Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Michael Blagg was convicted by jury of first degree murder for the death of his wife, for which he received a life sentence without parole. Years later, the trial court granted Blagg a new trial based on revelations of juror misconduct. After setting a new bond hearing, but before that hearing occurred, the court reinstated the bod amount it had set before Blagg's first trial. Because the trial court dispensed with the hearing, neither party had the change to argue changed circumstances and the alleged victim's family did not have the opportunity to be heard. The district attorney argued that this violated the Victims' Rights Act (VRA), and moved for an emergency stay of the trial court's order. The trial court denied the motion, and the district attorney petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in dispensing the hearing, which was indeed, in violation of the VRA. View "Colorado v. Blagg" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on judicial enforcement of an administrative investigatory subpoena for documents of a corporation outside of Colorado, but was suspected of conducting business within the state in violation of state consumer protection statutes. Tulips Investments, LLC was a Delaware corporation that the State alleged was running a loan business in violation of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) and the Colorado Protection Act (CCPA). The State issued a subpoena requesting certain documents from Tulips, which Tulips failed to produce. The State then obtained a trial court order in an unsuccessful attempt to enforce the subpoena. The State then pursued a contempt citation against Tulips for failing to comply. Tulips responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision setting aside the trial court's grant of Tulips' motion to dismiss. View "Tulips Investments, LLC v. Colorado ex rel. Suthers" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, applicants sought to change their use of an absolute water right. Applicants conducted a historical consumptive use (HCU) analysis to determine the amount of water previously used in accordance with its decreed right. Applicants performed the analysis on acreage not contemplated by the original appropriation nor any subsequent decree. The water court rejected the HCU. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether applicant could conduct an HCU on acreage not associated with the relevant water right. After review of the parties' arguments in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that a HCU on acreage beyond its associated water right is impermissible. The Court affirmed the water court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Widefield Water v. Witte" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Special District Act (SDA) gave special districts the power to assign to a private party the right to receive development fees. Cherry Creek South Metropolitan District 1 assigned to a predecessor-in-interest of petitioner SDI, Inc. the right to receive fees the District assessed on developers within its boundaries to finance development of municipal infrastructure. The District increased the fees by about four percent each of the years prior to the assignment. SDI increased the fees it collected, but at a rate of eight percent per year. SDI sued Pivotal Parker Commercial, LLC to recover unpaid development fees, and requested a declaratory judgment that it could raise annual fees in the future. The trial court held that SDI was entitled to receive the fees as increased annually. Pivotal argued on appeal that the fee increase was an improper delegation of legislative authority. The appellate court reversed the trial court, which found that the District had no right to assign the fees. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding that the appellate court's reasoning was contrary to the SDA itself. As such, the Supreme Court held that the District's assignment of the right to collect fees was a lawful exercise of its statutory authority. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of other issues Pivotal raised on appeal. View "SDI, Inc. v. Pivotal Parker, LLC" on Justia Law

Hours after receiving an angiogram from defendant-petitioner Dr. James Chapman, Dr. Lynn Harner died. Dr. Harner's wife, plaintiff-respondent Carolyn Harner subsequently sued petitioner for medical malpractice. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in accordance with Colorado case law, or whether it shifted only the burden of production in accordance with more recently adopted Colorado Rule of Evidence (CRE) 301. The Court of Appeals followed case law and disregarded CRE 301 n the absence of any clear statements by the Supreme Court overruling its precedent. After considering the various conflicting authorities on the subject, the Supreme Court concluded that CRE 301 represented the better approach to burden-shifting under res ipsa loquitur. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration of respondent's remaining arguments. View "Chapman v. Harner" on Justia Law

In a case brought under the Colorado Supreme Court's origination jurisdiction, the issue presented centered on whether a default judgment could be set aside as void for lack of jurisdiction due to the existence of a contractual forum selection clause. The clause at issue here purported to divest Colorado courts of jurisdiction over the dispute. After the trial court set aside the default judgment, plaintiff Christopher Nickerson sought to have the default reinstated against defendant Network Solutions, LLC. and Web.com Group, Inc. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in setting aside the judgment "A forum selection clause . . . does not divest a court of jurisdiction but instead presents the question of whether it is reasonable for the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction in the particular circumstances of the case. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the default judgment was not void; the trial court was directed to reinstate the default judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "In re Nickerson v. Network Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1952, Congress passed a resolution establishing a "National Day of Prayer," which was later officially defined as the first Thursday of May. Colorado's governor has issued annual honorary proclamations recognizing a Colorado Day of Prayer since 2004. In the past, a public event has been held on the steps of the Colorado Capitol to celebrate the Colorado Day of Prayer. The State Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Respondents Freedom from Religion Foundation and four of its Colorado members had standing to sue Petitioner Governor John Hickenlooper in his official capacity for issuing annual honorary proclamations that recognize a "Colorado Day of Prayer." Contrary to the holding from the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that the use of public funds to cover the incidental overhead costs associated with issuing the honorary proclamations does not, by itself, constitute an injury sufficient to establish taxpayer standing. Furthermore, contrary to the trial court, the Supreme Court held that the psychic harm endured by Respondents as a result of media coverage revealing the existence of the honorary proclamations did not, by itself, constitute an injury sufficient to establish individual standing. Accordingly, the court of appeals' judgment was reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to return the case to the trial court for dismissal. View "Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

In September 2007, Respondent Michael McKimmy was arrested for new offenses while on parole and was incarcerated. Respondent was charged in two separate cases, with second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, and a habitual burglary offender count. In 2008, the State filed complaints against respondent in two new cases, including charges for second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and criminal mischief. Unbeknownst to his public defender, respondent sent a pro-se letter in one of the cases to the Chief Judge of the County Court, "formally request[ing] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act." In the letter’s footer, respondent wrote, "CC: Deputy District Attorney [Prosecutor Name]." In all four cases, respondent sent pro-se letters without his attorney’s knowledge to Jefferson County’s Chief Judge formally requesting the protections of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), and all four letters included a footer purporting to copy the letter to the prosecutor of that particular case. Neither the trial court nor the prosecution, however, initially became aware of the requests in the 2007 cases. The trial court ignored the letters without reading them pursuant to its policy of refusing to acknowledge pro-se letters sent by represented parties, while the prosecution received the 2007 letters but inadvertently misfiled them. Crucially, the record was inconclusive whether the prosecution became immediately aware of the 2008 letters when respondent sent them in March 2008. On February 4, 2008, defendant pled not guilty in the 2007 cases, and insisted that he did not wish to waive his "speedy trial rights." The trial court, under the impression that respondent was referring to his rights as defined in section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. (2014), made certain that the trial dates fell within six months from the date of respondent's not-guilty pleas, and it set the trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the process for invoking one’s rights under the UMDDA. When prisoners strictly comply with the UMDDA’s procedural requirements, the Act mandates that they be brought to trial on pending charges within 182 days of their request. Even when prisoners do not strictly comply with the UMDDA’s requirements, the Court has previously determined that they nevertheless invoke their rights under the Act if: (1) their request substantially complies with the Act’s requirements; and (2) the prosecution receives “actual notice” of their request. Respondent did not strictly comply with the Act; rather, he attempted to invoke his UMDDA rights by mailing multiple letters to the prosecution and the trial court. But, while the prosecution received the defendant’s initial requests, it failed to actually become aware of them until well later in the proceedings. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution’s receipt of such a letter did not constitute "actual notice" sufficient to invoke respondent's rights under the UMDDA. View "Colorado v. McKimmy" on Justia Law

To address economic conditions and projections demonstrating a severely underfunded plan, the Colorado General Assembly approved measured designed to protect present and future retirees by providing an adequately pension program. This appeal centered on changes made to the annual cost of living (COLA) that applied to increase each retiree's vested base retirement benefit. Plaintiffs in this case were retired public employees who contended that they had a contract with the State entitling each of them, upon retirement, to have their base pension benefit annually adjusted by the specific COLA formula in existence at the time they were eligible to retire, for the rest of their lives without change. The district court ruled they had no such contract right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The court of appeals disagreed, finding the retirees had a contract right to the formula in place at the time of eligibility for retirement or actual retirement based on the so-called "public policy exception," and remanded for further review to determine whether the legislature's act violated the Contract Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals, and agreed with the district court. The appellate court's judgment was reversed that the district court's judgment reinstated. View "Justus v. Colorado Public Employee's Retirement Association Pension Plan" on Justia Law

A state trooper pulled over the defendant while she was driving a rental car that she was not authorized to drive. While impounding the car at rental company’s request, the trooper who stopped her discovered three suspicious gift-wrapped packages, one on the back seat and two in trunk. At the tow yard, a K-9 police dog alerted alerted the trooper that the trunk contained drugs. The trooper used this positive dog sniff to obtain a warrant, the execution of which revealed 57 pounds of marijuana. The trial court suppressed this marijuana evidence because the packages had been detained for an unreasonable amount of time before the dog alerted and the trooper thus obtained probable cause to continue the search. The State challenged the suppression, arguing that defendant did not have standing to contest the detention and search of the packages because she was not authorized to drive the rental car. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the packages that were detained. Therefore, she had standing to challenge the search of those packages even though she was not authorized to drive the car. Consequently, the Court affirmed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Sotelo" on Justia Law