Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Gregory T. Ludlow, S. Reid Ludlow, and Jean E. Cowles entered into an exclusive listing agreement with real estate brokerage firm Gibbons-White, Inc. for the sale of approximately 131 acres of vacant land in Boulder County. Over the next seven years, the Sellers received offers from at least three different buyers to purchase portions of the land; none of the offers resulted in a completed sale. In 2007, Actis, LLC made an offer to purchase half of the land. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter stemmed from that offer. The Court concluded that to sustain a professional malpractice claim against a transactional real estate broker, a plaintiff must show that but for the alleged negligent acts of the broker he either:(1) would have been able to obtain a better deal in the underlying transaction; or (2) would have been better off by walking away from the underlying transaction. The Court concluded that the Sellers here failed to present evidence of damages because they did not establish beyond mere speculation they suffered a financial loss because of the transactional brokers' professional negligence. View "Gibbons v. Ludlow" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether Denver could properly use quantified transmountain lawn irrigation return flows (LIRFs) as a substitute supply of water for its Civil Action (C.A.)3635 exchanges. The Court held that that properly quantified transmountain LIRFs are legally indistinguishable from reusable transmountain effluent and, therefore, the water court correctly determined that Denver could use its properly quantified transmountain LIRFs as substitute supply for the appropriative rights of exchange in C.A. 3635. In addition, the Court affirmed the water court's holding that junior appropriators could not claim injury premised solely upon the proper operation of the C.A. 3635 exchanges. View "Denver v. Englewood" on Justia Law

Cherokee Metropolitan District intervened in a lawsuit to try to minimize the loss of its water rights to some of its wells. In a separate legal malpractice action, Cherokee sued its former attorneys James Felt and James Culichia, and their firm Felt, Monson & Culichia, LLC (collectively "FMC"), alleging that FMC's negligence led to the eventual loss of those water rights. FMC sought to intervene in the water rights action, arguing that intervention was necessary in order to minimize damages it may have suffered in the legal malpractice case. The water court denied FMC's motion to intervene. FMC appealed. The Supreme Court found that despite taking opposite sides in the malpractice action, Cherokee and FMC shared an identical interest in the underlying water rights litigation. Because FMC did not made a compelling showing that Cherokee could not adequately represent the interest that it shared with Cherokee, the Court affirmed the water court's denial of FMC's motion to intervene as of right. Similarly, the Court dismissed FMC's appeal of the water court's denial of FMC's motion for permissive intervention because the water court did not abuse its discretion. View "Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Felt, Monson & Culichia LLC" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court answered a question of Colorado law certified from the United States Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiffs were landowners who owned property abutting a former railroad right-of-way. The United States authorized the right-of-way to be used as a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails System Act ("Rails-to-Trails" Act). The issue before the federal court was whether the United States took property for which Plaintiffs should have received compensation. The Colorado Court determined that the centerline presumption was a common law rule of conveyance that presumed a grantor who conveyed land abutting a right-of-way intended to convey land to the center of the right-of-way and absent a contrary intent on the face of the conveyance. Therefore, while the Court held that the centerline presumption applied to railroad rights-of-way, it also held that, to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of a railroad right-of-way, an adjacent landowner must produce evidence that his or her title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. View "Asmussen v. United States" on Justia Law

The Arapahoe County Sheriff's Department received a call from R. Talent, who claimed to have spotted his stolen van in the driveway of a house that was later determined to be Defendant Lance Brunsting's residence. Talent told police that "Lance" was known to carry a gun and was associated with dangerous people who were involved in drugs and who were known to carry guns. Concerned with the report of guns at the residence, the Sheriff dispatched five deputies and a sergeant to the location. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deputies' violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, or whether their claim of exigent circumstances at the time they were called to the property applied as an exception those rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that exigent circumstances existed when the deputies entered the curtilage of Defendant's residence, the issue of officer safety. With no violation of defendant's rights, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for consideration of other issues defendant raised on appeal. View "Colorado v. Brunsting" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dina Marshall was charged with driving under the influence of drugs, careless driving, and possession of drug paraphernalia after lab urinalysis results revealed she had methamphetamine in her system when she caused a car accident. At trial, the State sought to admit the lab result showing that Marshall had methamphetamine in her urine; over Marshall's objection, the trial court admitted the lab report without the testimony of the lab technician who actually performed the test. Marshall appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the admission of the report did not violate Marshall's right to confront witnesses. The Court found that there was no evidence presented at trial that Marshall possessed drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the Court found that the trial court erroneously denied Marshall's motion for judgment of acquittal on this charge, and reversed the district court's judgment with respect to that charge.View "Marshall v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Kathleen Hopkins retired from the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment. During her period of employment, the Department made contributions to her retirement fund, and once she retired, she began taking retirement payments from that fund. Later, she went to work for the Department again. When she was laid off from this second period of employment, she applied for and was awarded unemployment benefits. Benefits were discontinued and she was issued a notice of overpayment. She appealed the notice and a hearing officer restored her benefits. The Department appealed, and a panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) reversed the hearing officer's decision, reasoning that Hopkins was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because her retirement income exceeded the amount of the unemployment. Hopkins appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the offset provision applied only when the employer contributed to the claimant's retirement fund during the base period of employment that made her eligible for unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court and reversed, finding that the offset provision applied any time the employer has contributed to the retirement fund from which the claimant received payments, regardless of when the contributions were made. View "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Colorado Dept. of Labor & Employment" on Justia Law

Defendant Carlos Gallegos pled guilty to attempted sexual assault on a child after admitting to sexually assaulting his live-in-girlfriend's six-year-old daughter. The trial court found that defendant met the relationship criterion of the sexually violent predator (SVP) statute because he established a relationship with the victim primarily to sexually assaulting her. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was the interpretation of "established a relationship" and "promoted a relationship" in the SVP statute. Applying the definition of these phrases to defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse defendant's SVP designation because he had not "established a relationship" with the victim primarily for the purpose of assaulting her because he lived with her and treated her as a stepdaughter preceding the assault.View "Colorado v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

Defendant James Hunter was designated as a sexually violent predator (SVP) following his conviction of second-degree burglary, sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and a crime of violence. The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, but reversed the SVP designation, and remanded the case back to the trial court for specific findings on whether either of defendant's victims were strangers to him, or whether he had established or promoted a relationship with either. On remand, defendant argued he was not a stranger. The trial court found that he was, and designated him an SVP. The issue before the Supreme Court turns on the interpretation of "stranger" in the SVP statute. Upon review, the Court held that "stranger" meant that the offender did not know the victim, or the victim did not know the offender at the time of the offense. On application of "stranger" in the SVP statute to this case, the Court held that the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling designating defendant an SVP.View "Colorado v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Defendant David Uribe-Sanchez was charged with four felonies and two crimes-of-violence sentence enhancers for the sexual assault of a girl who referred to him as "dad." He would be sentenced to 34 years imprisonment and designated a sexually violent predator (SVP). To conclude that defendant satisfied the relationship criteria of the SVP statute, the trial court concluded defendant "promoted" his relationship with the victim primarily to victimize her. The appellate court affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts in this case erred by concluding defendant "promoted a relationship" with the victim when he assaulted her. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of whether the SVP designation was proper under the SVP statute.View "Uribe-Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law