Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the results of a preliminary breath test ("PBT") for blood alcohol content were admissible for impeachment purposes. When the defendant is charged with driving either while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) or while ability impaired by alcohol (DWAI), the results of the PBT may not be used as evidence of guilt at trial. Whether the results of the PBT may nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes was an issue of first impression for the Colorado Court. In this case, the county court determined that although evidence that a PBT registered a positive result for the presence of alcohol was inadmissible to prove intoxication, that evidence could nevertheless be admitted for impeachment purposes if the defendant testified that he had not been drinking. The district court affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court concluded that ruling was erroneous: "[w]hile a police officer is authorized to conduct a PBT as part of the officer's investigation, we hold that based on the plain language of section 42-4-1301(6)(i)(III), the PBT results may not be used in any court action except as specifically provided in the statute itself." Thus, because the statute did not allow for using PBT results as impeachment evidence, the Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case to that court with instructions to return the case to the county court for further proceedings. View "Cain v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In October 2010, the prosecution charged Alan DeAtley, a Washington State resident, with twenty-five counts of white-collar criminal activity involving alleged fraudulent tax credits for land conservation easements in Colorado. In July 2011, the trial court allowed DeAtley's first retained counsel to withdraw based on irreconcilable conflicts. It granted DeAtley a continuance to retain his then-current defense counsel, Martin Stuart and Jolie Masterson. In November 2012, DeAtley informed the court of his intention to discharge defense counsel. They promptly filed a motion to withdraw. In November 2012, instead of granting the motion to withdraw, the trial court granted DeAtley a relatively short continuance to retain yet a third defense attorney. DeAtley did not retain another attorney. Instead, he commenced a lawsuit against defense counsel for malpractice and breach of contract, reinforcing the discharge of them and causing defense counsel to renew their motion to withdraw. The trial court unreasonably and unfairly determined that the attorneys in this case could effectively represent DeAtley despite his discharge of them and the trial court's previous finding that a conflict of interest existed between defense counsel and DeAtley due to the malpractice and breach of contract suit. The trial court concluded that DeAtley was engaging in trial-delaying conduct. The Supreme Court concluded that the court subsequently chose the wrong remedy and thereby abused its discretion. The trial court's finding that defense counsel could "balance their personal interests implicated by the Defendant's actions with their obligation to represent him such that they can effectively do so" was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair given the trial court's first finding that a conflict existed. The trial court "should have granted the motion to withdraw and proceeded in accordance with Crim.P. 44(a), advising DeAtley that he had the obligation to hire other counsel, request the appointment of counsel by the court, or elect to represent himself." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw. View "In re Colorado v. DeAtley" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court centered on the lawfulness of Secretary of State Rule 4.1, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6:4.1 (2013). Petitioner Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler promulgated Rule 4.1 in response to "Sampson v. Buescher," (625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010)). Rule 4.1 increased the contribution and expenditure threshold that triggered issue committee status from $200 to $5000 and exempted retrospective reporting of contributions and expenditures once issue committee status is achieved. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Sampson" did not invalidate either the $200 contribution and expenditure threshold under article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(II)of the Colorado Constitution or the retrospective reporting requirement under section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2013), of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. Because Rule 4.1's $5000 threshold and its retrospective reporting exemption conflicted with these provisions, the Court held Rule 4.1 unlawful and set it aside. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals because the court of appeals properly concluded that Gessler exceeded his authority in promulgating Rule 4.1. View "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause" on Justia Law

Respondent Vasilios Haralampopoulos visited the emergency room with severe abdominal pain. After a CT scan revealed a large cystic mass in his liver, Petitioner Dr. Mauricio Waintrub examined Respondent, gave a differential diagnosis identifying four possible causes for his condition, and approved a fine-needle biopsy to determine the nature of the cyst. Petitioner Dr. Jason Kelly performed the procedure, during which Respondent suffered respiratory and cardiac arrest. Normal resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful, and it took over 30 minutes to revive Respondent's heart. Lack of oxygen to his brain left Respondent in a vegetative state. Ten days later, Respondent's family and friends met with doctors to determine why Respondent went into arrest and had such a poor reaction to resuscitation efforts. After the meeting, Respondent's then-roommate and ex-girlfriend Gulsans Akyol Hurd approached Dr. Kelly and asked him whether Respondent's prior cocaine use could have contributed to his injuries. Dr. Kelly responded that cocaine could have contributed to Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, but he was not a cardiologist so he did not know. Respondent brought a medical malpractice suit against seven individuals, including Petitioners Dr. Kelly and Dr. Waintrub. Respondent filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly as inadmissible hearsay not covered by any hearsay exception. The trial court denied the motion in limine, finding that Hurd's statements were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment under Rule 803(4), and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Colorado Rule of Evidence 403. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Respondent's cocaine use. The court held that Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly were not admissible under Rule 803(4) because the statements were made after Respondent was in a vegetative state and treatment was no longer possible, they were not made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in limiting the scope of Rule 803(4) to statements made for the purpose of prospective treatment. The Rule's plain language applies to "diagnosis or treatment," and while the term "treatment" has a prospective focus, the term "diagnosis" does not. "Here, Hurd's statements were made for the purpose of discovering the cause of Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, and were thus admissible under Rule 803(4)." The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Haralampopoulos" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Storlie argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the district attorney's motion under Crim. P. 48(a) to dismiss the charges against him. In response, the respondent trial court, through a brief filed on its behalf by the Attorney General's office, argued that a criminal defendant such as Storlie had no standing to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss. Respondent further argued that even if Storlie had standing, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. First, the Supreme Court concluded that it need not decide whether Storlie had standing to challenge the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss because the district attorney, who joined in Storlie's request for relief before the Supreme Court, had standing to challenge such a denial. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss because there was no evidence that the prosecution acted in bad faith in seeking the dismissal, nor did the trial court make any findings suggesting bad faith. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Storlie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision to vacate Carey Griffin's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. After the Court granted certiorari review, Griffin died. Griffin's counsel filed a notice of death and moved to dismiss. The State appealed, arguing that the proceedings should have abated ab initio. The Supreme Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss but later vacated that order to allow the State to respond to the motion. Griffin's counsel argued that the doctrine of abatement ab initio applied here because Griffin died while his case was pending on direct appellate review of his conviction. The State argued Griffin's appeal should have been resolved despite his death because the State had an interest in obtaining resolution of the court of appeals' interpretation of the sex offender registration laws and this issue was likely to evade future review. The State also noted that other courts have questioned the continuing validity of the abatement ab initio doctrine in light of other interests, including the rights of crime victims. Consistent with cases from the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, the Colorado Court declined to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio to matters pending on certiorari review. In light of Griffin's death, the Court vacated its order granting the writ of certiorari and dismissed the State's petition, but did not abate the proceedings ab initio. View "Colorado v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Jack Schaufele was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in injuries to himself and others. While he lay unresponsive at the hospital, a police officer asked a nurse to draw Schaufele's blood for an alcohol analysis. The State later sought to use evidence from that blood draw to prosecute Schaufele for vehicular assault, driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, and careless driving. In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court applied the proper legal test when it suppressed evidence stemming from the blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's analysis in suppressing the evidence. The Court declined the State's invitation to disregard the majority opinion in "Missouri v. McNeely" (which instructed a trial court to consider the totality of the circumstances and adopt Chief Justice Roberts' concurring and dissenting opinion that a "warrantless blood draw may ensue" if an officer could reasonably conclude that there was not sufficient time to seek and receive a warrant"). View "Colorado v. Schaufele" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was attacked by two ranch dogs herding sheep while participating in a mountain bike race. The cyclist and dogs were on federally owned land on which the attack took place, subject to a sheep grazing permit and a recreational use permit. The cyclist sustained serious injuries during the attack. The cyclist and her husband sued the dog's owners, alleging negligence, negligence per se and loss of consortium. They also brought a strict liability claim under Colorado's dog bite statute. The shepherds moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the Colorado Premises Liability Act preempted the cyclist's common law claims; and (2) they were immune from strict liability under the working-dog exemption to the dog bite statute. The district court granted the shepherds' motion. The court of appeals reversed, interpreting the working dog exemption as applicable only when the dog is on the owner's own property. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate court: the exemption applied when a dog bite occurs on the dog owner's property or when the dog is working under the control of the dog owner. View "Robinson v. Legro" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Town of Dillon enacted two municipal ordinances: one authorized a local road improvement project, and another concerning parking enforcement on a public right-of-way. Owners of the Yacht Club Condominiums challenged the ordinances, arguing, among other things, that the ordinances were an unreasonable exercise of the Town's police power because they eliminated the ability of the owners' guests to use the Town's rights-of-way as overflow parking. The trial court concluded the Town's exercise of its police power was unreasonable. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Town appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the ordinances were within the Town's police power to regulate matters of public health, safety and welfare, and reasonably related to the Town's objectives of improving traffic safety and improving water drainage. View "Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condominiums Home Owners Association" on Justia Law

A man called "Rabbit" tried to strangle two people in a Boulder park. Witnesses identified the man to police. Plainclothes officers located "Rabbit," identified themselves as police, and asked him questions regarding the incident in the park. Petitioner Bradley Begay (a/k/a "Rabbit") was never told he was under arrest, nor was he handcuffed. Begay never tried to leave during the encounter with police, but police did not say specifically defendant was free to leave. Approximately twenty minutes into their conversation, an officer who had interviewed one of the alleged victims identified petitioner as the assailant. Officers then read defendant his Miranda rights and arrested him for assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made before his arrest as the product of a custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. The trial court granted the motion; the State appealed. Finding that the trial court conflated the standards governing seizure under the Fourth Amendment and custody under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Colorado v. Begay" on Justia Law