Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A petition in Dependency and Neglect was filed a few days after O.C.'s birth. The child was removed from her parents' care over concerns that her mother was not adequately caring for her. O.C. was eventually placed in foster care. At issue in this case was whether O.C.'s grandparents could intervene to have the child placed in their care. The County and Guardian Ad Litem opposed the grandparents' motion, arguing the grandparents lacked standing to intervene. The trial court denied the grandparents' motion. The Supreme Court held that parents, grandparents and relatives could intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Colorado law. The Court affirmed the appellate court which overturned the trial court's judgment. View "In the Int. of O.C." on Justia Law

Petitioner Cameron Davis was driving his girlfriend's car while a man in the passenger seat shot and killed a bystander. At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on testimony from three witnesses: Davis' girlfriend, his mother, and one of his friends. The appeal concerned the testimony of two detectives who testified about their interviews with these three witnesses. The record in this case indicated that the testimony from law enforcement officials regarding a witness' credibility was offered to provide context for the detectives' interrogation tactics and investigative decisions. The Supreme Court concluded that this kind of evidence was properly admitted.View "Davis v. Colorado " on Justia Law

Following defendant's conviction for manslaughter, the trial court delayed sentencing to await resolution of an unrelated felony charge. Defendant pled guilty to that felony. The manslaughter case thereafter proceeded to sentencing. At the rescheduled hearing, the trial court found that the unrelated felony triggered sentencing within an aggravated range. Defendant was then sentenced to twice the maximum presumptive sentence (in this case, twelve years) for manslaughter. The Court of Appeals found the manslaughter sentencing delay unreasonable, also holding that defendant's right to speedy trial was violated. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: the six-month, seven-day delay was not unreasonable under Colo. Crim. P. 32(b) because the trial court imposed the delay for a legally justifiable reason. Furthermore, the Court rejected defendant's constitutional claim, holding the delay was no presumptively prejudicial. View "Colorado v. Sandoval-Candelaria" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' reversal of defendant Matthew Alfaro's convictions on murder, burglary and attempted kidnapping charges. On direct appeal, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in allowing defendant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized by statute and rule. Although defendant did not object to the trial court's interpretation of the applicable statute, the appellate court found that the trial court's error was not harmless. However, after its review, the Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals did not apply the outcome-determinative standard (as discussed in "Colorado v. Novotony," released in addition to the opinion of this case). The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper standard. View "Colorado v. Alfaro" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' judgments reversing convictions of the defendants in this case and "Colorado v. Vigil." In both cases, the appellate court applied a rule requiring automatic reversal for any erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause that adversely impacted defendant's ability to shale the jury through exercise of peremptory challenges. The Court overruled prior holdings to the contrary and concluded in this consolidated opinion that reversal of a criminal conviction for other that structural error, or an appropriate case-specific, outcome-determinative analysis, will not longer be sustained. Allowing a defendant fewer peremptory challenges that authorized does not in and of itself amount to structural error. View "Colorado v. Novotny" on Justia Law

The Colorado Division of Insurance initiated an investigation into Milton Trujillo's application to renew as a insurance producer license with bail bond authority. It later denied the application based on a complaint it received. The Division charged Trujillo with twelve counts of violating the insurance code, professions and occupations code, and Division regulations. The ALJ revoked the license; the Commissioner of Insurance adopted the ALJ's decision. The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner's action, determining that Trujillo violated a fiduciary duty prescribed by 10-2-704(a). The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals erred in applying section 10-2-704(1)(a) to this case: "[w]hile there are unappealed findings of fact upon which the Commissioner on remand could uphold the sanction it ordered, it is not clear [to the Court] whether, absent the agency's construction of 10-2-704(1)(a), the Commissioner would have exercised his authority to revoke Trujillo's license and deny his renewal application." The case was therefore remanded for redetermination by the Commissioner the appropriate sanction for Trujillo's conduct. View "Trujillo v. Colorado Division of Insurance" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether a proposed amendment to the fire department's disciplinary system was subject to collective bargaining under the Charter of the City and County of Denver. Upon review of the Charter, and construing its plain language as a "harmonious and sensible whole," the Supreme Court concluded that Denver had the authority to both draft and implement disciplinary rules, and that that authority was not limited by the firefighters' right to collectively bargain. The court of appeals held that discipline was a term and condition of employment under the Charter and not subject to collective bargaining. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City & County of Denver v. Denver Firefighters" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case called for a determination of whether section 15-11-1106(2) C.R.S. (2013) required a court to reform a revocable option that was negotiated as part of a commercial contract entered into before the effective date of the statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act. In Colorado, the Act superseded the common law rule for nonvested property interests created after May 31, 1991. The common rule still applied to nonvested property interests created prior to that date. Under the Act, all donative transfers after that date were valid so long as the property interest created vested or terminated within ninety years of its creation. With regard to the specifics of this case, the trial court concluded that the revocable option at issue violated the common law rule against perpetuities. The Court then inserted a savings clause pursuant to statute, to prevent the option from being voided by the common law rule, and ruled that the option holder was entitled to specific performance of the reformed option. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the option did not violate the common law rule, and therefore no reformation by the trial court was necessary. View "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil and Gas Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the appellate court applied the presumption of regularity when the it determined the jury did not receive correct jury forms. The trial court record reflected that the trial judge read the correct instructions and verdict forms. But when the record was certified on appeal, it was discovered that one of the verdict forms was stapled to a refused jury instruction that was not given to the jury, raising the question that the jury may not have received the correct forms. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that when the trial court reads the correct elemental instructions and verdict form to the jury, the party asserting error must overcome the presumption of regularity. In this case, the party did not overcome the presumption by pointing out that a verdict form was stapled to a refused instruction, and in relation by pointing to ambiguous statements in the trial transcript. View "LePage v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case called for an evaluation of the relationship between C.R.S. sections 17-22.5-101 and 17-22.5-403(1) (2013) of article 22.5, governing "Inmate and Parole Time Computation." Petitioner Jeffrey Nowak was convicted on two counts of aggravated motor theft and sentenced to eight years. He began serving the sentence on May 13, 2003 - the effective date of the sentence for parole eligibility purposes. The Department of Corrections calculated petitioner's parole eligibility date (PED) as July 3, 2006. Several months after reaching his PED, petitioner absconded from a halfway house while on a temporary leave. Petitioner would later be convicted of felony escape and sentenced to twelve years in prison to run consecutively to the eight-year sentence. Petitioner began serving the new sentence on July 13, 2007. Because he had already reached his PED on the original sentence when he started serving the new sentence, the DOC used the July 2007 date (rather than the May 2003 date) to calculate petitioner's new PED. Petitioner sought habeas relief, arguing the DOC should have used the PED from May 2003. The Supreme Court concluded that for the purpose of computing an inmate's PED, section 17-22.5-101 required the DOC to construe all sentences as one continuous sentence when the inmate has been committed under several convictions with separate sentences, even when doing so results in the inmate becoming parole eligible before serving at least 50% of the second sentence. View "Nowak v. Suthers" on Justia Law