Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lillian Malm filed suit against Marion Villegas by filing a complaint with the district court in 2005.The complaint alleged that Villegas caused Malm to suffer personal injuries in an automobile accident in 2002 (two years and eleven months earlier). It was undisputed that the complaint was filed approximately one month before expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations. In September 2006, having failed to find and personally serve Villegas, Malm moved for permission to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching Villegas's insurance policy and accomplishing service through publication. Although the court granted her motion and she demonstrated service by publication, in response to a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by Villegas's insurer, the court ultimately found quasi in rem jurisdiction to be an improper means of acquiring jurisdiction over Villegas's property. Nonetheless, the court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that additional time was warranted to allow Malm to attempt personal service. In September 2007, Malm filed a status report with the court, noting that she had been unable to locate and personally serve Villegas and requesting that the court take no further action at that time. No activity of record occurred for the next five years, but on June 27, 2013, Malm moved to reopen, alleging that "[i]n early 2013 investigators retained by Plaintiff's counsel got a 'lead' that Defendant Villegas was living in Germany," and as a result, Villegas was served in Germany "[i]n accordance with the Hague Convention . . . on May 24, 2013." The district court granted the motion in August 2013. Once the case was reopened, Villegas moved to reconsider, arguing that Malm's failure to make reasonable efforts after the case was closed in 2007 or to serve her within a reasonable time amounted to failure to prosecute. Villegas appealed the district court granting of Malm's motion to reopen her personal injury lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because service following commencement of the action by filing a complaint with the court was delayed for an unreasonable length of time, the district court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to prosecute. View "In re Malm v. Villegas" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the question of who in a dissolved limited liability company("LLC") is entitled to the profits from a successful contingent fee case that was pending upon the dissolution of the company. Attorneys Richard LaFond and Charlotte Sweeney formed LaFond & Sweeney, LLC ("L&S") in 1995 pursuant to Colorado's Limited Liability Company Act ("LLC Act"). L&S had several cases pending when it dissolved in 2008, including the subject of this action, the "Maxwell" case. LaFond and Sweeney were unable to reach an agreement on how to divide the profits that could come from the successful completion of the case. Sweeney filed an attorneys' lien on any profits derived from the case. LaFond then brought suit against Sweeney seeking a declaratory judgment for the full amount of the contingent fee. Sweeney filed a counterclaim to enforce the attorneys' lien. In the declaratory judgment suit, the trial court found that the Maxwell case was an asset of L&S and valued it using a quantum meruit approach based upon the number of hours L&S had worked on the case pre-dissolution, multiplied by L&S's hourly fee rate. The trial court concluded that Sweeney could only recover half of this amount in accordance with LaFond and Sweeney's profit sharing agreement. Sweeney appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Maxwell case was unfinished business of the LLC and all profit derived therefrom belonged to the LLC subject to division according to LaFond and Sweeney's profit sharing agreement. LaFond appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals: any profit derived from the Maxwell case belonged to L&S and should have been divided between LaFond and Sweeney according to their profit sharing agreement. LaFond was not entitled to additional compensation for his post-dissolution work on the case. View "LaFond v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Blagg was convicted by jury of first degree murder for the death of his wife, for which he received a life sentence without parole. Years later, the trial court granted Blagg a new trial based on revelations of juror misconduct. After setting a new bond hearing, but before that hearing occurred, the court reinstated the bod amount it had set before Blagg's first trial. Because the trial court dispensed with the hearing, neither party had the change to argue changed circumstances and the alleged victim's family did not have the opportunity to be heard. The district attorney argued that this violated the Victims' Rights Act (VRA), and moved for an emergency stay of the trial court's order. The trial court denied the motion, and the district attorney petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in dispensing the hearing, which was indeed, in violation of the VRA. View "Colorado v. Blagg" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on judicial enforcement of an administrative investigatory subpoena for documents of a corporation outside of Colorado, but was suspected of conducting business within the state in violation of state consumer protection statutes. Tulips Investments, LLC was a Delaware corporation that the State alleged was running a loan business in violation of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) and the Colorado Protection Act (CCPA). The State issued a subpoena requesting certain documents from Tulips, which Tulips failed to produce. The State then obtained a trial court order in an unsuccessful attempt to enforce the subpoena. The State then pursued a contempt citation against Tulips for failing to comply. Tulips responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision setting aside the trial court's grant of Tulips' motion to dismiss. View "Tulips Investments, LLC v. Colorado ex rel. Suthers" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, applicants sought to change their use of an absolute water right. Applicants conducted a historical consumptive use (HCU) analysis to determine the amount of water previously used in accordance with its decreed right. Applicants performed the analysis on acreage not contemplated by the original appropriation nor any subsequent decree. The water court rejected the HCU. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether applicant could conduct an HCU on acreage not associated with the relevant water right. After review of the parties' arguments in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that a HCU on acreage beyond its associated water right is impermissible. The Court affirmed the water court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Widefield Water v. Witte" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Special District Act (SDA) gave special districts the power to assign to a private party the right to receive development fees. Cherry Creek South Metropolitan District 1 assigned to a predecessor-in-interest of petitioner SDI, Inc. the right to receive fees the District assessed on developers within its boundaries to finance development of municipal infrastructure. The District increased the fees by about four percent each of the years prior to the assignment. SDI increased the fees it collected, but at a rate of eight percent per year. SDI sued Pivotal Parker Commercial, LLC to recover unpaid development fees, and requested a declaratory judgment that it could raise annual fees in the future. The trial court held that SDI was entitled to receive the fees as increased annually. Pivotal argued on appeal that the fee increase was an improper delegation of legislative authority. The appellate court reversed the trial court, which found that the District had no right to assign the fees. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding that the appellate court's reasoning was contrary to the SDA itself. As such, the Supreme Court held that the District's assignment of the right to collect fees was a lawful exercise of its statutory authority. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of other issues Pivotal raised on appeal. View "SDI, Inc. v. Pivotal Parker, LLC" on Justia Law

Hours after receiving an angiogram from defendant-petitioner Dr. James Chapman, Dr. Lynn Harner died. Dr. Harner's wife, plaintiff-respondent Carolyn Harner subsequently sued petitioner for medical malpractice. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in accordance with Colorado case law, or whether it shifted only the burden of production in accordance with more recently adopted Colorado Rule of Evidence (CRE) 301. The Court of Appeals followed case law and disregarded CRE 301 n the absence of any clear statements by the Supreme Court overruling its precedent. After considering the various conflicting authorities on the subject, the Supreme Court concluded that CRE 301 represented the better approach to burden-shifting under res ipsa loquitur. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration of respondent's remaining arguments. View "Chapman v. Harner" on Justia Law

In a case brought under the Colorado Supreme Court's origination jurisdiction, the issue presented centered on whether a default judgment could be set aside as void for lack of jurisdiction due to the existence of a contractual forum selection clause. The clause at issue here purported to divest Colorado courts of jurisdiction over the dispute. After the trial court set aside the default judgment, plaintiff Christopher Nickerson sought to have the default reinstated against defendant Network Solutions, LLC. and Web.com Group, Inc. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in setting aside the judgment "A forum selection clause . . . does not divest a court of jurisdiction but instead presents the question of whether it is reasonable for the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction in the particular circumstances of the case. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the default judgment was not void; the trial court was directed to reinstate the default judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "In re Nickerson v. Network Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1952, Congress passed a resolution establishing a "National Day of Prayer," which was later officially defined as the first Thursday of May. Colorado's governor has issued annual honorary proclamations recognizing a Colorado Day of Prayer since 2004. In the past, a public event has been held on the steps of the Colorado Capitol to celebrate the Colorado Day of Prayer. The State Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Respondents Freedom from Religion Foundation and four of its Colorado members had standing to sue Petitioner Governor John Hickenlooper in his official capacity for issuing annual honorary proclamations that recognize a "Colorado Day of Prayer." Contrary to the holding from the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that the use of public funds to cover the incidental overhead costs associated with issuing the honorary proclamations does not, by itself, constitute an injury sufficient to establish taxpayer standing. Furthermore, contrary to the trial court, the Supreme Court held that the psychic harm endured by Respondents as a result of media coverage revealing the existence of the honorary proclamations did not, by itself, constitute an injury sufficient to establish individual standing. Accordingly, the court of appeals' judgment was reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to return the case to the trial court for dismissal. View "Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

In September 2007, Respondent Michael McKimmy was arrested for new offenses while on parole and was incarcerated. Respondent was charged in two separate cases, with second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, and a habitual burglary offender count. In 2008, the State filed complaints against respondent in two new cases, including charges for second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and criminal mischief. Unbeknownst to his public defender, respondent sent a pro-se letter in one of the cases to the Chief Judge of the County Court, "formally request[ing] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act." In the letter’s footer, respondent wrote, "CC: Deputy District Attorney [Prosecutor Name]." In all four cases, respondent sent pro-se letters without his attorney’s knowledge to Jefferson County’s Chief Judge formally requesting the protections of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), and all four letters included a footer purporting to copy the letter to the prosecutor of that particular case. Neither the trial court nor the prosecution, however, initially became aware of the requests in the 2007 cases. The trial court ignored the letters without reading them pursuant to its policy of refusing to acknowledge pro-se letters sent by represented parties, while the prosecution received the 2007 letters but inadvertently misfiled them. Crucially, the record was inconclusive whether the prosecution became immediately aware of the 2008 letters when respondent sent them in March 2008. On February 4, 2008, defendant pled not guilty in the 2007 cases, and insisted that he did not wish to waive his "speedy trial rights." The trial court, under the impression that respondent was referring to his rights as defined in section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. (2014), made certain that the trial dates fell within six months from the date of respondent's not-guilty pleas, and it set the trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the process for invoking one’s rights under the UMDDA. When prisoners strictly comply with the UMDDA’s procedural requirements, the Act mandates that they be brought to trial on pending charges within 182 days of their request. Even when prisoners do not strictly comply with the UMDDA’s requirements, the Court has previously determined that they nevertheless invoke their rights under the Act if: (1) their request substantially complies with the Act’s requirements; and (2) the prosecution receives “actual notice” of their request. Respondent did not strictly comply with the Act; rather, he attempted to invoke his UMDDA rights by mailing multiple letters to the prosecution and the trial court. But, while the prosecution received the defendant’s initial requests, it failed to actually become aware of them until well later in the proceedings. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution’s receipt of such a letter did not constitute "actual notice" sufficient to invoke respondent's rights under the UMDDA. View "Colorado v. McKimmy" on Justia Law