Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jay McIntyre's then ten-year-old niece accused him of sexually assaulting her on two separate occasions. In an interlocutory appeal, the State sought review of a trial court's order suppressing defendant's inculpatory statements. The trial court found defendant did not make the statements voluntarily. Upon review of the State's petition, the Supreme Court held that when considering the totality of the circumstances, police did not improperly coerce defendant into making his statements, but that he instead spoke voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McIntyre" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dallas Jeffrey Finney was charged with two counts of sexual assault-helpless victim and two counts of sexual assault-victim incapable. He entered into a series of plea agreements before a final agreement was accepted by the trial court. Five different trial court judges reviewed the agreements, and at several junctures, petitioner was advised of the potential penalties he faced. The prosecution filed a complaint to revoke petitioner's final plea agreement, alleging petitioner violated the terms of the agreement because he had been terminated from a sex offender treatment program. At the hearing on the revocation complaint, defense counsel informed the court that petitioner would admit to violating the conditions of the plea agreement and that the prosecutor would agree to a sentence of community corrections if petitioner were accepted into such a facility. The court accepted petitioner's admission and set the case for sentencing. Petitioner was not advised of the potential sentence he faced if not accepted into community corrections. Petitioner later learned he was not eligible for community corrections because he had been terminated from the sex offender program. Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to two years to file in the Department of Corrections. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief arguing, among other things, that the failure to advise him of the potential penalties prior to admitting violating the terms of the plea agreement violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that petitioner had been advised multiple times of potential penalties, particularly with respect to negotiating the five plea agreements. With regard to his statutory right to an advisement under 16-11-206, the Court concluded the requirements were met in this case. View "Finney v. Colorado " on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case, two novel questions of Colorado law: (1) the interaction between various waiver provisions in the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA); and (2) whether the "recreation area waiver" of the Act applied to injuries sustained on a walkway adjacent to a public school playground. The plaintiff in this case (a minor child) slipped and fell in a puddle of water that accumulated on a concrete walkway at his public elementary school. As a result of his fall, the child sustained a severe head injury. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court: (1) reversed the court of appeals to the extent that it held that the consideration of one CGIA waiver provision affirmatively precluded consideration of any alternative waiver provisions; and (2) the recreation area waiver's requirements were not met in this case because the walkway at issue was not itself a "public facility" nor was it a component of a larger collection of items that qualified as a "public facility." View "Young v. Brighton School District 27J" on Justia Law

The Board of Commissioners of the County of Teller filed a petition seeking the district court's review of the City of Woodland Park's annexation of certain real property. Upon review of the petition and the district court's order denying the City's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order: the district court indeed did not have jurisdiction to review the County's petition under 31-12-116 C.R.S. (2013). View "County of Teller Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Woodland Park" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was one of first impression: whether an injury that occurred on a "zip line" on a public school playground met the requirements of the "recreation area waiver" of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. A student was playing on the zip line during lunch recess when she fell and fractured her wrist. Her parents sued the school district in tort. Using the three-step analysis announced in "Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs," the Supreme Court held that a collection on playground equipment considered as a whole qualified as a "public facility" under the recreation area waiver. The court of appeals erred when it held that the zip line individually (rather than the playground collectively) constituted a "public facility." View "St. Vrain Valley School District RE-1J v. A.R.L." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression: whether the requirements of a statutory "recreation area waiver" can be met by a party injured in a public golf course's parking lot. Specifically, the issue was reduced to whether a public golf course's parking lot qualified as a "public facility" under the Governmental Immunity Act, and whether such lot is "located in" a "recreation area." Respondent Marilyn Daniel drove to a public golf course in Colorado Springs to see her Congressional Representative speak at the clubhouse. Instead of parking in a lot close to the clubhouse, respondent parked on a street a block away. As she crossed the golf course parking lot, she stepped in a hole, fell and fractured her hip. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a parking lot serving a public golf course is a "public facility" under the recreational area waiver. A three-step analysis should be used to determine whether a public facility is "located in" a "recreation area:" (1) determine which specific portions of the property should be considered a "putative recreation area;" (2) determine whether the public entity's primary purpose in building or maintaining that area was for the promotion of recreation; and (3) determine whether the facility at issue was located within the boundaries of that recreation area. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in categorically holding that the recreation area waiver did not apply to this type of parking lot. View "Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred when it suppressed evidence that the police found in defendant-appellee Lynette Webb's purse. In a visit with defendant's son, officers found spoons with methamphetamine residue under the son's bed, and a syringe that tested positive for methamphetamine in a visitor's backpack. Upon executing a search warrant of the house (and all personal property within) based on the visit with the son, officers found methamphetamine paraphernalia in defendant's purse. The trial court concluded that defendant had a heightened expectation of privacy to the purse, and that officers' search was unreasonable because it was unlikely that the son would hide contraband in his mother's purse. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied the wrong analysis: "[o]nce a lawful search warrant is issued, the scope of the search is defined by the scope of the warrant rather than an individual's expectation of privacy in any particular area or item." The Court therefore reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Webb" on Justia Law

Petitioner Western Logistics, Inc. appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's decision that certain individuals were employees rather than independent contractors under Colorado law. The appellate court found that the individuals were not simultaneously providing services for others in the field, and were not free from petitioner's control and direction. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in affirming the Appeals Office's decision: because the court felt the independent-trade-or-business issue and the control-and-direction issue may have been related, the Court did not address the control-and-direction issue. The Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals to vacate the portion of its decision that addressed the control-and-direction issue, then to remand the case to the Appeals Office for further proceedings. View "Western Logistics, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Dennis Sanchez appealed the court of appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for a class 3 felony on "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse", notwithstanding the jury's verdict of "not guilty" on the charge entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child," based on a separate finding of two of six enumerated touching incidents presented on a verdict form entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse." A majority of the appeals court concluded defendant had been adequately charged in a single count and that the jury's instructions did not make its finding of a pattern of abuse contingent upon first finding the defendant's guilt of the separately charged crime of "Sexual Assault of a Child." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that because the verdict form the jury used never offered the jury the opportunity to find that defendant committed the elements of sexual assault on a child, and instead reflected at most, the jury's factual finding of two different incidents of sexual contact. The trial court erred in entering judgment for a class 3 felony and as such, the court of appeals' judgment affirming the trial court was error. View "Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether an individual was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee for unemployment tax liability purposes. Waterman Ormsby was a geologist contracted to work on a project basis for Softrock Geological Services, Inc. In 2011, the Division of Employment and Training audited Softrock and issued a notice of liability on grounds that Softrock should have treated Ormsby as an employee for Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA) purposes. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that whether an individual was "customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed" was a question of fact. Whether the individual worked for another was not dispositive of whether the individual was engaged in an independent business. The Court disagreed with the appellate court, however, that whether an individual was engaged in an independent trade or business could be determined by applying a nine-factor test to create a presumption of an independent contractor relationship under statute. Instead, the Court held that the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances test that evaluates the dynamics of the relationship between the putative employee and the employer. The factors listed in the statute might be relevant to that determination, but the statute does not provide an exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The case was remanded to the appellate court to return the case to the Industrial Claim Appeals office for further proceedings. View "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Softrock Geological Services, Inc." on Justia Law