Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The court of appeals rejected defendant Lessell Moore's challenge to the validity of his waiver of his right to testify, and upheld his conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing defendant's claim that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and whether contemporaneous objection at trial was required to preserve the issue. The Court concluded the appellate court erred in considering defendant's challenge of his waiver. The Court reaffirmed that a defendant's challenge to his waiver to the right to testify is not subject to review on direct appeal, but only in post-conviction proceedings. Defendant need not make a contemporaneous objection to the trial court's advisement. The Court therefore vacated the court f appeals' decision regarding the validity of the waiver, but upheld the judgment of conviction. View "Moore v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the defendant in this case validly waived his right to a jury trial following the trial court's advisement that failed to substantially comply with Crim. P. 23(a)(5)(II). Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant may not litigate the validity of such a waiver on direct appeal, but must do so in a post-conviction proceeding. Furthermore, the Court held that when evaluating a defendant's waiver to a jury trial, the post-conviction court must determine whether the defendant personally waived the right knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. View "Colorado v. Walker" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court was not required to award presentence confinement credit against a jail term imposed as a condition of probation, if the trial court chose to award credit, it had to do so equal to the full amount of time served. The Supreme Court disagreed with that holding. The Supreme Court concluded that the statutory provision governing presentence confinement credit does not apply to probation, and therefore does not apply to the jail component of a probation sentence. View "Colorado v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case centered on the contested March 19, 2013 election in Center, Colorado. The district court set aside the results of the recall, ordered a new recall election, and allowed the recalled officials to continue until the new election was conducted. The recalled officials challenged the district court's decision, arguing that court erred in setting aside the recall and ordering a new election, and erred in determining that there were flaws in how the votes were counted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall and ordering a new recall election. Accordingly, the Court returned the case back to the district court with directions that judgment be entered that the replacement officials were duly elected. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law

In 2000, Gregory T. Ludlow, S. Reid Ludlow, and Jean E. Cowles entered into an exclusive listing agreement with real estate brokerage firm Gibbons-White, Inc. for the sale of approximately 131 acres of vacant land in Boulder County. Over the next seven years, the Sellers received offers from at least three different buyers to purchase portions of the land; none of the offers resulted in a completed sale. In 2007, Actis, LLC made an offer to purchase half of the land. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter stemmed from that offer. The Court concluded that to sustain a professional malpractice claim against a transactional real estate broker, a plaintiff must show that but for the alleged negligent acts of the broker he either:(1) would have been able to obtain a better deal in the underlying transaction; or (2) would have been better off by walking away from the underlying transaction. The Court concluded that the Sellers here failed to present evidence of damages because they did not establish beyond mere speculation they suffered a financial loss because of the transactional brokers' professional negligence. View "Gibbons v. Ludlow" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether Denver could properly use quantified transmountain lawn irrigation return flows (LIRFs) as a substitute supply of water for its Civil Action (C.A.)3635 exchanges. The Court held that that properly quantified transmountain LIRFs are legally indistinguishable from reusable transmountain effluent and, therefore, the water court correctly determined that Denver could use its properly quantified transmountain LIRFs as substitute supply for the appropriative rights of exchange in C.A. 3635. In addition, the Court affirmed the water court's holding that junior appropriators could not claim injury premised solely upon the proper operation of the C.A. 3635 exchanges. View "Denver v. Englewood" on Justia Law

Cherokee Metropolitan District intervened in a lawsuit to try to minimize the loss of its water rights to some of its wells. In a separate legal malpractice action, Cherokee sued its former attorneys James Felt and James Culichia, and their firm Felt, Monson & Culichia, LLC (collectively "FMC"), alleging that FMC's negligence led to the eventual loss of those water rights. FMC sought to intervene in the water rights action, arguing that intervention was necessary in order to minimize damages it may have suffered in the legal malpractice case. The water court denied FMC's motion to intervene. FMC appealed. The Supreme Court found that despite taking opposite sides in the malpractice action, Cherokee and FMC shared an identical interest in the underlying water rights litigation. Because FMC did not made a compelling showing that Cherokee could not adequately represent the interest that it shared with Cherokee, the Court affirmed the water court's denial of FMC's motion to intervene as of right. Similarly, the Court dismissed FMC's appeal of the water court's denial of FMC's motion for permissive intervention because the water court did not abuse its discretion. View "Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Felt, Monson & Culichia LLC" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court answered a question of Colorado law certified from the United States Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiffs were landowners who owned property abutting a former railroad right-of-way. The United States authorized the right-of-way to be used as a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails System Act ("Rails-to-Trails" Act). The issue before the federal court was whether the United States took property for which Plaintiffs should have received compensation. The Colorado Court determined that the centerline presumption was a common law rule of conveyance that presumed a grantor who conveyed land abutting a right-of-way intended to convey land to the center of the right-of-way and absent a contrary intent on the face of the conveyance. Therefore, while the Court held that the centerline presumption applied to railroad rights-of-way, it also held that, to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of a railroad right-of-way, an adjacent landowner must produce evidence that his or her title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. View "Asmussen v. United States" on Justia Law

The Arapahoe County Sheriff's Department received a call from R. Talent, who claimed to have spotted his stolen van in the driveway of a house that was later determined to be Defendant Lance Brunsting's residence. Talent told police that "Lance" was known to carry a gun and was associated with dangerous people who were involved in drugs and who were known to carry guns. Concerned with the report of guns at the residence, the Sheriff dispatched five deputies and a sergeant to the location. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deputies' violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, or whether their claim of exigent circumstances at the time they were called to the property applied as an exception those rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that exigent circumstances existed when the deputies entered the curtilage of Defendant's residence, the issue of officer safety. With no violation of defendant's rights, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for consideration of other issues defendant raised on appeal. View "Colorado v. Brunsting" on Justia Law