Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This water case involving neighboring property owners in Saguache County presented an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court: may the land owner whose property is burdened by an easement across his or her property for a water ditch obtain a junior conditional water right at the headgate of that ditch for non-consumptive hydropower use of water that the neighbor is diverting from the stream under a senior water right for irrigation use through that headgate? Applying the no material injury, water availability, and maximum beneficial use principles of Colorado water law, in conjunction the decision in "Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co.," (36P.3d 1229 (2001)), the District Court for Water Division No. 3 issued a declaratory judgment and a conditional water right decree in the amount of 0.41 cubic feet per second ("cfs") with a 2010 priority for hydropower use to Charles and Barbara Tidd for diversion from Garner Creek at the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. The Plaintiffs–Appellants, David L. Frees, George A. Frees, Delmer E. Frees, and Shirley A. Frees, asserted that the water court lacked authority to decree this water right over their objection. After review, the Supreme Court deferred to the water court's findings of fact and upheld its conclusions of law. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the water court did not err in issuing a conditional decree for a non-consumptive hydropower use water right with a 2010 priority for 0.41 cfs diverted from Garner Creek through the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. View "Frees v. Tidd" on Justia Law

Health Grades, Inc., operated a website providing information to healthcare consumers about hospitals and physicians around the country, filed suit against two of its former employees, Christopher Boyer and Patrick Singson. Its complaint alleged that Boyer and Singson created competing websites during their employment at Health Grades and solicited Health Grades’ clients to advertise on their competing websites, which utilized proprietary methodologies created by Health Grades to increase the probability that consumers would discover their websites. The complaint included claims of breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, and ultimately, breach of contract and conversion. Defendants Boyer and Singson denied Health Grades’ material allegations and asserted a counterclaim for abuse of process. In support of their counterclaim, they alleged that Health Grades’ claims lacked a reasonable factual basis or cognizable basis in law and were based on allegations Health Grades largely knew to be false. A jury rejected all of Health Grades’ claims and returned a verdict for defendants on their counterclaim. The court subsequently denied Health Grades’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court found that the district court erred by allowing the jury to decide the question of whether Health Grades’ claims were devoid of reasonable factual support or lacked any cognizable basis in law such that they were not immune from liability under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment; and it remanded with instructions for the district court to make an independent judicial determination of that question. Shortly after the opinion was released, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in "General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller," (291 P.3d 1), holding that the heightened standard set forth in earlier case law did not apply where the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint concerning a purely private dispute. On rehearing, the court of appeals modified its initial opinion, concluding that nothing in "General Steel" required the modification of its remand order. Because the Supreme Court held that the underlying rationale for its judgment in General Steel concerning arbitration proceedings was equally applicable to actions filed in courts of law, and because it was uncontested by the parties that the action filed by Health Grades involved a purely private dispute, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the matter remanded with directions to affirm the jury’s verdict. View "Boyer v. Health Grades, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, then-Governor Bill Ritter, Jr. consulted with the state's medical and nursing boards and concluded that opting out of the supervision requirement for certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) would be consistent with state law and would be in the state's best interest. The Governor sent notice of his conclusions to the federal government, and exercised the opt-out as to all critical access hospitals in Colorado and certain rural general hospitals. Petitioners, the Colorado Medical Society and the Colorado Society of Anesthesiologists, filed suit against the Governor, claiming that Colorado law did not permit CRNAs to administer anesthesia without supervision by a physician. The Governor and three intervening medical associations (respondents) moved to dismiss petitioners'' complaint. The trial court found that petitioners failed to state a valid claim and granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, which also affirmed, albeit on different grounds: the Court found petitioners had standing, however, contrary to the assumption that belied this case (the Governor's attestation with regard to physician supervision of CRNAs) is not a generally binding interpretation of Colorado that is subject to de novo review. The Governor's decision, if reviewable at all, is reviewable only for a gross abuse of discretion. Because petitioners did not allege as much, the case was properly dismissed. View "Colorado Medical Society v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

Defendants Tenarro Banks and Michael Tate were convicted in 2004 of class 1 felonies for acts committed when they were juveniles. The Supreme Court granted review in defendants' respective cases to determine what remedy was appropriate in light of the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time (which governed offenses committed between 1990 and 2006), both Banks and Tate were given mandatory sentences to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). While both cases were pending on appeal to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court released its opinion in "Miller." The "Miller" decision rendered the Colorado statutory scheme for mandatory LWOP in place from 1990-2006 as unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Because the Colorado legislature has not acted to adopt a new sentencing scheme in light of "Miller," so the Colorado Supreme Court was tasked with "filling the gap." For Tate and Banks, the Supreme Court remanded the cases for the trial court to determine wither LWOP was an appropriate sentence under "Miller;" if the trial court determined LWOP was not warranted, life with the possibility of parole (LWPP) was the proper sentence. A third case before the Court on collateral review centered on whether "Miller" applied retroactively: Brendan Jensen was convicted in 1998 of first degree murder while he was seventeen. Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time, his sentence was LWOP. The Court held that the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive in nature, and therefore did not apply retroactively. For Jensen, the Court affirmed the trial court's order denying his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law

Commercial Research, LLC (“Creditor”) obtained an assignment of a default judgment that had been entered against Gary S. Roup in a Texas court. Creditor then filed the judgment in Colorado and began collection proceedings against Roup’s assets, including $3,729.24 held in a Health Savings Account (HSA). Roup asserted these funds were exempt from attachment or garnishment because his HSA is a retirement plan under section 13-54-102(1)(s), which exempted certain types of property (including funds held in any “retirement plan”) from levy and sale. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an HSA qualified as a “retirement plan” for the purposes of section 13-54-102(1)(s), C.R.S. (2014). The Court held that an HSA is not a “retirement plan” within the meaning of Colorado’s exemption statute. "An HSA is not intended to replace income lost as a result of retirement; it is intended to cover medical costs incurred at any point during a person’s lifetime. The General Assembly has not chosen to provide an exemption for HSAs in the relevant statutes." The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Roup v. Commercial Research, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Douglas Wilson was charged with first degree murder. He was appointed a public defender, but citing a conflict of interest, Wilson insisted upon new representation. The trial court determined that Wilson either had to keep the same lawyer or represent himself. Wilson opted to represent himself with assistance from advisory counsel. At a subsequent hearing, a question over Wilson's competency to stand trial became an issue. After being deemed competent as long as he was on his medications, Wilson went through two more attorneys until six days prior to trial when Wilson alleged he was no longer competent to stand trial. The trial court disagreed with Wilson's allegations, and he continued to represent himself with limited help. A jury ultimately found him guilty. Wilson appealed his conviction through counsel, and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner William Beaty was charged with assault, criminal mischief, tampering with a victim or witness, and intimidating a victim or witness. A public defender was appointed to represent Beaty, but that counsel was dismissed and Beaty elected to represent himself. After his Arguello advisement, Beaty chose not to represent himself, and accepted the help of a public defender. Beaty stated that his original decision to proceed pro se was due in part to his failing to take his medications to control bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. On the first day of trial, Beaty expressed a renewed desire to represent himself due to a conflict with his public defender. Beaty represented himself throughout the trial, and a jury found him guilty of all charges. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in Williams' and Beaty's cases to determine whether to adopt a new competency standard for mentally ill defendants in light of "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). The Court declined to create a new standard, and affirmed the court of appeals' decisions to retain the existing analytical framework. View "Wilson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant Rashaim Davis with possession and distribution of a schedule II controlled substance after Davis allegedly sold 0.372 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover detective. The State appointed a series of attorneys to represent Davis, but he refused to cooperate with any of his lawyers. He also threatened to harm at least one lawyer and wanted an investigator from the public defender's office that he might harm her if she made him uncomfortable. Several of Davis' lawyers questioned whether he was competent to proceed because at times he "exhibited a flat affect, bordering on catatonic." Prior to trial, Davis told the trial court he wanted to represent himself. Davis was taking several medications for his "bipolarism," and that he had a mistrust of lawyers resulting from paranoia that the medications did not completely control. The trial court was not convinced that Davis could proceed pro se; the case was tried with court-appointed counsel. A jury found Davis guilty of all counts. Davis appealed the trial court's denial of his requests to represent himself and his subsequent convictions to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order denying Davis' request to represent himself, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, declining to adopt a new competency standard for mentally ill defendants pursuant to "Edwards." Furthermore, the Court reversed the appellate court's failing to order the trial court to merge Davis' possession and distribution convictions during sentencing. View "Colorado v. Davis" on Justia Law

Morgan Drexen was described as a "legal software and legal software development company" owned and operated by nonlawyers but provided paraprofessional and administrative support to attorneys. The company provided debt-management services nationwide in conjunction with contracting attorneys, known as "engagement counsel." Morgan Drexen referred to engagement counsel as its "clients" and paid them a minimal fee that passed through the engagement counsel's (or engagement law firm's) trust accounts. Parties Donald Moore and Lawrence Williamson, Jr. served as engagement counsel. Moore was a Colorado-licensed attorney, and Williamson was a Kansas attorney who represented Colorado clients by association with Moore. In 2011, Morgan Drexen applied in Colorado to be registered as a debt-management service provider under the Debt Management Services Act (DMSA). The DMSA Administrator denied the application and issued a cease-and-desist order instructing Morgan Drexen to stop providing its services to Colorado residents and collecting fees. Morgan Drexen, Moore and Williamson filed a complaint seeking a declaration that :(1) they did not provide debt-management services under the original DMSA; and (2) the amended DMSA was unconstitutional. In its review of Morgan Drexen's appeal, the Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in concluding that Morgan Drexen's services fell within the scope of the legal services exemption in the original DMSA. Further, the amended DMSA was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coffman v. Williamson" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve a split of authority between divisions of the court of appeals on whether double jeopardy barred a new habitual criminal sentencing hearing when the trial court erroneously dismissed the habitual counts before the State presented any evidence as to those counts. In 2002, Reginald Porter robbed and attempted to sexually assault a casino worker. He tried to evade capture after a police chase. Based on these events, the State charged Porter with two counts of first degree burglary and one count each of aggravated auto theft, attempted sexual assault, aggravated robbery, vehicular eluding and third degree assault. The prosecution added habitual counts later. A jury found Porter guilty of all charges. The trial court adjudicated Porter as a habitual offender. Porter appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Porter waived his right to trial by jury, and the court found him guilty of most of the substantive charges. Before the habitual phase, Porter moved to dismiss the habitual counts. The trial court was persuaded by his arguments, and the counts were dismissed. The court of appeals concluded, in pertinent part, that double jeopardy precluded a new habitual criminal sentencing hearing. The court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in "Colorado v. Quintana," (634 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1981)) to conclude that jeopardy attached during the substantive phase of trial, and carried through to the habitual phase. Since Quintana, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal constitutional double jeopardy protections do not apply to habitual criminal proceedings. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Colorado double jeopardy law did not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings. Accordingly, double jeopardy did not bar trial of defendant's habitual counts in this case. View "Colorado v. Porter" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk sought a declaration that it was prohibited from disclosing the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, the General Assembly enacted 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014) that made voted ballots subject to CORA. The Clerk thereafter produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect. The only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. After its review, the Supreme Court held that when an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure, a prevailing requestor was entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court found that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. The district court in this case found the denial was proper, therefore Marks was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law