was acting in a quasi-legislative capacity when it decided to appropriate the San Miguel ISF because, among other things, it was not adjudicating individual rights. The Supreme Court agreed: the CWCB's ISF appropriation was quasi-legislative because it was a policy decision "to preserve the natural environment" on behalf of the people of Colorado, as opposed to an adjudication of the rights of any specific party. View "Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Farmers Water Development Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Zachariah Jones petitioned the Supreme Court to appeal a district court's decision to revoke his bail bond in its entirety, and ordered that he be held without bond pending resolution of charges in a different district. Defendant was arrested, charged and released on bond in connection with several felony drug offenses in Denver County. Several months later, the Denver District Attorney moved to revoke bond, alleging that while Jones was released on bond, a court in Adams County issued a warrant for his arrest, based on an assault charge. The Denver district court concluded that because another court had found probable cause to believe defendant committed another felony, it had the statutory authority to revoke bond. The Court of Appeals found it lacked jurisdiction to review the Denver district court's judgment according to an expedited procedure listed in 16-4-205 (3), C.R.S. (2014). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded after review, concluding the appellate court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. "Because section 105(3) merely empowered the district court to have Jones brought before it for purposes of modifying the conditions of his pretrial release, the district court erred in revoking his existing bond and denying him a right to pretrial release altogether." The matter was remanded to the district court with directions to reinstate defendant's bail bond. View "In re Colorado v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sarah Burnett and a friend went camping at Cherry Creek State Park. They chose a campsite under a canopy of mature cottonwood trees. "The weather that night was uneventful." Early the next morning, while petitioner and her friend remained sleeping inside their tent, a large limb dropped from one of the trees and struck both of them. The blow fractured petitioner's skull and a vertebra, and caused other injuries, including a concussion and multiple lacerations to her scalp and face. The friend suffered only minor injuries, and was able to drive petitioner to the hospital. Petitioner brought a premises liability action against the State Division of Parks and Outdoor Recreation, seeking compensation for her injuries, arguing the Park was a "public facility" and the branches overhanging the campsite constituted a "dangerous condition." The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State waived its immunity for petitioner's injuries. The answer turned on whether the tree was a "natural condition...of unimproved property" under 24-10-106(1)(e) C.R.S. (2014) of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. The Court held that a "natural condition of any unimproved property" includes native trees originating on unimproved property. Because a limb from such a tree caused petitioner's injuries, the natural condition provision of the statute immunized the State in this case. View "Burnett v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law