Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a case brought under the Colorado Supreme Court's origination jurisdiction, the issue presented centered on whether a default judgment could be set aside as void for lack of jurisdiction due to the existence of a contractual forum selection clause. The clause at issue here purported to divest Colorado courts of jurisdiction over the dispute. After the trial court set aside the default judgment, plaintiff Christopher Nickerson sought to have the default reinstated against defendant Network Solutions, LLC. and Web.com Group, Inc. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in setting aside the judgment "A forum selection clause . . . does not divest a court of jurisdiction but instead presents the question of whether it is reasonable for the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction in the particular circumstances of the case. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the default judgment was not void; the trial court was directed to reinstate the default judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "In re Nickerson v. Network Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1952, Congress passed a resolution establishing a "National Day of Prayer," which was later officially defined as the first Thursday of May. Colorado's governor has issued annual honorary proclamations recognizing a Colorado Day of Prayer since 2004. In the past, a public event has been held on the steps of the Colorado Capitol to celebrate the Colorado Day of Prayer. The State Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Respondents Freedom from Religion Foundation and four of its Colorado members had standing to sue Petitioner Governor John Hickenlooper in his official capacity for issuing annual honorary proclamations that recognize a "Colorado Day of Prayer." Contrary to the holding from the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that the use of public funds to cover the incidental overhead costs associated with issuing the honorary proclamations does not, by itself, constitute an injury sufficient to establish taxpayer standing. Furthermore, contrary to the trial court, the Supreme Court held that the psychic harm endured by Respondents as a result of media coverage revealing the existence of the honorary proclamations did not, by itself, constitute an injury sufficient to establish individual standing. Accordingly, the court of appeals' judgment was reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to return the case to the trial court for dismissal. View "Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

In September 2007, Respondent Michael McKimmy was arrested for new offenses while on parole and was incarcerated. Respondent was charged in two separate cases, with second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, and a habitual burglary offender count. In 2008, the State filed complaints against respondent in two new cases, including charges for second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and criminal mischief. Unbeknownst to his public defender, respondent sent a pro-se letter in one of the cases to the Chief Judge of the County Court, "formally request[ing] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act." In the letter’s footer, respondent wrote, "CC: Deputy District Attorney [Prosecutor Name]." In all four cases, respondent sent pro-se letters without his attorney’s knowledge to Jefferson County’s Chief Judge formally requesting the protections of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), and all four letters included a footer purporting to copy the letter to the prosecutor of that particular case. Neither the trial court nor the prosecution, however, initially became aware of the requests in the 2007 cases. The trial court ignored the letters without reading them pursuant to its policy of refusing to acknowledge pro-se letters sent by represented parties, while the prosecution received the 2007 letters but inadvertently misfiled them. Crucially, the record was inconclusive whether the prosecution became immediately aware of the 2008 letters when respondent sent them in March 2008. On February 4, 2008, defendant pled not guilty in the 2007 cases, and insisted that he did not wish to waive his "speedy trial rights." The trial court, under the impression that respondent was referring to his rights as defined in section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. (2014), made certain that the trial dates fell within six months from the date of respondent's not-guilty pleas, and it set the trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the process for invoking one’s rights under the UMDDA. When prisoners strictly comply with the UMDDA’s procedural requirements, the Act mandates that they be brought to trial on pending charges within 182 days of their request. Even when prisoners do not strictly comply with the UMDDA’s requirements, the Court has previously determined that they nevertheless invoke their rights under the Act if: (1) their request substantially complies with the Act’s requirements; and (2) the prosecution receives “actual notice” of their request. Respondent did not strictly comply with the Act; rather, he attempted to invoke his UMDDA rights by mailing multiple letters to the prosecution and the trial court. But, while the prosecution received the defendant’s initial requests, it failed to actually become aware of them until well later in the proceedings. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution’s receipt of such a letter did not constitute "actual notice" sufficient to invoke respondent's rights under the UMDDA. View "Colorado v. McKimmy" on Justia Law

To address economic conditions and projections demonstrating a severely underfunded plan, the Colorado General Assembly approved measured designed to protect present and future retirees by providing an adequately pension program. This appeal centered on changes made to the annual cost of living (COLA) that applied to increase each retiree's vested base retirement benefit. Plaintiffs in this case were retired public employees who contended that they had a contract with the State entitling each of them, upon retirement, to have their base pension benefit annually adjusted by the specific COLA formula in existence at the time they were eligible to retire, for the rest of their lives without change. The district court ruled they had no such contract right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The court of appeals disagreed, finding the retirees had a contract right to the formula in place at the time of eligibility for retirement or actual retirement based on the so-called "public policy exception," and remanded for further review to determine whether the legislature's act violated the Contract Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals, and agreed with the district court. The appellate court's judgment was reversed that the district court's judgment reinstated. View "Justus v. Colorado Public Employee's Retirement Association Pension Plan" on Justia Law

A state trooper pulled over the defendant while she was driving a rental car that she was not authorized to drive. While impounding the car at rental company’s request, the trooper who stopped her discovered three suspicious gift-wrapped packages, one on the back seat and two in trunk. At the tow yard, a K-9 police dog alerted alerted the trooper that the trunk contained drugs. The trooper used this positive dog sniff to obtain a warrant, the execution of which revealed 57 pounds of marijuana. The trial court suppressed this marijuana evidence because the packages had been detained for an unreasonable amount of time before the dog alerted and the trooper thus obtained probable cause to continue the search. The State challenged the suppression, arguing that defendant did not have standing to contest the detention and search of the packages because she was not authorized to drive the rental car. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the packages that were detained. Therefore, she had standing to challenge the search of those packages even though she was not authorized to drive the car. Consequently, the Court affirmed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Sotelo" on Justia Law

Respondent-plaintiff Scott Simpson sought to obtain meeting minutes from two Cedar Springs Hospital quality management committees in his medical malpractice case. Cedar Springs refused to produce these documents, arguing they were protected by the quality management privilege in 25-3-109, C.R.S. (2014). Simpson argued at trial that Cedar Springs failed to show that the quality management program was "approved by" the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDHPE), and because Cedar Springs failed to adhere to the requirements of the CDHPE with regard to the program, the meeting minutes should have been produced. The trial court agreed with Simpson that simple licensure was insufficient to demonstrate that facilities "complied with what they are required to comply with" and no "authoritative" documentation was provided confirming the quality management plan was properly implemented. The Supreme Court reversed: "because a quality management program is required in order to be licensed by CDHPE, and because Cedar Springs was licensed by CDHPE during all relevant periods, its quality management program was necessarily "approved." Therefore the documents Simpson sought from Cedar Springs were privileged, and the trial court erred in ordering them produced. View "Simpson v. Cedar Springs Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

A police officer observed a traffic violation. Upon stopping the car, the officer discovered that the driver, defendant Christopher Vaughn, was driving under a suspended license. The officer decided to arrest defendant, ordered him out of the car, and began an inventory search of the vehicle prior to having the vehicle impounded. The officer found one big bag filled with smaller individual bags of crack cocaine in the glove compartment. Defendant appealed his ultimate conviction on drug trafficking charges, arguing the drug evidence should have been suppressed because the traffic stop was not enough probable cause to have defendant arrested. The Supreme Court held that the drug evidence was properly seized as the result of a valid inventory search, reversing the trial court's suppression order. View "Colorado v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped the vehicle defendant Ari Liggett was driving, and upon asking dispatch to scan the license plate, determined that it was associated with both a missing person (defendant's mother) and an armed-and-dangerous person (defendant himself). After police ordered defendant to turn off the car and place both hands through the window, defendant opted to speed off. A chase ensued. Defendant spun out and hit a concrete wall. Defendant was later chased on foot, ultimately surrendered, and was arrested. In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether statements defendant made to investigators while the investigators "were talking among themselves" and other unsolicited statements should have been suppressed at defendant's trial for murder, crime of violence and vehicular eluding. The statements defendant made were given prior to a reading of his Miranda rights. The trial court suppressed a majority of the defendant's statements, finding that they were involuntary. The Supreme Court held, however, that considering the totality of the circumstances, investigators never overbore defendant's will, and the statements were voluntary. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Liggett" on Justia Law

Petitioners Conley Hoskins and Jane Medicals, LLC, sought to vacate a trial court's order disqualifying the Peters Mair Wilcox (PMW) law firm as their counsel. The trial court disqualified the firm on the grounds that the firm previously represented another party, All Care Wellness, LLC, in the same matter for which PWM represented petitioners. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that All Care and petitioners had materially adverse interests. Petitioners argued on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' retained counsel of choice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court record was insufficient to support the finding that the interests of petitioners and All Care were materially adverse to one another. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court indeed abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' counsel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Defendants Sir Mario Owens and Robert Ray petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for relief from a series of discovery rulings by the district court relative to post-conviction proceedings in their respective death-penalty cases. Each had moved to discover the prosecution’s investigation of the claims raised by Owens’s motion for post-conviction review, on the grounds that such disclosure was required either by Crim. P. 16 or by the federal or state constitution. The district court ruled that Crim. P. 16 did not impose obligations on the prosecution with respect to its preparation to meet the defendants’ post-conviction claims, but that the prosecution continued to have obligations to disclose information that was both exculpatory and constitutionally material, without regard for the time of or impetus for its discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the district court did not err in finding Crim. P. 16 inapplicable to information acquired in response to the defendants’ post-conviction claims. Because, however, the Court has previously held not only that a prosecutor’s constitutional obligation to disclose information favorable to an accused extended through the appeal of a death sentence, but that district courts should order the disclosure of some possibly exculpatory material, despite being unable to find a reasonable probability that nondisclosure would change the result of the proceeding. The cases were remanded for the district court to apply the due process standard the Court announced in "Colorado v. Rodriguez," (786 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1989)). View "In re Colorado v. Owens" on Justia Law