Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Division of Motor Vehicles (a section of the Department of Revenue), revoked petitioner Tom Francen's driver's license following a hearing whereby it was determined petitioner had operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content in excess of the statutory minimum. The district court reversed, holding that the stop of petitioner's vehicle was not supported by a reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the legality of the initial contact between petitioner and the police was not relevant in the civil administrative proceeding to revoke the driver's license. Petitioner appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Francen v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Public Service Company of Colorado applied for a tax refund from the state Department of Revenue. The company argued that it was entitled to a refund because it paid taxes when it was actually eligible for an exemption. The district court held in favor of the company, concluding that electricity was tangible personal property and that the production of electricity constituted manufacturing, thus entitling the company to the exemption (the "manufacturing exemption" under 39-26-709(1)(a)(II) C.R.S. (2013)). Upon review of the Department's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that section 39-26-104(1)(d.1) applied in this case: electricity did not qualify as tangible personal property, and that the Code "contemplate[d] that 'electricity furnished and sold'" was to be taxed as a service. View "Department of Revenue v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner and State Representative Debbie Benefield, and other current or former members of the Colorado House of Representatives, appealed the court of appeals' judgment which reversed the district court's order denying costs and attorney fees for the Colorado Republican Party. In 2006, the Party submitted an Open Records Act request to each petitioner seeking access to responses to a 2005 survey that contained various constituents' viewpoints on a variety of legal, political and social issues. When petitioners declined to make the surveys available, the Party sued to get access. The Party ultimately got 925 of 1584 surveys it requested. The Party then moved for costs and fees as the "prevailing applicant." The Supreme Court concluded that because section 24-72-204(5), "when properly construed," mandated an award in favor of any person who applied for and received a district court order requiring a custodian to permit inspection of a public record. Because the appellate court was correct in its interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Benefield v. Colorado Republican Party" on Justia Law

Defendant Randy Kailey was charged with two counts of aggravated incest. After a jury trial, he was found guilty and ultimately sentenced to thirty-two years in jail. Kailey met with a psychologist employed by the Department of Corrections for a private therapy session. At the outset, Kailey reviewed a DOC form that provided that any statements Kailey made during therapy indicating that he intended to harm himself or others would not be considered confidential and would be disclosed to the DOC. During his session, Kailey allegedly made several statements about witnessed that testified against him at trial. The psychologist considered these statements to constitute serious threats of violence. Pursuant to his statutory "duty to warn," the psychologist submitted an "indicent report" to the DOC describing what Kailey said during therapy. The State subsequently charged Kailey with retaliation against a witness. Kailey moved to exclude the incident report. The trial court granted Kailey's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that once a provider's legal "duty to warn" is triggered, the patient's threatening statements are not protected by privilege. View "Colorado v. Kailey" on Justia Law

Proponents Mike Spaulding and Natalie Menten proposed Initiative 76 which sought to repeal and replace the existing manner of triggering and conducting a recall election under article XXI of the Colorado Constitution, and to institute a new constitutional right to recall state and local non-elected officers. The Title Board set a title and submission clause for the initiative. Registered elector Philip Hayes objected to the Board's action. The Board modified the title and submission clause in response to Hayes' objections, but otherwise denied his motion for rehearing. The proponents contended that the initiative, title and submission clause addressed a single subject and were in compliance with state law. The Supreme Court disagreed, and concluded the Title Board acted unconstitutionally in setting a title for the initiative. The Board's action was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #76" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court issues a rule to show cause to decide whether the district court in this case abused its discretion in holding that as a matter of law, section 12-36.5-104(10)(a), C.R.S. (2013) protected professional review committee records from subpoena or discovery and admissibility in "civil suits," but not administrative proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that the term "civil suit" included administrative proceedings of an adjudicatory nature. Accordingly, the Colorado Medical Board's records were protected from subpoena or discovery or were admissible in the administrative hearing in Dr. Polly Train's medical license. The Court reversed the district court's order requiring the Board produce the records in question. View "Colorado Medical Board v. Office of Administrative Courts" on Justia Law

Proponents Peter Coulter and Lisa Brumfiel proposed Initiative 129 to amend article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution, known as the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR). The Initiative sought to amend TABOR to define the term "fee" and differentiate it from a tax. Petitioner Anthony sought to challenge the initiative, arguing it contained multiple subjects. Alternatively, he argued the initiative's title was misleading. The Supreme Court concluded the initiative contained a single subject, and that the title clearly expressed a single subject. Therefore the Court affirmed the action of the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #129" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the results of a preliminary breath test ("PBT") for blood alcohol content were admissible for impeachment purposes. When the defendant is charged with driving either while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) or while ability impaired by alcohol (DWAI), the results of the PBT may not be used as evidence of guilt at trial. Whether the results of the PBT may nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes was an issue of first impression for the Colorado Court. In this case, the county court determined that although evidence that a PBT registered a positive result for the presence of alcohol was inadmissible to prove intoxication, that evidence could nevertheless be admitted for impeachment purposes if the defendant testified that he had not been drinking. The district court affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court concluded that ruling was erroneous: "[w]hile a police officer is authorized to conduct a PBT as part of the officer's investigation, we hold that based on the plain language of section 42-4-1301(6)(i)(III), the PBT results may not be used in any court action except as specifically provided in the statute itself." Thus, because the statute did not allow for using PBT results as impeachment evidence, the Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case to that court with instructions to return the case to the county court for further proceedings. View "Cain v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In October 2010, the prosecution charged Alan DeAtley, a Washington State resident, with twenty-five counts of white-collar criminal activity involving alleged fraudulent tax credits for land conservation easements in Colorado. In July 2011, the trial court allowed DeAtley's first retained counsel to withdraw based on irreconcilable conflicts. It granted DeAtley a continuance to retain his then-current defense counsel, Martin Stuart and Jolie Masterson. In November 2012, DeAtley informed the court of his intention to discharge defense counsel. They promptly filed a motion to withdraw. In November 2012, instead of granting the motion to withdraw, the trial court granted DeAtley a relatively short continuance to retain yet a third defense attorney. DeAtley did not retain another attorney. Instead, he commenced a lawsuit against defense counsel for malpractice and breach of contract, reinforcing the discharge of them and causing defense counsel to renew their motion to withdraw. The trial court unreasonably and unfairly determined that the attorneys in this case could effectively represent DeAtley despite his discharge of them and the trial court's previous finding that a conflict of interest existed between defense counsel and DeAtley due to the malpractice and breach of contract suit. The trial court concluded that DeAtley was engaging in trial-delaying conduct. The Supreme Court concluded that the court subsequently chose the wrong remedy and thereby abused its discretion. The trial court's finding that defense counsel could "balance their personal interests implicated by the Defendant's actions with their obligation to represent him such that they can effectively do so" was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair given the trial court's first finding that a conflict existed. The trial court "should have granted the motion to withdraw and proceeded in accordance with Crim.P. 44(a), advising DeAtley that he had the obligation to hire other counsel, request the appointment of counsel by the court, or elect to represent himself." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw. View "In re Colorado v. DeAtley" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court centered on the lawfulness of Secretary of State Rule 4.1, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6:4.1 (2013). Petitioner Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler promulgated Rule 4.1 in response to "Sampson v. Buescher," (625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010)). Rule 4.1 increased the contribution and expenditure threshold that triggered issue committee status from $200 to $5000 and exempted retrospective reporting of contributions and expenditures once issue committee status is achieved. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Sampson" did not invalidate either the $200 contribution and expenditure threshold under article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(II)of the Colorado Constitution or the retrospective reporting requirement under section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2013), of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. Because Rule 4.1's $5000 threshold and its retrospective reporting exemption conflicted with these provisions, the Court held Rule 4.1 unlawful and set it aside. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals because the court of appeals properly concluded that Gessler exceeded his authority in promulgating Rule 4.1. View "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause" on Justia Law