Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following an election recount in the Town of Center, Maurice Jones and Citizen Center filed suit seeking to set aside the results of the recount. Jones argued that voters' right to ballot secrecy had been violated. The district court set aside the results and ordered a new recall election. The three officials who had been elected in the recall petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the district court's decision. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall results and ordering a new election. As such, the Court reversed the district court and enter judgment in favor of the newly elected officials. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Grassi was involved in a single-car accident early one September morning. He suffered serious injuries, and his passenger was killed. Paramedics transported petitioner to a local hospital for treatment, where he remained unconscious for several hours. At the hospital, a trooper (part of the investigation but who had not been at the scene of the accident) detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from petitioner's mouth though he remained unconscious. The trooper ordered a blood draw. Prior to the blood draw, police knew that petitioner had been driving when it crashed, that no road conditions or other external factors appeared to have caused the crash, that petitioner's driving was consistent with that of an intoxicated driver, and that his breath smelled of alcohol. The blood draw revealed that petitioner's blood alcohol content (BAC) was well over the legal limit for driving under the influence. Petitioner was later charged with vehicular homicide, manslaughter and driving with an excessive BAC. Petitioner moved to suppress evidence of his BAC, arguing that the officer at the hospital who ordered the blood draw lacked probable cause to order blood from him while he lay unconscious in the hospital. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Colorado's express consent statute did not require police to possess probable cause in order to draw blood from an unconscious driver. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the fellow-officer rule imputed information that the police possess as a whole to individual officers who conduct searches if: (1) that officer acts pursuant to a coordinated investigation; and (2) police possess the information at the time of the search or arrest. Because the record of this case reflected those conditions, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Grassi v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Honorable Robert Rand was publicly censured for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline. The Supreme Court found that Judge Rand engaged in undignified conduct (making inappropriate jokes about the appearance of certain people that appeared before him in proceedings), engaged in ex parte communications with attorneys and witnesses in trials that appeared before him, and failed to promote confidence in the judiciary by engaging in off-the-record conversations with persons in the courtroom, described as "advice or pep talks." View "In the Matter of: Robert A. Rand" on Justia Law

Respondent Helen Rodriguez injured herself after falling down a flight of stairs at work. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether an "unexplained" fall satisfied the "arising out of" employment requirement of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court agreed with the appellate court that respondent's unexplained fall was compensable, but it disagreed with the reasoning. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred when it agreed with respondent's view that her injuries arose out of employment, and held that an unexplained fall necessarily stemmed from a "neutral" risk attributable to neither the employment nor the employee. "Under our longstanding 'but-for' test, such an unexplained fall 'arises out of' employment if the fall would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of employment placed the employee in a position where he or she was injured." View "City of Brighton v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mark Steen was convicted on misdemeanor offenses. He challenged ordered issued by the county and district courts denying his motions to stay execution of his sentence pending appeal of those convictions. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the county court in this case was required to enter a stay upon petitioner's request to remain in effect through the final disposition of the appeal unless modified by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Steen" on Justia Law

The court of appeals rejected defendant Lessell Moore's challenge to the validity of his waiver of his right to testify, and upheld his conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing defendant's claim that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and whether contemporaneous objection at trial was required to preserve the issue. The Court concluded the appellate court erred in considering defendant's challenge of his waiver. The Court reaffirmed that a defendant's challenge to his waiver to the right to testify is not subject to review on direct appeal, but only in post-conviction proceedings. Defendant need not make a contemporaneous objection to the trial court's advisement. The Court therefore vacated the court f appeals' decision regarding the validity of the waiver, but upheld the judgment of conviction. View "Moore v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the defendant in this case validly waived his right to a jury trial following the trial court's advisement that failed to substantially comply with Crim. P. 23(a)(5)(II). Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant may not litigate the validity of such a waiver on direct appeal, but must do so in a post-conviction proceeding. Furthermore, the Court held that when evaluating a defendant's waiver to a jury trial, the post-conviction court must determine whether the defendant personally waived the right knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. View "Colorado v. Walker" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court was not required to award presentence confinement credit against a jail term imposed as a condition of probation, if the trial court chose to award credit, it had to do so equal to the full amount of time served. The Supreme Court disagreed with that holding. The Supreme Court concluded that the statutory provision governing presentence confinement credit does not apply to probation, and therefore does not apply to the jail component of a probation sentence. View "Colorado v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case centered on the contested March 19, 2013 election in Center, Colorado. The district court set aside the results of the recall, ordered a new recall election, and allowed the recalled officials to continue until the new election was conducted. The recalled officials challenged the district court's decision, arguing that court erred in setting aside the recall and ordering a new election, and erred in determining that there were flaws in how the votes were counted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall and ordering a new recall election. Accordingly, the Court returned the case back to the district court with directions that judgment be entered that the replacement officials were duly elected. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law