Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ascension Baez-Lopez, Jose Soto-Lopez and Juan Cantu-Bojorquez were indicted on counts of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act, and counts of conspiracy to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance. The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter centered on he trial court’s order suppressing evidence from interceptions of oral and wire communications in these three cases. The trial court suppressed the “wiretap” recordings on grounds that they had not been sealed in compliance with state law and no satisfactory explanation for the absence of the seal given. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the suppression motions because the sealing procedure indeed complied with the applicable state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order. View "Colorado v. Baez-Lopez" on Justia Law

Prosecutors alleged defendant Ricky Hoang instigated a home invasion robbery involving three others stealing jewelry and cash at gunpoint. Defendant was restrained with leg shackles during his jury trial over his repeated objections. The issues this case presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the trial court erred by requiring defendant to be tried with the shackles without a finding of specific need; and (2) whether defendant’s claims of delays and deficiencies in producing the record violated his rights to a meaningful and speedy appeal. The Supreme Court held that “When the record does not show the restrains were plainly visible, the defendant must point to something in the record justifying an appellate court’s reasonable inference that at least one juror saw or heard them. If defendant fails to meet that burden, then the constitutional harmless error standard . . . does not apply.” Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendant’s rights to a meaningful and speedy appeal were not violated. View "Hoang v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Marquez was convicted at a single trial of attempted aggravated robbery (a statutorily designated crime of violence); second degree assault (found by the jury to have been committed as a crime of violence under the circumstances of this case); and two counts of felony menacing. Petitioner was also found to be an habitual criminal requiring sentences to triple the maximum of the presumptive range for each of his crimes. The district court sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment for his felony menacing convictions, which it also ordered to be served concurrently with his crime-of-violence sentences, but it ordered petitioner's two crime-of-violence sentences to be served consecutively. After concluding that both crimes of violence were committed as part of a single "crime spree," the district court felt compelled to impose consecutive 48-year sentences. Petitioner sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed the district court's imposition of consecutive sentences for two crime-of-violence convictions. Because the phrase "arising out of the same incident," as appearing in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S. (2013), is a reference to, and has the same meaning as, the phrase "arising from the same criminal episode," in section 18-1-408(2), C.R.S. (2013), and because the record in this case established that the crimes of violence of which petitioner was convicted were not "based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode," as previously construed in the latter statute, the Supreme Court concluded the district court was not required to impose consecutive sentences. Rather, it was not only permitted, but in fact, required to exercise its discretion concerning the imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore reversed, and the case was remanded for resentencing.View "Marquez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Election Rule 10.7.5, promulgated as a temporary or emergency rule on the evening of the November 5, 2013 election. Plaintiffs were registered electors of the Adams 12 Five Star School District who sued seeking judicial review of the Secretary of State's authority to promulgate the rule, and for an order to direct the Clerk and Recorder of Adams County to finish counting votes and to certify the vote tally for all candidates in the school district director election. The district court ruled that the Secretary acted in excess of his authority in promulgating the emergency rule, and ordered all defendants to complete and certify the vote count for all candidates in the Adams 12 director district 4 election. The Secretary petitioned the Supreme Court for review of whether the district court erred in holding "Rule 10.7.5 [was] contrary to and in conflict with existing election statutes." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rule 10.7.5 indeed "contravene[d] the election code by permitting a designated election official to usurp the courts' express authority to resolve . . . issues." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court only in holding that Rule 10.7.5 conflicted with existing election rules. View "Hanlen v. Gessler" on Justia Law

The issue for the Supreme Court's consideration in this case was the balance between a defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to counsel of his or her choice and the public's interest in the fairness and efficiency of the judicial system. The Court of appeals developed a balancing test for a trial court to use when deciding whether to grant or deny a defendant's request for a continuance so that s/he may change counsel. The appellate court applied its test to the facts of this case and determined that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant's constitutional rights to counsel of choice when it denied a request for a continuance. As a result, the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed that outcome. While the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the decision whether to grant a continuance is a fact-based question best decided by the trial court, it declined to adopt the appellate court's test because it did not adequately reflect longstanding precedent requiring consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" when deciding on whether to grant a continuance. The Court concluded that the trial court record in this case was inadequate to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the continuance. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for additional findings and conclusions. View "Colorado v. Brown" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Court of Appeals' reversal of defendant's convictions for first degree assault and first degree burglary, and his sentence of 28 years' imprisonment. The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause on the grounds of juror bias, and that the defendant removed the juror in question with a peremptory challenge, and then exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges. The appellate court reversed noting the Supreme Court's rule of automatic reversal, as explained in "Colorado v. Macrander" (828 P.2d 234 (1992)). The State petitioned the Supreme Court solely to request reconsideration of automatic reversal under these circumstances. The Supreme Court overruled the automatic reversal requirement of "Macrander." Because the Court of Appeals relied on the bright-line automatic reversal rule of "Macrander," rather than evaluating the likely effect of the trial court's error on the outcome of the specific case in which it occurred, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this holding. View "Colorado v. Montero-Romero" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Court of Appeals' reversal of defendant's convictions for theft by receiving and his sentence to three years' probation. The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause on the grounds of juror bias, and that defendant removed the juror with a peremptory challenge and then exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges. The appellate court reversed noting the Supreme Court's rule of automatic reversal, as explained in "Colorado v. Macrander" (828 P.2d 234 (1992)). The State petitioned the Supreme Court solely to request reconsideration of automatic reversal under these circumstances. Because the Court of Appeals relied on the bright-line automatic reversal rule of "Macrander," rather than evaluating the likely effect of the trial court's error on the outcome of the specific case in which it occurred, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this holding. View "Colorado v. Roldan" on Justia Law

A petition in Dependency and Neglect was filed a few days after O.C.'s birth. The child was removed from her parents' care over concerns that her mother was not adequately caring for her. O.C. was eventually placed in foster care. At issue in this case was whether O.C.'s grandparents could intervene to have the child placed in their care. The County and Guardian Ad Litem opposed the grandparents' motion, arguing the grandparents lacked standing to intervene. The trial court denied the grandparents' motion. The Supreme Court held that parents, grandparents and relatives could intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Colorado law. The Court affirmed the appellate court which overturned the trial court's judgment. View "In the Int. of O.C." on Justia Law

Petitioner Cameron Davis was driving his girlfriend's car while a man in the passenger seat shot and killed a bystander. At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on testimony from three witnesses: Davis' girlfriend, his mother, and one of his friends. The appeal concerned the testimony of two detectives who testified about their interviews with these three witnesses. The record in this case indicated that the testimony from law enforcement officials regarding a witness' credibility was offered to provide context for the detectives' interrogation tactics and investigative decisions. The Supreme Court concluded that this kind of evidence was properly admitted.View "Davis v. Colorado " on Justia Law

Following defendant's conviction for manslaughter, the trial court delayed sentencing to await resolution of an unrelated felony charge. Defendant pled guilty to that felony. The manslaughter case thereafter proceeded to sentencing. At the rescheduled hearing, the trial court found that the unrelated felony triggered sentencing within an aggravated range. Defendant was then sentenced to twice the maximum presumptive sentence (in this case, twelve years) for manslaughter. The Court of Appeals found the manslaughter sentencing delay unreasonable, also holding that defendant's right to speedy trial was violated. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: the six-month, seven-day delay was not unreasonable under Colo. Crim. P. 32(b) because the trial court imposed the delay for a legally justifiable reason. Furthermore, the Court rejected defendant's constitutional claim, holding the delay was no presumptively prejudicial. View "Colorado v. Sandoval-Candelaria" on Justia Law