Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Vasilios Haralampopoulos visited the emergency room with severe abdominal pain. After a CT scan revealed a large cystic mass in his liver, Petitioner Dr. Mauricio Waintrub examined Respondent, gave a differential diagnosis identifying four possible causes for his condition, and approved a fine-needle biopsy to determine the nature of the cyst. Petitioner Dr. Jason Kelly performed the procedure, during which Respondent suffered respiratory and cardiac arrest. Normal resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful, and it took over 30 minutes to revive Respondent's heart. Lack of oxygen to his brain left Respondent in a vegetative state. Ten days later, Respondent's family and friends met with doctors to determine why Respondent went into arrest and had such a poor reaction to resuscitation efforts. After the meeting, Respondent's then-roommate and ex-girlfriend Gulsans Akyol Hurd approached Dr. Kelly and asked him whether Respondent's prior cocaine use could have contributed to his injuries. Dr. Kelly responded that cocaine could have contributed to Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, but he was not a cardiologist so he did not know. Respondent brought a medical malpractice suit against seven individuals, including Petitioners Dr. Kelly and Dr. Waintrub. Respondent filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly as inadmissible hearsay not covered by any hearsay exception. The trial court denied the motion in limine, finding that Hurd's statements were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment under Rule 803(4), and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Colorado Rule of Evidence 403. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Respondent's cocaine use. The court held that Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly were not admissible under Rule 803(4) because the statements were made after Respondent was in a vegetative state and treatment was no longer possible, they were not made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in limiting the scope of Rule 803(4) to statements made for the purpose of prospective treatment. The Rule's plain language applies to "diagnosis or treatment," and while the term "treatment" has a prospective focus, the term "diagnosis" does not. "Here, Hurd's statements were made for the purpose of discovering the cause of Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, and were thus admissible under Rule 803(4)." The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Haralampopoulos" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Storlie argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the district attorney's motion under Crim. P. 48(a) to dismiss the charges against him. In response, the respondent trial court, through a brief filed on its behalf by the Attorney General's office, argued that a criminal defendant such as Storlie had no standing to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss. Respondent further argued that even if Storlie had standing, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. First, the Supreme Court concluded that it need not decide whether Storlie had standing to challenge the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss because the district attorney, who joined in Storlie's request for relief before the Supreme Court, had standing to challenge such a denial. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss because there was no evidence that the prosecution acted in bad faith in seeking the dismissal, nor did the trial court make any findings suggesting bad faith. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Storlie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision to vacate Carey Griffin's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. After the Court granted certiorari review, Griffin died. Griffin's counsel filed a notice of death and moved to dismiss. The State appealed, arguing that the proceedings should have abated ab initio. The Supreme Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss but later vacated that order to allow the State to respond to the motion. Griffin's counsel argued that the doctrine of abatement ab initio applied here because Griffin died while his case was pending on direct appellate review of his conviction. The State argued Griffin's appeal should have been resolved despite his death because the State had an interest in obtaining resolution of the court of appeals' interpretation of the sex offender registration laws and this issue was likely to evade future review. The State also noted that other courts have questioned the continuing validity of the abatement ab initio doctrine in light of other interests, including the rights of crime victims. Consistent with cases from the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, the Colorado Court declined to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio to matters pending on certiorari review. In light of Griffin's death, the Court vacated its order granting the writ of certiorari and dismissed the State's petition, but did not abate the proceedings ab initio. View "Colorado v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Jack Schaufele was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in injuries to himself and others. While he lay unresponsive at the hospital, a police officer asked a nurse to draw Schaufele's blood for an alcohol analysis. The State later sought to use evidence from that blood draw to prosecute Schaufele for vehicular assault, driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, and careless driving. In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court applied the proper legal test when it suppressed evidence stemming from the blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's analysis in suppressing the evidence. The Court declined the State's invitation to disregard the majority opinion in "Missouri v. McNeely" (which instructed a trial court to consider the totality of the circumstances and adopt Chief Justice Roberts' concurring and dissenting opinion that a "warrantless blood draw may ensue" if an officer could reasonably conclude that there was not sufficient time to seek and receive a warrant"). View "Colorado v. Schaufele" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was attacked by two ranch dogs herding sheep while participating in a mountain bike race. The cyclist and dogs were on federally owned land on which the attack took place, subject to a sheep grazing permit and a recreational use permit. The cyclist sustained serious injuries during the attack. The cyclist and her husband sued the dog's owners, alleging negligence, negligence per se and loss of consortium. They also brought a strict liability claim under Colorado's dog bite statute. The shepherds moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the Colorado Premises Liability Act preempted the cyclist's common law claims; and (2) they were immune from strict liability under the working-dog exemption to the dog bite statute. The district court granted the shepherds' motion. The court of appeals reversed, interpreting the working dog exemption as applicable only when the dog is on the owner's own property. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate court: the exemption applied when a dog bite occurs on the dog owner's property or when the dog is working under the control of the dog owner. View "Robinson v. Legro" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Town of Dillon enacted two municipal ordinances: one authorized a local road improvement project, and another concerning parking enforcement on a public right-of-way. Owners of the Yacht Club Condominiums challenged the ordinances, arguing, among other things, that the ordinances were an unreasonable exercise of the Town's police power because they eliminated the ability of the owners' guests to use the Town's rights-of-way as overflow parking. The trial court concluded the Town's exercise of its police power was unreasonable. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Town appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the ordinances were within the Town's police power to regulate matters of public health, safety and welfare, and reasonably related to the Town's objectives of improving traffic safety and improving water drainage. View "Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condominiums Home Owners Association" on Justia Law

A man called "Rabbit" tried to strangle two people in a Boulder park. Witnesses identified the man to police. Plainclothes officers located "Rabbit," identified themselves as police, and asked him questions regarding the incident in the park. Petitioner Bradley Begay (a/k/a "Rabbit") was never told he was under arrest, nor was he handcuffed. Begay never tried to leave during the encounter with police, but police did not say specifically defendant was free to leave. Approximately twenty minutes into their conversation, an officer who had interviewed one of the alleged victims identified petitioner as the assailant. Officers then read defendant his Miranda rights and arrested him for assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made before his arrest as the product of a custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. The trial court granted the motion; the State appealed. Finding that the trial court conflated the standards governing seizure under the Fourth Amendment and custody under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Colorado v. Begay" on Justia Law

Defendant Jay McIntyre's then ten-year-old niece accused him of sexually assaulting her on two separate occasions. In an interlocutory appeal, the State sought review of a trial court's order suppressing defendant's inculpatory statements. The trial court found defendant did not make the statements voluntarily. Upon review of the State's petition, the Supreme Court held that when considering the totality of the circumstances, police did not improperly coerce defendant into making his statements, but that he instead spoke voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McIntyre" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dallas Jeffrey Finney was charged with two counts of sexual assault-helpless victim and two counts of sexual assault-victim incapable. He entered into a series of plea agreements before a final agreement was accepted by the trial court. Five different trial court judges reviewed the agreements, and at several junctures, petitioner was advised of the potential penalties he faced. The prosecution filed a complaint to revoke petitioner's final plea agreement, alleging petitioner violated the terms of the agreement because he had been terminated from a sex offender treatment program. At the hearing on the revocation complaint, defense counsel informed the court that petitioner would admit to violating the conditions of the plea agreement and that the prosecutor would agree to a sentence of community corrections if petitioner were accepted into such a facility. The court accepted petitioner's admission and set the case for sentencing. Petitioner was not advised of the potential sentence he faced if not accepted into community corrections. Petitioner later learned he was not eligible for community corrections because he had been terminated from the sex offender program. Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to two years to file in the Department of Corrections. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief arguing, among other things, that the failure to advise him of the potential penalties prior to admitting violating the terms of the plea agreement violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that petitioner had been advised multiple times of potential penalties, particularly with respect to negotiating the five plea agreements. With regard to his statutory right to an advisement under 16-11-206, the Court concluded the requirements were met in this case. View "Finney v. Colorado " on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case, two novel questions of Colorado law: (1) the interaction between various waiver provisions in the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA); and (2) whether the "recreation area waiver" of the Act applied to injuries sustained on a walkway adjacent to a public school playground. The plaintiff in this case (a minor child) slipped and fell in a puddle of water that accumulated on a concrete walkway at his public elementary school. As a result of his fall, the child sustained a severe head injury. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court: (1) reversed the court of appeals to the extent that it held that the consideration of one CGIA waiver provision affirmatively precluded consideration of any alternative waiver provisions; and (2) the recreation area waiver's requirements were not met in this case because the walkway at issue was not itself a "public facility" nor was it a component of a larger collection of items that qualified as a "public facility." View "Young v. Brighton School District 27J" on Justia Law