Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the Title Board set titles and submission clauses for Proposed Initiative 2013-2014 #103, petitioners moved for a rehearing, claiming the initiative contained more than one subject and was impermissibly vague. One of the initiative's representatives was unable to attend the rehearing. The Secretary of State's office suggested that a designated representative withdraw and a substitute alternate attend the hearing. The Title Board allowed the substitution and proceeded to deny the petitioner's motion. On appeal, petitioners argued that the proposed initiative still contained too many subjects and was impermissibly vague. Furthermore, the argued the Title Board did not have authority to allow the substitute representative. The Supreme Court agreed that the Title Board's approval of the substitute was improper. Therefore, the Court reversed the Title Board's action and remanded the case back to the Board without decision on claims that the initiative addressed more than one subject or was vague. View "In re Proposed Initiative 2013-2014 #103" on Justia Law

Sir Mario Owens and Robert Ray petitioned the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction for relief from a series of discovery rulings of the district court in their respective death-penalty cases relating to post-conviction proceedings. Each moved to discover the prosecution's investigation of claims raised by Owens' motion for post-conviction review, on grounds that disclosure was required by the state rules of criminal procedure or the federal and state constitutions. The district court held that Crim. P. 16 did not impose obligations on the prosecution with respect to its preparation to meet defendants' post-conviction claims, but that the prosecution did have obligations to disclose information that was both exculpatory and constitutionally material. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in finding it inapplicable to information acquired in response to defendants' post-conviction claims. However, because the Court had not previously held that only a prosecutor's constitutional obligation to disclose extended through the appeal of a death sentence, the district court should order disclosure of some possibly exculpatory material despite being unable to find a reasonable probability that nondisclosure would change the result of the proceedings. The cases were remanded for the district court to review defendants' constitutional claims. View "In re Colorado v. Owens " on Justia Law

The Division of Motor Vehicles (a section of the Department of Revenue), revoked petitioner Andrew Hanson's driver's license following a hearing whereby it was determined petitioner refused a blood alcohol test in violation of state law. At the revocation hearing, the arresting officer failed to appear, and petitioner moved for dismissal of the administrative action to revoke his license. The hearing officer denied the request and submitted the officer's report into evidence. Both the district court and the court of appeals affirmed the Department. Petitioner appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. "When [petitioner] refused, he violated section 42-2-126(3)(c), C.R.S. (2011). The hearing officer was not required to consider the legality of the legality of the first police officer's contact … because any evidence regarding the legality of the initial contact … is irrelevant for the purpose of revoking his license for refusing to take the blood or breath test." View "Hanson v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Division of Motor Vehicles (a section of the Department of Revenue), revoked petitioner Tom Francen's driver's license following a hearing whereby it was determined petitioner had operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content in excess of the statutory minimum. The district court reversed, holding that the stop of petitioner's vehicle was not supported by a reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the legality of the initial contact between petitioner and the police was not relevant in the civil administrative proceeding to revoke the driver's license. Petitioner appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Francen v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Public Service Company of Colorado applied for a tax refund from the state Department of Revenue. The company argued that it was entitled to a refund because it paid taxes when it was actually eligible for an exemption. The district court held in favor of the company, concluding that electricity was tangible personal property and that the production of electricity constituted manufacturing, thus entitling the company to the exemption (the "manufacturing exemption" under 39-26-709(1)(a)(II) C.R.S. (2013)). Upon review of the Department's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that section 39-26-104(1)(d.1) applied in this case: electricity did not qualify as tangible personal property, and that the Code "contemplate[d] that 'electricity furnished and sold'" was to be taxed as a service. View "Department of Revenue v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner and State Representative Debbie Benefield, and other current or former members of the Colorado House of Representatives, appealed the court of appeals' judgment which reversed the district court's order denying costs and attorney fees for the Colorado Republican Party. In 2006, the Party submitted an Open Records Act request to each petitioner seeking access to responses to a 2005 survey that contained various constituents' viewpoints on a variety of legal, political and social issues. When petitioners declined to make the surveys available, the Party sued to get access. The Party ultimately got 925 of 1584 surveys it requested. The Party then moved for costs and fees as the "prevailing applicant." The Supreme Court concluded that because section 24-72-204(5), "when properly construed," mandated an award in favor of any person who applied for and received a district court order requiring a custodian to permit inspection of a public record. Because the appellate court was correct in its interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Benefield v. Colorado Republican Party" on Justia Law

Defendant Randy Kailey was charged with two counts of aggravated incest. After a jury trial, he was found guilty and ultimately sentenced to thirty-two years in jail. Kailey met with a psychologist employed by the Department of Corrections for a private therapy session. At the outset, Kailey reviewed a DOC form that provided that any statements Kailey made during therapy indicating that he intended to harm himself or others would not be considered confidential and would be disclosed to the DOC. During his session, Kailey allegedly made several statements about witnessed that testified against him at trial. The psychologist considered these statements to constitute serious threats of violence. Pursuant to his statutory "duty to warn," the psychologist submitted an "indicent report" to the DOC describing what Kailey said during therapy. The State subsequently charged Kailey with retaliation against a witness. Kailey moved to exclude the incident report. The trial court granted Kailey's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that once a provider's legal "duty to warn" is triggered, the patient's threatening statements are not protected by privilege. View "Colorado v. Kailey" on Justia Law

Proponents Mike Spaulding and Natalie Menten proposed Initiative 76 which sought to repeal and replace the existing manner of triggering and conducting a recall election under article XXI of the Colorado Constitution, and to institute a new constitutional right to recall state and local non-elected officers. The Title Board set a title and submission clause for the initiative. Registered elector Philip Hayes objected to the Board's action. The Board modified the title and submission clause in response to Hayes' objections, but otherwise denied his motion for rehearing. The proponents contended that the initiative, title and submission clause addressed a single subject and were in compliance with state law. The Supreme Court disagreed, and concluded the Title Board acted unconstitutionally in setting a title for the initiative. The Board's action was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #76" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court issues a rule to show cause to decide whether the district court in this case abused its discretion in holding that as a matter of law, section 12-36.5-104(10)(a), C.R.S. (2013) protected professional review committee records from subpoena or discovery and admissibility in "civil suits," but not administrative proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that the term "civil suit" included administrative proceedings of an adjudicatory nature. Accordingly, the Colorado Medical Board's records were protected from subpoena or discovery or were admissible in the administrative hearing in Dr. Polly Train's medical license. The Court reversed the district court's order requiring the Board produce the records in question. View "Colorado Medical Board v. Office of Administrative Courts" on Justia Law

Proponents Peter Coulter and Lisa Brumfiel proposed Initiative 129 to amend article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution, known as the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR). The Initiative sought to amend TABOR to define the term "fee" and differentiate it from a tax. Petitioner Anthony sought to challenge the initiative, arguing it contained multiple subjects. Alternatively, he argued the initiative's title was misleading. The Supreme Court concluded the initiative contained a single subject, and that the title clearly expressed a single subject. Therefore the Court affirmed the action of the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #129" on Justia Law