Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Board of Commissioners of the County of Teller filed a petition seeking the district court's review of the City of Woodland Park's annexation of certain real property. Upon review of the petition and the district court's order denying the City's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order: the district court indeed did not have jurisdiction to review the County's petition under 31-12-116 C.R.S. (2013). View "County of Teller Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Woodland Park" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was one of first impression: whether an injury that occurred on a "zip line" on a public school playground met the requirements of the "recreation area waiver" of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. A student was playing on the zip line during lunch recess when she fell and fractured her wrist. Her parents sued the school district in tort. Using the three-step analysis announced in "Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs," the Supreme Court held that a collection on playground equipment considered as a whole qualified as a "public facility" under the recreation area waiver. The court of appeals erred when it held that the zip line individually (rather than the playground collectively) constituted a "public facility." View "St. Vrain Valley School District RE-1J v. A.R.L." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression: whether the requirements of a statutory "recreation area waiver" can be met by a party injured in a public golf course's parking lot. Specifically, the issue was reduced to whether a public golf course's parking lot qualified as a "public facility" under the Governmental Immunity Act, and whether such lot is "located in" a "recreation area." Respondent Marilyn Daniel drove to a public golf course in Colorado Springs to see her Congressional Representative speak at the clubhouse. Instead of parking in a lot close to the clubhouse, respondent parked on a street a block away. As she crossed the golf course parking lot, she stepped in a hole, fell and fractured her hip. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a parking lot serving a public golf course is a "public facility" under the recreational area waiver. A three-step analysis should be used to determine whether a public facility is "located in" a "recreation area:" (1) determine which specific portions of the property should be considered a "putative recreation area;" (2) determine whether the public entity's primary purpose in building or maintaining that area was for the promotion of recreation; and (3) determine whether the facility at issue was located within the boundaries of that recreation area. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in categorically holding that the recreation area waiver did not apply to this type of parking lot. View "Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred when it suppressed evidence that the police found in defendant-appellee Lynette Webb's purse. In a visit with defendant's son, officers found spoons with methamphetamine residue under the son's bed, and a syringe that tested positive for methamphetamine in a visitor's backpack. Upon executing a search warrant of the house (and all personal property within) based on the visit with the son, officers found methamphetamine paraphernalia in defendant's purse. The trial court concluded that defendant had a heightened expectation of privacy to the purse, and that officers' search was unreasonable because it was unlikely that the son would hide contraband in his mother's purse. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied the wrong analysis: "[o]nce a lawful search warrant is issued, the scope of the search is defined by the scope of the warrant rather than an individual's expectation of privacy in any particular area or item." The Court therefore reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Webb" on Justia Law

Petitioner Western Logistics, Inc. appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's decision that certain individuals were employees rather than independent contractors under Colorado law. The appellate court found that the individuals were not simultaneously providing services for others in the field, and were not free from petitioner's control and direction. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in affirming the Appeals Office's decision: because the court felt the independent-trade-or-business issue and the control-and-direction issue may have been related, the Court did not address the control-and-direction issue. The Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals to vacate the portion of its decision that addressed the control-and-direction issue, then to remand the case to the Appeals Office for further proceedings. View "Western Logistics, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Dennis Sanchez appealed the court of appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for a class 3 felony on "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse", notwithstanding the jury's verdict of "not guilty" on the charge entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child," based on a separate finding of two of six enumerated touching incidents presented on a verdict form entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse." A majority of the appeals court concluded defendant had been adequately charged in a single count and that the jury's instructions did not make its finding of a pattern of abuse contingent upon first finding the defendant's guilt of the separately charged crime of "Sexual Assault of a Child." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that because the verdict form the jury used never offered the jury the opportunity to find that defendant committed the elements of sexual assault on a child, and instead reflected at most, the jury's factual finding of two different incidents of sexual contact. The trial court erred in entering judgment for a class 3 felony and as such, the court of appeals' judgment affirming the trial court was error. View "Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether an individual was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee for unemployment tax liability purposes. Waterman Ormsby was a geologist contracted to work on a project basis for Softrock Geological Services, Inc. In 2011, the Division of Employment and Training audited Softrock and issued a notice of liability on grounds that Softrock should have treated Ormsby as an employee for Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA) purposes. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that whether an individual was "customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed" was a question of fact. Whether the individual worked for another was not dispositive of whether the individual was engaged in an independent business. The Court disagreed with the appellate court, however, that whether an individual was engaged in an independent trade or business could be determined by applying a nine-factor test to create a presumption of an independent contractor relationship under statute. Instead, the Court held that the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances test that evaluates the dynamics of the relationship between the putative employee and the employer. The factors listed in the statute might be relevant to that determination, but the statute does not provide an exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The case was remanded to the appellate court to return the case to the Industrial Claim Appeals office for further proceedings. View "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Softrock Geological Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Bristol Bay Productions, LLC brought claims against author Clive Cussler in California for fraud based on allegations that he had misrepresented his readership numbers. Bristol Bay alleged Cussler told it he had sold over 100 million books when the figure was, in fact, closer to 40 million. According to Bristol Bay, it reasonably relied on those numbers when it purchased the film rights to Cussler's books and produced an ultimately unsuccessful movie based on one of them (Sahara), with resulting damages of more than $50 million. In a special verdict, a California jury found Cussler misrepresented his readership figures and that Bristol Bay reasonably relied on those misrepresentations, but that Bristol Bay's reliance on those misrepresentations did not cause its damages. Bristol Bay also sued Cussler's literary agent and publishers for fraud in Colorado based on the same allegations asserted in the California suit. Following Bristol Bay's unsuccessful appeal of the California action, the trial court dismissed Bristol Bay's Colorado action on issue preclusion grounds for failing to state a claim. The court of appeals affirmed. Bristol Bay appealed the Colorado courts' dismissal. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Bristol Bay's Colorado action was indeed barred on issue preclusion grounds. However, the Colorado Court held the trial court erred by dismissing Bristol Bay's Colorado action without converting the defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. View "Bristol Bay Prods., LLC v. Lampack" on Justia Law

J.R. was sexually assaulted by a man who offered her a ride as she was walking home at 2:00 A.M. one winter morning in 2005. J.R. was taken to the hospital for examination; she complained of neck and jaw pain stemming from when her assailant held her mouth shut. A presence of semen later implicated Respondent Michael Jones as J.R.'s assailant. The State charged respondent with numerous offenses. Prior to trial, he moved the trial court to bar the State from introducing evidence that he allegedly sexually assaulted two other women in two other states. The trial court denied the motion, finding the evidence of the two other alleged assaults under the four-part "Spoto" admissibility test allowed the evidence's admissibility to show respondent's "common plan, scheme, or design" and to rebut respondent's defense of consent (Colorado v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (1990)). A jury ultimately convicted respondent, but the appellate court reversed, finding that evidence of the two out-of-state assaults were not sufficiently similar to the Colorado assault. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that trial courts have no obligation to determine that evidence of other acts offered under the Colorado Rules of Evidence satisfy the doctrine of chances, and to also satisfy the second and third prongs of the Spoto admissibility test. Though the doctrine of chances provides one theory pursuant to which other-act evidence may satisfy components of the Spoto analysis, trial courts have discretion to assess the relevance of other-act evidence under Spoto apart from the doctrine. The court of appeals therefore erred when it effectively held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the other-act evidence without conducting a doctrine of chances analysis.View "Colorado v. Jones" on Justia Law

Police arrested Jeffrey Knedler for allegedly assaulting two people. Days after the assault, officers contacted Knedler at a hair salon where he occasionally stayed. As they approached the salon, the officers observed Knedler drinking from what appeared to be a liquor bottle. He also took a long drink from an alcoholic beverage before officers handcuffed him and placed him in a police car. Knedler agreed to speak with an investigator, but he did not want to talk in the police car, so he was taken to police headquarters. Upon arriving at headquarters, Knedler was presented with a written Miranda advisement, and it was read aloud to him. Knedler stated he did not have his glasses with him to read the advisement and waiver, but he initialed by each of the numbered rights, signed the advisement and waiver and stated "I know my rights." After questioning, Knedler admitted to beating both victims and made numerous incriminating statements. The State sought reversal of the trial court's order that suppressed videotaped statements Knedler made after he signed the written waiver of his Miranda rights. Based on Knedler's extremely high blood alcohol contend at the time of the waiver, the trial court found the waiver was invalid. Because Knedler's waiver was nonetheless knowing and intelligent, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Knedler" on Justia Law