Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Alva Hickerson signed a ten-year promissory note payable to Vessels Oil and Gas Company. Under the terms of the note, the debt was due for full payment in 1999. The holder of the note sued in 2009 for collection of the full, unpaid amount of the debt, plus interest. The six-year statute of limitations would have barred suit after 2005, but the unpaid balance was restarted because a partial payment was deemed a promise to repay the remaining debt. The trial court allowed the laches defense, but the Court of Appeals ruled that Colorado's separation of powers doctrine prohibited a court form applying laches to shorten the filing period. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the separation of powers doctrine did not bar a laches defense to a debt collection action filed within the original or restarted limitations period because laches does not conflict with the statute of limitation. View "Hickerson v. Vessels" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether accrued vacation and sick leave may be considered marital property subject to division under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA). The trial court entered an order dividing the value of the husband's accrued vacation and sick leave as part of the marital estate. The husband appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where a spouse has an enforceable right to be paid for accrued vacation or sick leave, such leave earned during the marriage is marital property for the purposes of the UDMA. Where the value of the leave can be ascertained at the time of dissolution, a trial court should consider such value when equitably dividing the marital estate. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in considering the value of the husband's accrued leave because no competent evidence was presented to establish he had an enforceable right to payment for such leave. View "In re the Marriage of Cardona and Castro" on Justia Law

A Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy was transporting two juveniles from a court hearing. The two were seated in the rear of the transport van, handcuffed. En route, another driver allegedly turned into an intersection without yielding and collided with the transport van. As a result of the collision, the juveniles sustained multiple injuries. The juveniles sued the County, alleging the deputy transporting them was negligent. The County claimed it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the County's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review of the County's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in finding allegations of negligence alone were sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith afforded to law enforcement. The Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Young v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

The parties appealed the water court's decision that holdover directors of a water conservancy district could not continue to act on behalf of the district a year after the expiration of their term. The Supreme Court held that the holdover provision in the Water Conservancy Act allowed for a holdover director to continue to serve as a de jure officer, and did not impose a temporal limit on that director's authority to act on behalf of the district. View "Yellow Jacket Water Conservancy District v. Livingston" on Justia Law

The State challenged the trial court's suppression of evidence taken from defendant Jesse Lee Cunningham's home pursuant to warrant. The trial court ruled that pursuant to Crim. P. 41(e), defendant's motion to suppress required the State to initially go forward with evidence that the seizure was performed pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and that the warrant was legally executed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in that analysis. "Whether a search or seizure is performed pursuant to a warrant or is warrantless, defendant under Crim. P. 41(e) bears the burden of going forward to show that the search or seizure violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." View "Colorado v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider an issue of first impression: whether under the state premises liability statute, the attractive nuisance doctrine applied only to trespassing children but not to licensees or invitees. The Court held that the doctrine permits all children, regardless of classification, to bring a claim for attractive nuisance. This case was remanded for the trial court to consider the merits of the plaintiff's attractive nuisance claim. View "S.W. ex rel. Wacker v. Towers Boat Club, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Neil Roggow of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, based on his unlawful sexual contact with an eight-year-old girl. The court of appeals reversed his conviction, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Roggow was in a position of trust with respect to the victim because he was not charged with her care or supervision when the unlawful acts occurred. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that, for purposes of section 18-3-405.3, a defendant need not be expressly charged with a particular duty or responsibility over the child at the time of the unlawful act in order to occupy a position of trust. The Court concluded that the evidence in this case was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Roggow was in a position of trust with respect to the victim at the time of the unlawful acts. View "Colorado v. Roggow" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the District Court's suppression of Jasim Ramadon's statements obtained from a custodial interrogation. Ramadon is a native of Iraq who the United States military brought to this country for his protection as a teenager. In 2012, the Colorado Springs police brought Ramadon to the police station as part of a sexual assault investigation. The police had information identifying Ramadon as one of the perpetrators in the sexual assault. The trial court found that under the totality of the circumstances, all of Ramadon's statements after minute forty-two of the interrogation tape were impermissibly coerced and involuntary. After viewing the videotape of the interrogation, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's suppression order, however disagreeing with the time of the coercive behavior. The Supreme Court held that starting at minute fifty-four, instead of minute forty-two, was when the interrogating officer told Ramadon that if he did not tell the truth, he would likely be deported to Iraq. The record supported the trial court's conclusion that coercive police conduct during the custodial interrogation played a significant role in inducing Ramadon's inculpatory statements. View "Colorado v. Ramadon" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the District Court's suppression of Defendant Khaled Zadran's statements, which were obtained through a custodial interrogation. The police arrested and interrogated Zadran in the course of an investigation of a suspected drug dealer. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the police officer who interrogated Zadran engaged in coercive conduct sufficient to render Zadran's inculpatory statements involuntary. The trial court found that the interrogating officer made improper implied promises and had a generally coercive demeanor. Thus, the trial court concluded that all of Zadran's statements were involuntary and inadmissible. The Court held that under the totality of the circumstances, that the interrogation was not coercive and the statements were voluntary. View "Colorado v. Zadran" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a final water court order which voided a rule promulgated by the Office of the State Engineer regarding nontributary ground water extracted in the course of coalbed methane (CBM) production and other oil and gas development. The final rules were challenged by owners of vested water rights and citizen groups whose members owned vested water rights. After extensive briefing by the parties, the water court upheld the Final Rules in their entirety except for the "Fruitland Rule," which it invalidated. The water court held that although H.B. 1303 granted authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the Fruitland Rule, the Tribal Rule essentially divested the State Engineer of that authority. The water court also found that the State Engineer had issued an improper "advisory" rule, and thus could not promulgate the Fruitland Rule unless he first obtained a judicial determination of his authority over nontributary ground water underlying the Reservation. The State Engineer, the Tribe, and several Intervenors appealed the water court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule. The Court concluded the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of this authority: it stated on its face that the Final Rules themselves do not form the basis of or "establish" the State Engineer's authority to administer the nontributary ground water within Reservation boundaries. Because the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of his authority, the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule on that ground. Furthermore, the water court also erred in labeling the Fruitland Rule an "advisory" rule and in requiring the State Engineer to obtain a judicial determination that he had authority to administer nontributary ground water within the boundaries of the Reservation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s invalidation of the Fruitland Rule and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dick Wolfe v. Pawnee Well Users, Inc." on Justia Law